Vol. 3, No. 1 Spring 2003

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EDITOR'S NOTE

Sociobiology and the End of Racial Egalitarianism — TOQ Editors 3

ARTICLES

The Importance of Spearman's *g* as a Psychometric, Social, and Educational Construct — Harrison Kane and Chris Brand 7

Pan-European Genetic Interests — Michael Rienzi 31

Social Darwinism: The Development of an Intellectual Mood — Louis Andrews 45

Racial Differences in Intelligence: The Evolution of One Person's Views — Lawrence Auster 61

BOOK REVIEWS

The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature — Reviewed by Jared Taylor 73

The Outline of Sanity
Economism and the National Prospect
The Free Press — Reviewed by Samuel Francis 83

The Funding of Scientific Racism
Intelligence, Race, and Genetics — Reviewed by Kevin Lamb 89

At the Hands of Persons Unknown — Reviewed by Dwight D. Murphey 99

About the Editors 103

Editorial Advisory Board 104

The Occidental Quarterly (ISSN 1539-3925), a journal of Western thought and opinion, is published by The Charles Martel Society four times annually in the Fall, Winter, Spring, and Summer. Unsolicited manuscripts from contributing authors should be submitted to the editorial department address: P.O. Box 695, Mt. Airy, MD 21771. Style sheets are available upon request. Subscriptions in the U.S. are $40 annually, $78 for two years, and $114 for three years; subscription rates for Canada $45 (first year), $88 (two years), and $129 (three years); European subscription rates: $60 (first year), $118 (two years) $174 (three years). All subscriptions including additional inquiries or subscription problems should be mailed to the subscription department: P.O. Box 3462 Augusta, GA 30914. Back issues are $10 per issue.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Lost Philosopher

The Best of
Anthony M. Ludovici

EDITED BY
JOHN V. DAY

In the first decades of the twentieth century, Anthony Mario Ludovici (1882-1971) was one of Britain's most celebrated intellectuals.

One of the first and most accomplished translators of Nietzsche into English and a leading exponent of Nietzsche's thought, Ludovici was also an original philosopher in his own right.

Without a graduate degree or university professorship (indeed, without any need of them), Ludovici went over the heads of academia and directly addressed the educated public, supporting himself entirely by his writings.

In nearly forty books, including eight novels, and dozens of shorter works, Ludovici set forth his views on metaphysics, religion, ethics, politics, economics, the sexes, health, eugenics, art, modern culture, and current events with a clarity, wit, and fearless honesty that made him famous.

After World War II, however, Ludovici fell rapidly into obscurity. Why? Because Ludovici was a passionate, principled defender of aristocracy and conservatism and a fierce, uncompromising critic of egalitarianism in all its manifestations: Christianity, liberalism, Marxism, socialism, feminism, multiculturalism, crass commercialism, a debased popular culture, and the denial of biological differences between individuals and races, as well as the envious hobbling of the gifted and the sentimental coddling of the mediocre and botched.

Thanks to this volume, however, the lost philosopher has been found again, and far from seeming antiquated, his ideas are even more radical, relevant, and challenging in our day than in his own.

The Lost Philosopher collects Ludovici's thoughts on nine topics—Religion, Conservatism, Liberalism, Men and Women, Eugenics, Health, Education, Economics, and Art—in the hope that our times might catch up to Ludovici's philosophy.

Praise for *The Lost Philosopher:*

"Of all unjustly ignored authors, Anthony M. Ludovici is certainly the one who today most deserves to be remembered. In his works, as imposing in quantity as in quality, this profoundly original philosopher never ceased to offer opinions on the most various subjects (from religion and education to art, eugenics, and the relations between the sexes) that are perfectly opposed to contemporary 'political correctness.' Even those who will disapprove of his remarks will be able to recognize their prescient character. For collecting in this volume the most significant pages of Ludovici's works, John V. Day without a doubt deserves the gratitude of all free spirits."—Alain de Benoist, author of *On Being a Pagan* (Ultra, 2004)

Ordering Information:

ISBN 0-9746264-0-6
Cloth edition limited to 500 numbered copies.
v + 305 pages.
Printed on acid free paper.

Price: $30.00
California Residents: Add 7.75% sales tax
(for a total of $32.33).
U.S. Orders: Add $5.00 for postage.
Foreign orders: Add $10.00 for postage (Air Mail).
Send check or money order made payable to ETSF to:

ETSF
1678 Shattuck Ave, #330
Berkeley, CA 94709-1631
USA

www.etsf.org
lostphilosopher@etsf.org

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Editor's Note

Sociobiology and the End of Racial Egalitarianism

More than a quarter of a century has passed since the publication of Edward O. Wilson's landmark text *Sociobiology*.[1] The book's emphasis on genetic influences on within-group social behavior and its linkage of kinship and biology to man's behavioral norms inspired a scientific revolution—one that fused together critical strands of the biological and social sciences, even though only the last chapter addressed these issues as they pertained to mankind. This theoretical construct, grounded upon the careful study of kin selection, altruism, and group evolutionary behavior, signaled the beginning of a paradigmatic shift whereby the influence of biology in shaping human nature was once again recognized. Kin-based altruism has profound implications for explaining social cooperation and group cohesion among cultures, races, and tribes.

Wilson's book ignited a firestorm of protests. Egalitarian ideologues in the social and behavioral sciences vigorously attacked Wilson and have over the years tried to discredit sociobiology and its offshoots. These ideological critics have intuitively understood the tenuousness of the assumptions that underlie what psychologist Henry E. Garrett, former chairman of the psychology department at Columbia University, once termed "The Equalitarian Dogma." Garrett predicted that this modern dogma would eventually unravel and become exposed "as the scientific hoax of the [twentieth] century."[2] The doctrine of human equality—that races, cultures, and individuals have equal genetic potential for intelligence and other traits valued in human societies—has not only unraveled but has been thoroughly demolished as a viable theory of human nature. As Garrett Hardin recently argued, "No two Human Beings are created equal."[3] Individual, and thus racial, inequality is simply an iron law of nature.

Although sociobiologists have for the most part soft-pedaled the matter of race and ethnicity, the persistence of group differences has undermined the fable that all races and ethnic groups are created equal. Despite overlaps in the trait distributions for IQ and other valued traits, there are large and persistent differences between races and ethnic groups in the ability to create and adapt

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to the advanced civilizations of the modern world. Ethnic group competition merely confirms the maxim that people are inherently unequal. A few innovative researchers are beginning to connect the strands between the biological and social realm through their examinations of the role that ethnic and racial differences play in economic, social, cultural, and political endeavors. The research of Dr. Frank Salter, political ethologist at the Max Planck Institute, is plowing important new ground by drawing together findings from ethological research and fitting data on ethnic group competition into a comparative political framework. Mike Rienzi's article in this issue highlights the implications of Salter's work.

Human inequality in general, and racial inequality in particular, is the overarching theme that connects the articles and reviews in this issue. From Spearman's *g* factor to the historical threads of Social Darwinism, each contribution touches upon some facet of this natural condition of human existence. One of the primary objectives of *The Occidental Quarterly* remains the critical re-evaluation of racial egalitarianism, and in particular to examine the possible political consequences of the latest research in various academic fields—from physical anthropology to population genetics and behavior genetics to sociobiology—in order to end the ironclad dominance of what might well be the most destructive social dogma among the utopian ideologies.

In his 1998 book *Consilience*, Wilson put his finger on a disturbing trend that should concern all who value their own racial and ethnic survival:

> The big story in recent human evolution is not directional change, not natural selection at all, but homogenization through immigration and interbreeding. Populations have been in flux throughout history. Tribes and states have pressed into and around the territories of rivals, often absorbing these neighbors, occasionally extinguishing them altogether. The historical atlases of Europe and Asia, when their pages are flipped chronologically through five millennia, become film clips of changing ethnic boundaries....
>
> The mixing sharply accelerated when Europeans conquered the New World and transported African slaves to its shores. Homogenization took a smaller leap in the nineteenth century with the European colonization of Australia and Africa. In more recent times it has quickened yet again through the spread of industrialization and democracy, the two signature traits of modernity that render people restless and international borders porous. Most human populations remain differentiated on a geographical basis, and some ethnic enclaves will probably endure for centuries more, but the trend in the opposite direction is unmistakably strong. It is also irreversible....Its main consequence is the gradual erasure of previous racial differences—those statistical differences in hereditary traits that distinguish whole populations....
>
> Continued over tens or hundreds of generations the present rates of emigration and intermarriage could in theory eliminate all population differences around the world.[4]

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Wilson overlooks the obvious implication of this for Europeans: These trends mean a catastrophic loss of biological fitness for European populations. Since World War II, immigration has been almost exclusively by non-Europeans immigrating to lands that have historically been controlled and populated by Europeans. For nations with a large European-majority population, the reality of these racial and ethnic demographic trends, aggravated by the ongoing rates of emigration and intermarriage, presents some of the most difficult problems to surmount. It will require new ways of thinking about the future of nation-states, devolution, and the likely balkanization of peoples into ethno-states and ethno-political enclaves. We should remember and take seriously the dire warnings of the distinguished geneticist F.A.E. Crew:

> The modern civilized peoples come of an ancestry that has been passed repeatedly through the fine meshes of the sieve of civilization, those individuals and those stocks whose mental abilities fitted them for the discipline of civilization passed through: those which have refused to accommodate themselves to the demands of changing social orders have been rejected and eliminated. The destiny of a race is determined by its genetic composition....Race-preservation, not self-preservation, has been the first law of nature and, among all organisms, the race is of paramount importance, its perpetuation and welfare being cared for by the strongest instincts. In many species reproduction means the death of the individual. Even among the higher organisms, the strongest of all the instincts are those connected with reproduction, but in the human, intellect and freedom interfere with instinct; the reproductive instinct is not only controlled by reason, as it should be, but is commonly thwarted and perverted. If the demand for individual freedom blinds men to their racial obligations, then the decadence and extinction of their lines must inevitably follow. The best use a man can make of his freedom is to place limitations upon it.[5]

The future survival of Western civilization hinges on the continued existence of Western peoples; the challenge of future generations is to establish social and political structures that maximize their own group interests while respecting the legitimate interests of other groups.

End Notes

1. Edward O. Wilson, *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975).

2. Henry E. Garrett, "The Equalitarian Dogma," *Perspectives in Biology and Medicine* (Summer 1961), pp. 480-484.

3. Garrett Hardin, *The Ostrich Factor: Our Population Myopia* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 109.

4. Edward O. Wilson, *Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge* (New York, NY: Knopf, 1998), pp. 272-273.

5. F.A.E. Crew, *Organic Inheritance in Man* (Edinburgh, UK: Oliver and Boyd, 1927), pp. 137, 177.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Right Now!

A magazine of politics, ideas and culture

Britain's most outspoken magazine

Since 1993, *Right Now!* has been thinking the unthinkable and saying the unsayable with panache and style.

Our combination of respected interviewees and contributors, uncensored but thoughtful articles, international news, cutting gossip and arts coverage has earned us friends and enemies across the world.

Isn't it time you read the magazine everyone's talking about? Send for your free sample copy today.

Dept OQ,
Box 361,
78 Marylebone High Street,
London,
W1U 5AP,
United Kingdom.

***Telephone*:**
+44 1507 339 056

***E-mail*:**
rightnow@
compuserve.com

***Internet*:**
www.right-now.org

It's time for change

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Importance of Spearman's *g*

as a psychometric, social, and educational construct

Harrison Kane and Chris Brand

Abstract

Since its discovery in 1904, the general factor of intelligence (*g*) has generated considerable controversy. A historical review reveals that *g* has survived the scrutiny of psychometricians, educators, and politicians who simply wish that its importance in explaining individual and group differences would disappear. However, even in an atmosphere of political correctness, *g* survives as a robust variable explaining educational and societal attainment. In their efforts to control educative and societal outcomes, policy makers and educators commit an injustice in their active disavowal of such an important psychological construct.

Four thousand years ago, the Chinese were the first to use written mental tests in order to predict performance. Civil servants were administered standardized tests, which included measures of mathematical ability, nonverbal reasoning, and reading comprehension. Ironically, the Chinese ended this practice in 1905, the same year Alfred Binet introduced the first standardized test designed to measure the construct most psychologists and educators long identified as intelligence.

Robert Thorndike (1997) pointed to two historical influences in the development of measures of intelligence. First, in the late nineteenth century, universal education became a reality. Prior to this time, only a select few in the upper strata of society attended school. Intelligence testing became a means of ensuring that educational resources were allocated to those students who could most benefit; in particular, it helped remove genuinely dull children from normal classes. Second, in the work of Wundt, Fechner, and Galton there appeared the growing belief that individual differences in cognitive ability could be empirically quantified. Previously, scientists had relied on qualitative techniques such as introspection to gain insight into the workings of the human mind. The quantification of the mind established psychology as a science, with intelligence tests as the primary instrument for measuring cognitive ability.

Many theories of intelligence have been offered through the years. However, most have not endured the rigors of empirical scrutiny. Because they lend themselves so readily to statistical review, factor analytic theories offer the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

most promise to researchers and educators hoping to explain the structure and nature of intelligence. The following presents an overview of key psychometric theories of intelligence and outlines the important contribution of the general factor of intelligence in explaining individual differences.

Exploratory Factor Analysis and Theories of Intelligence

Charles Spearman invented factor analysis in 1904 as part of an experiment to "find out whether, as Galton has indicated, the abilities commonly taken to be intellectual had any correlation with each other or with sensory discrimination" (Spearman, 1927, p. 322). Spearman obtained teacher evaluations of 36 students from a village school. Students were rated on the usual academic subjects (Latin, English, and math) as well as music and pitch discrimination. The observed correlation between the variables prompted Spearman to hypothesize that the variables shared a common source of variance, which he termed a "general factor of intelligence" (Spearman, 1904, p. 36). From the observation that variables had different levels of intercorrelation, he concluded that the variables had different levels of saturation with the general factor, which he called *g* (distinguishing little *g* from the big *G* of Newtonian gravity). The different levels of saturation represented different loadings on the general factor.

Spearman-Holzinger Model

It was manifest to Spearman that *g* did not account for all the variance in students' scores. Therefore, he posited a two-factor theory of intelligence. That is, each variable may be described as involving two factors, *g* and a factor specific to the variable. (Figure 1 depicts the Spearman-Holzinger model of intelligence.)

Spearman devoted the rest of his academic career to explicating the general factor, which he later referred to as *g*. He conceived of *g* as "mental energy," and stated that it was the "leading part of intelligence, and is displayed by the ability to handle not merely abstract ideas, but above all symbols" (p. 211). Later, working from several data sets collected over twenty years, he evolved the idea that *g* consisted of three processes. The first process is "the apprehension of experience." Spearman assumed, as did Galton, that the greater the sphere of experiences an individual can draw upon, the more complex is the problem solving that he can undertake. The second process is the "eduction of relationships." Spearman conceived of eduction as the "drawing out of a logical relationship between two stimuli" (p. 227). The third process is the "eduction of correlates," in which an individual notes the similarities between two stimuli. A cognitive task was loaded on *g* to the extent that it drew on these three processes. Although Spearman recognized that *g* may not account for all the variance in a matrix of scores, he preferred to emphasize *g* as the explanatory factor in intelligence.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THURSTONE'S MODEL OF PRIMARY ABILITIES

Advances in statistical methods permitted empirical tests of Spearman's theory. In 1938, Thurstone administered a large battery of paper and pencil tests to 240 student volunteers from the University of Chicago. Using orthogonal rotation techniques to reduce the matrix of scores to a simple structure, Thurstone identified seven factors, which he termed "primary abilities." He labeled the factors as S (Space), P (Perceptual Speed), N (Number Facility), V (Verbal Relations), M (Memory), I (Induction), and W (Word Fluency). Thurstone commented:

> So far in our work we have not found the general factor of Spearman, but our methods do not preclude it. The presence of a general factor could be indicated by a large part of the communality of each test that remains unaccounted for by the common factors identified in a simple structure. So far we have found no conclusive evidence for a general factor. (p. 7)

Thus, Thurstone offered a theory of intelligence that did not accommodate a general factor. (Figure 2 offers a Thurstonian portrait of intelligence.) Carroll (1993) criticized Thurstone for his exclusive use of orthogonal rotation, when oblique rotation would have shown many of his primary abilities to be correlated, indicating the presence of a general factor at the second order. Several researchers (e.g., Carroll, 1993) have re-analyzed Thurstone's data using various combinations of oblique and orthogonal rotation, and in most studies the variance of test scores appears evenly distributed between *g* and different combinations of group factors. Therefore, Thurstone's emphasis on group factors in explaining individual differences in intelligence may be justified, as long as they are held in equal regard to *g*.

GUILFORD'S STRUCTURE OF INTELLECT MODEL

Throughout his esteemed career, Thurstone's emphasis on primary abilities influenced many of students. He and his wife, Thelma, constructed many tests designed specifically to identify and expand the number of group factors associated with cognitive ability. Ekstrom (1979) summarized several of these studies and confirmed dozens of group and primary factors. The most fervent advocate of Thurstonian methods was J.P. Guilford at the University of Southern California. In an extensive series of studies spanning more than two decades, Guilford's Aptitude Research Project expanded Thurstone's primary abilities into the Structure of Intellect (SOI) model. Guilford largely employed a centroid method to condense each correlation matrix, and thereby carried factorization to the extreme. Guilford identified large numbers of factors, always guided by the reasonable assumption that under-factorization may lead to composite factors that cloud the true relationship between variables.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Unlike Spearman and Thurstone, whose studies converged toward a hierarchical model of intelligence, Guilford's approach was taxonomic. In the SOI model, each factor consisted of three facets or parameters. The three facets were labeled content, operation, and product. Guilford (1967) identified four kinds of content, five types of operations, and six kinds of product, yielding 120 possible factors. (Figure 3 depicts Guilford's SOI model.) Guilford's SOI model completely disavowed the possibility of *g*, which by the 1960s had become equated for the London School [an English dominated group of researchers identified by their empirically driven, biologically grounded theory of intelligence whose ranks included Galton, Spearman, Burt, Cattell, Thomson, Eysenck, and Vernon as well as Jensen] with the biological basis of intellect (see Eysenck & Kamin, 1981). Therefore, Guilford's SOI model gained wide acceptance, especially with educators and social environmentalists who considered the possibility of a biologically based general factor unpalatable.

Cronbach and Snow (1977) criticized the SOI model on several grounds. First, the SOI model is unnecessarily complex, violating the rules of parsimony. Second, Guilford utilized orthogonal rotation methods, even when data and previous research clearly demanded oblique rotation. Third, Cronbach and Snow were unable to replicate Guilford's results upon re-analysis, prompting them to question the reliability of his instruments. Although Guilford (1985) later revised the SOI model to address these shortcomings, Carroll (1993) rejected the SOI model outright, terming it "fundamentally defective" (p. 59). Despite his vehement rejection of the SOI model, Carroll certainly found some merit in Guilford's approach. In his survey of factor analytic studies of cognitive abilities, Carroll (1993) references Guilford sixty-two times, more than any other researcher, including Carroll himself; but Carroll is very far from coming to Guilfordian conclusions.

Cattell and Horn's Model of Fluid and Crystallized Intelligence

The eminent psychologist Raymond B. Cattell was a student of Spearman; therefore, it is no surprise that he took intelligence seriously. In 1943, Cattell proposed that human intelligence is composed of two separate yet complementary factors. The first is fluid intelligence (g_f), reflecting basic reasoning abilities. The second is crystallized intelligence (g_c), indicating an individual's learning from experience (though not from specific instruction). Crystallized intelligence depends, in part, on fluid intelligence. A student of Cattell, John Horn, empirically tested the g_f/g_c theory in his doctoral dissertation in 1965. His use of Thurstonian methods not only proved the g_f/g_c dichotomy, but also disclosed six additional second-order factors, including Visualization (g_v), Working Memory Capacity (g_m), and Perceptual Speed (g_{ps}). Gustafsson (1989) has used the modern factorial method LISREL and confirmed the g_c/g_f model of intelligence clearly identifying a general factor (*g*) which is strongly related to g_c and is very close to g_f.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The g_c /g_f theory presents the first true hierarchical model of intelligence and cognitive abilities. (Figure 4 is a graphic illustration of the Horn-Cattell model of intelligence.)

CARROLL'S THREE-STRATUM THEORY

In 1993, John B. Carroll undertook the massive task of re-analyzing and summarizing more than 400 high-quality data sets related to intelligence and cognitive ability. Data sets were especially selected on the basis of their broad sampling of cognitive abilities. Carroll's summary led him to posit his own theory of intelligence, a hierarchical model with three *strata* of abilities. The first stratum consists in part of narrow abilities that appear reflective of specific experiences, learning, and strategies. Examples from the first stratum include length estimation and meaningful memory. The second stratum is characterized by broad factors that represent some specialization of abilities and established traits, such as broad retrieval ability and speed of information processing. The third stratum is essentially Spearman's *g*. (Figure 5 provides a graphical representation of the proposed three-strata structure of cognitive abilities.)

DAS-NAGLIERI PASS THEORY

The Planning, Attention, Simultaneous, and Successive (PASS) theory of intelligence is the most recent factor-analytically based theory of intelligence offered to the educational and psychological community and attempts to explain individual differences within a cognitive processing framework (Naglieri, 1989). The PASS model evolved from the work of Russian psychologist A.R. Luria. According to Luria (1973), human cognitive processing involves three functional units, which work in concert, and are "necessary for any type of mental activity" (p. 43). Each functional unit is associated with a particular part of the human brain. The first unit is responsible for regulating attention and arousal. Proper states of arousal and attention are necessary for optimal mental performance (Ormrod, 1996). This first unit is associated with the brain stem, diencephalon, and medial regions of the brain. The second functional unit is responsible for simultaneous and successive processing of information. Simultaneous processing involves the integration of stimuli into groups or clusters with common characteristics. Conversely, successive processing involves the integration of stimuli into a particular series where the elements have a hierarchical or chain-like progression. The second functional unit is associated with the occipital, parietal, and temporal lobes posterior to the central sulcus. The third functional unit performs meta-cognitive duties forming, executing, and evaluating plans of action. This third functional unit is associated with the frontal lobes. These three functional units operate in concert within the context of an individual's knowledge base. In theory, the PASS processes work in concert to solve and complete nearly all tasks encountered in everyday life (Das & Naglieri, 1997).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Processes are allocated according to the demands of the task; the individual's preferences, experiences, and motivation; and the influences of the immediate environment. Naglieri and Das operationalized the PASS model in their Cognitive Assessment System (CAS; 1997). (Figure 6 portrays the PASS model.)

Noticeably absent from the PASS model is an overarching general factor. However, independent confirmatory research (Kranzler & Weng, 1995) finds that the PASS model is inadequate in explaining variance in test scores. A hierarchical general factor is in fact needed. Ironically, the PASS tests were actually deemed to provide a superior measure of *g*: Kranzler and Weng reported, "the *g* of the PASS tests accounted for considerably more variance than the *g* of conventional IQ tests." (p. 154).

To *g* or Not to *g*, That Is The Question: The Existence of Spearman's *g*

Spearman's *g*, through custom and empirical evidence, has become the ubiquitous cornerstone of empirically based theories of intelligence. It is the reference point for most studies conducted over the past ninety years. Every factor analytic study of cognitive ability has yielded a *g*, provided the data were analyzed in such a manner as to allow a general factor to materialize. The notion of Spearman's *g* is surrounded by social, scientific, and political controversy. Therefore, a brief description of this ubiquitous general factor seems appropriate in any discussion of intelligence.

Spearman's *g* is a latent variable which apparently becomes manifest in factor analysis. The ubiquity of *g* arises from the positive manifold: the phenomenon that all mental tests correlate to some degree. Therefore, statistical and methodological considerations determine, at least in part, how "good" *g* will be in a factor analysis (Jensen & Weng, 1993). To find a good *g*, the psychological tests must be diverse with respect to content, type of response, and problem. Certainly, psychometric *g* will vary according to the reliability of the test, the number of tests, the range of participants in the sample, and the number of diverse abilities represented by the tests. However, not every general factor that arises from a factor analysis is Spearman's *g*. For example, conventional personality questionnaires do not yield a *g*. Psychometric *g* arises from a battery of cognitive tests.

Although some tests, such as Raven's Progressive Matrices, are referenced as being saturated with *g* (Jensen, 1994), every cognitive test measures *g* to some extent. There is no uniquely defining characteristic to *g* that can be expressed in psychological terms, though psychologists of the London School continue to present data showing the centrality of mental speed. Recently, Wisconsin researchers reported that inspection time (IT) performance correlated 0.63 with fluid *g* in 40 college students having a mean fluid IQ of 106; correction for restriction of IQ range (only 86-123) made the true correlation 0.74, and the researchers concluded the IT-IQ link did not just arise from visuo-spatial

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

abilities (Osmon & Jackson, 2002). Tests differing in content, stimulus modality, and response modality can have identical *g*-loadings (Jensen, 1998), but the speed with which people can take in simple information has proved the most remarkable measure of a "basic" process that correlates strongly with *g*, especially in the low- and mediocre-IQ ranges (Brand, Constales, & Kane, in press).

Factor analysis is a statistical method of minimizing the number of variables under investigation while concomitantly maximizing the amount of information in the analysis (Gorsuch, 1983). This aspect of factor analysis is especially useful when the sheer amount of information in a study exceeds comprehensibility, or when certain distinctions and relationships between variables are hypothesized. Spearman regarded *g* as the "common and essential element in intelligence" (1904, p. 126).

In a comprehensive review of intelligence and theory, Brody (1992) confirms "contemporary knowledge is congruent with this belief. Contemporary psychometric analysis provides clear support for a theory that assigns fluid ability, or *g*, to a singular position at the apex of a hierarchy of abilities" (p. 349). Psychometric *g* outweighs all other factors derived from a battery of tests. It is the single most important factor in predicting scholastic and occupational achievement, as well as a host of desirable and undesirable social outcomes (Brand, 1996b, 1996c). The *g* factor is the best predictor of upward social mobility and occupational success, especially in occupations of any complexity; it is the best predictor of romantic compatibility, for people prefer partners of similar intelligence; and low levels of *g* are the best psychological predictors of delinquency in boys and out-of-wedlock births in girls.

In IQ data from around one hundred countries, Lynn and Vanhanen (2002) find that *g* and Gross Domestic Product correlate at around 0.65, a very high correlation in social science. In line with this finding, Lynn & Vanhanen's data also show a racial link. Of the world's twenty-one countries which steadily tripled their Gross Domestic Product from 1983 through 1990 and 1993 to 1996, not one was on the African mainland; whereas of the twenty-seven countries whose GDP decreased by 50% or more, ten were African (Angola, Burkina Faso, Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Madagascar, Somalia, Sudan, Zambia, and Sao Tome & Principe). [The consensus of modern work is that the average IQ in sub-Saharan Africa is not much above 70 (e.g., Rushton & Skuy, 2000).]

However, *g* is not without critics, and a number of researchers have mounted theoretical and implicit arguments to challenge its existence. As noted earlier, Guilford (1967) and Thurstone (1938) objected to the feasibility of *g* on theoretical grounds. Their positions presented genuine theoretical challenges to the actuality of psychometric *g*. To their credit, both Guilford and Thurstone submitted their respective theories to rigorous investigation (e.g., Carroll, 1968; Guilford, 1967; Spearman, 1941; Thurstone, 1938). As evidence mounted favoring the existence of a general factor, Guilford (1985) and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Thurstone (1947) willingly conceded the likelihood of *g*. Finally, the work of Gustafsson (1989) and Carroll (1993) settled matters for all who respect empirical factoring. As Blaha and Wallbrown (1982) once observed of the most famous test of mental abilities, the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (which uses a mixture of verbal, numerical, and diagrammatic problems), the *g* factor typically accounts for some three times as much variance as all other mental ability factors put together. However, most of the contemporary opponents of *g* are not prepared to accept the method of sampling populations with a good range of reliable tests and objectively factoring the results.

At Harvard University, Howard Gardner (1983) has renounced *g* in favor of a theory of multiple intelligences. Gardner's theory includes linguistic, musical, logical-mathematical, spatial, bodily-kinesthetic, and personal intelligences. These competencies may be viewed as building blocks from which behavior and actions develop. In his introductory text to the theory, *Frames of Mind*, Gardner gives his rationale for emphasizing multiple intelligences over a general factor:

> I cannot accept these correlations at face value. Nearly all the current tests are so devised as to call principally on linguistic and logical faculties…the truth is that we do not yet know how far various intelligences (or as I would now say, instantiations of various intelligences) actually correlate if at all. (p. 10)

Gardner offers no logical explanation for his rejection of *g*. In fact, a closer reading of the quotation indicates that Gardner acknowledges his intelligences are not separate constructs, but interrelated. Therefore, a general factor exists even in the context of his multiple intelligences. Gardner's own research on his theory is sparse, and usually does not support the notion of multiple intelligences, despite his heavy-handed spin of the data. For example, a recent study from his Project Zero at Harvard University consisted of forty-two children who completed tests designed to measure each of his multiple intelligences (Adams, 1993). The null hypothesis that all scores were uncorrelated with each other was rejected, indicating the presence of an underlying general factor that could account for a substantial part of the variance in test scores.

Akin to Gardner's claims of various intelligences independent of a general factor are Robert J. Sternberg's assertions of "practical intelligence," "tacit intelligence," and "creative intelligence." Much like Gardner, Sternberg's primary method of addressing the actuality of *g* is to ignore it. Investigations of his proposed constructs (e.g., Sternberg & Wagner, 1986) typically include poorly defined variables, small samples restricted in range of talent, misleading statistics (e.g., the use of R^2 instead of R as a measure of predictive efficiency), and analyses that may virtually preclude the manifestation of a general factor (Ree & Earles, 1993).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Perhaps the most cited critic of *g* was the late Harvard biologist, Stephen J. Gould. His 1981 text, *The Mismeasure of Man*, is still widely known for its strident condemnation of *g*, as well as its personal attacks on many researchers who choose to study a general factor of intelligence. The book was well received by the general public, winning the National Book Critics Circle award. In 1996, it was re-issued as a refutation to *The Bell Curve* (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994).

The pivotal argument of *The Mismeasure of Man* is that researchers investigating individual differences in intelligence have intentionally and misleadingly reified Spearman's *g*. With immodest effrontery, Gould inaccurately paraphrased many scientists, claiming they view *g* as a "quantifiable thing" and a "single scaleable, fundamental thing residing in the human brain" (p. 259). Gould claimed this *error of reification* resulted in the "hegemony of *g*" (p. 234) as an instrument of bias and discrimination. In his own words:

> This book is about the abstraction of intelligence as a single entity, its location within the brain, its quantification as one number for each individual and the use of these numbers to rank people in a single series of worthiness, invariably to find that oppressed and disadvantaged groups—races, classes, or sexes—are innately inferior and deserve their status. (p. 25)

However, even a cursory reading of Spearman (1904), Burt (1940), and Jensen (1982) confirms that no expert in the field of factor analysis or intelligence has ever considered *g* a "thing" to be found in the human body. Fifty years before the first publication of *The Mismeasure of Man*, Burt (1940) addressed the error of reification in his text *The Factors of the Mind*. From a chapter entitled, "The Metaphysical Status of Mental Factors," Burt warned that "to speak of factors of the mind as if they existed in the same way as, but in addition to, the physical organs and tissues of the body and their properties, is assuredly indefensible and misleading" (p. 218). In a direct response to Gould's misquotations, Jensen (1982) stated:

> In the same chapter from which Gould is supposedly paraphrasing my views, I stated unequivocally that intelligence is not an entity, but a theoretical construct…which is intended to explain an observable phenomenon, normally the positive intercorrelations among all mental tests, regardless of their apparently great variety. (p. 126)

Therefore, Gould himself seems to have been the source of the error of reification, rather than Burt, Spearman, or Jensen. The funny thing is that Gould was quite happy to accept other products of factor analysis, the Thurstone-type multiple factors: it was only *g* that seemed to Gould to involve grievous philosophical error.

A growing body of research suggests that the provenance of *g* may lie not in factor analysis of mental test items, but in genetic and physical variables and in more "basic" psychological processes. Kranzler and Jensen (1991) were able to account for 54% of the variance in IQ scores using a battery of reaction time

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(RT) tasks. Vernon (1990) summarized a number of studies in which measures of *g* were regressed on subjects' RTs derived from multiple elementary cognitive tasks (ECTs). Various combinations of RT variables accounted for 22% to 56% of the variance in participants' IQ scores. Eysenck and Barrett (1985) found a rank order correlation of 0.93 between the *g* loadings of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) and the subtests' correlations with a composite measure of the average evoked potential (AEP). Similarly, Haier (1993) reported an average correlation of -0.79 between WAIS subtest performance and glucose metabolic rate (GMR).

In effect, subjects with high IQs consumed less energy during test performance than subjects with low IQs. In vivo studies utilizing MRI measures of total brain volume have shown correlations averaging 0.40 with IQ (Jensen, 1998). Egan, Wickett, and Vernon (1995) reported a correlation of 0.48 between brain volume and IQ, with weight partialed out and corrected for restriction in range of talent. For a sample of 61 dizygotic twins, Jensen (1994) estimated the correlation between brain size and IQ to be 0.56, controlling for the effects of race, socio-economic status (SES), and environment. A recent study by Jensen and Reed (1992) involving 200 university students found that nerve conduction velocity (NCV) measured in the visual tract (i.e., the distance between the retina and the optic nerve) correlated 0.38 with scores from Raven's Progressive Matrices, a highly *g*-loaded test. In a related paper, Miller (1994) reported that the developmental growth of myelination follows the same trajectory as the growth of mental ability. Because myelin is composed of lipids and cholesterol, Benton (1995) hypothesized that *g* levels may be related to dietary variables. Using a random sample of 7,076 British citizens, Benton found that individuals consuming a high-fat diet had reaction times that were significantly faster than individuals who consumed a low-fat diet. The effect was so pronounced, at the 0.00001 *p*-level, that the RTs of white collar workers consuming low-fat diets were slower than blue collar eating high-fat diets. For most researchers in psychology, Spearman's *g* derives its importance from its behaviorally manifested relationship with educational, economic, and social outcomes. However, these studies and others (e.g., Vernon & Mori, 1990) indicate that *g* is equally grounded in a varied number of physiological and biological processes.

Therefore, far from being a statistical artifact (see Gould, 1981), *g* appears to be a material as much as a mental reality. For many years, Gould and his fellow travelers tried hard to deny that brain size was substantially correlated with IQ and also with racial differences, blacks having smaller brains though larger genitalia than whites and Asians. Especially invoked was the claim of social anthropologist Franz Boas that skull measurements differed considerably between earlier and later European migrants to the United States, suggesting that better nutrition and prenatal care could lead to big improvements in IQ and brain size. But the *New York Times* science

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

correspondent Nicholas Wade reported that Boas's work had been reanalyzed (showing no difference among migrants) and could no longer be taken as a refutation of scientific racism. Apparently skull measurements can yield accurate assignment of race in as many as 80% of cases. (The substantial relations between race, IQ, and brain size were usefully summarized and updated by Rushton, 2002.) As to the "Lynn / Flynn" effect, the worldwide rise in IQ scoring in the twentieth century, this is most obviously handled as a result of increasing test sophistication rather than increasing intelligence: certainly James Flynn himself does not believe that our grandparents bordered on being mentally defective, instead maintaining that they lacked only "open-ended problem solving skills" (see Brand, 1996 and Brand, 2002). Altogether the case for thinking of *g* as firmly biologically based and racially linked remains as strong as any theory in the social sciences.

The Importance of *g* as an Educational and Social Construct

Having established the viability of *g* as a theoretical construct, the next step is to assess *g*'s practical validity. Establishing the practical importance of *g* is crucial if educators and researchers are to accept it as an explanatory concept in psychology. However, this task is not as easy as one would expect. The immutable and biological basis theorized for *g* attracts a host of detractors. Whether from political beliefs, social-environmental doctrines, or egalitarian fancifulness, the social and educational importance of Spearman's *g* is regularly disputed. Noted researchers such as Flynn (1999), Gardner (1983), Ceci (1991), and Fraser (1995) have each tried to diminish *g* as an influential agent in educational and occupational attainment. Yet their criticisms and alternative hypotheses pale in comparison to the empirical support for the very real and practical importance of the general factor. Large-scale meta-analyses reveal that *g* is the primary predictor for occupational success in the U.S. Schmidt, Ones, and Hunter (1992) surveyed the causes of promotability among occupations in the private and public sectors. Their results indicate that *g* is the singular factor offering any predictive validity. Their results also indicate that many skilled and professional jobs have a de facto minimal requirement of *g* for entry. Below certain levels of *g*, it is virtually impossible for an individual to gain access to some occupations (e.g., attorney, teacher, and doctor). Therefore, to a large degree, *g* is related to personal success and economic prosperity.

As detailed in *The Bell Curve* (Hernnstein & Murray, 1994), *g* may also account for a host of undesirable social outcomes. It has long been acknowledged that the average IQ of convicted criminals in the U.S. is on the order of 85. Simply stated, individuals who find themselves adjudicated within the court system have made poor judgments reflective of poor problem-solving ability and low levels of Spearman's *g*. This consideration has some interesting implications beyond the immediate field of psychology. In light of this finding,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

when sociologists consider the robust relationship between IQ and criminality, the sociological problem of "black" or minority criminality becomes a moot point: black crime rates are no higher than what might be expected given the distribution of *g* in the black population (Gordon, 1987). Similarly, Spearman's *g* also casts a new light on the problem of juvenile delinquency. Criminality among youth has often been attributed to a complex constellation of environmental variables such as poor parenting practices, television violence, low SES, and inadequate community resources. The causal role of *g* is rarely examined, despite a wealth of compelling research. For example, Yoshikawa (1994) estimated that 74% of the reported crimes by delinquents were committed by children with IQs between 70 and 100. Impartial minds should find no surprise that group differences in crime rates parallel group differences in intelligence. Herrnstein and Wilson (1986) brought such parallels into sharp focus:

> During the 1960s, one neighborhood in San Francisco had the lowest income, the highest unemployment rate, the least educational attainment, the highest tuberculosis rate, and the highest proportion of substandardized housing. That neighborhood was Chinatown. Yet in 1965, there were only five persons of Chinese ancestry committed to prison in the entire state of California. (p. 86)

Strangely, liberal-minded politicians and sociologists seem to have abandoned affirmative action when it comes to punishing society's most dangerous criminals. Contrary to the notion that blacks are executed more often than whites, the actual data indicate that whites are far more likely to be executed than blacks. In fact, if such proportions were evidenced in the workplace, they would be considered violations of law.

Obviously, *g* is not the sole agent in explaining criminality. Environmental influences often play a detectable part in accounting for desired and undesired societal outcomes, not least in interaction with genetic factors. But genetic factors were unduly played down in post-1945 Western thought (see Pinker, 2002; Brand, 2003), and *g* in particular is certainly more important than most egalitarian researchers would care to admit. This is especially true when active genetic-environmental covariation is considered. People actively select their environments and social settings. Individuals with higher levels of Spearman's *g* may select immediate environments that are conducive to productive and positive social choices, while individuals poorly endowed with *g* may make more destructive personal choices. On a more intimate note, it is a well-accepted finding that individuals seek the friendship and romantic attachment of others with similar *g* levels. Rather than adhering to the chimerical notion that intellectual differences are exotically attractive or inspiring, most people find some comfort in social environments occupied by people similar to themselves in intelligence. From a purely practical standpoint, such cognitive similarity may aid in mutual communication and understanding. The selection of like-minded companionship begins early. Silverman (1993) notes that gifted children often seek the company of children who are older, yet cognitively

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

similar, to themselves. Gross (1994) also documented that trends in assortative mating usually indicate a tendency for adults to choose intellectually similar spouses and friends.

As one would expect, the importance of *g* is most evident in educational settings. Courts and classrooms have struggled valiantly to address the perceived injustice of minority overrepresentation in special education, even going so far as to declare a moratorium on intelligence testing of blacks (e.g., *Larry P. v. Riles*). Several researchers (e.g., Ogbu, 1999) opt to abandon laws of parsimony in search of an unidentified "variable x" that may offer alternative explanations for minority achievement. Such controversies become moot when the impartial mind considers general intelligence instead of skin color. Stated differently, when only general intelligence is considered, black students are not overrepresented in special education classes. Nor are they underrepresented in classes for the gifted. Simple descriptive statistics prove this point. The usual cutoff score for a child to be considered gifted is an IQ of 130, or two standard deviations above the mean IQ of 100. The average IQ of American blacks is 85. Whereas 2% of the white population makes this cutoff, only 0.13% of the black population falls into this category. The implications of *g* are even more dramatic at the opposite end of the intellectual spectrum. Approximately 16% of blacks meet the intellectual criteria for classification as mentally retarded. A wealth of research in education and psychology reveals that children's *g* levels dictate the most appropriate instructional methods. School children with higher levels of *g* grasp content more quickly and are able to generalize beyond the context of the immediate instruction (Brand, 1996). Simply stated, individual differences in *g* account for many of the observed individual differences in achievement. Making his first big mark as a psychometrician-psychologist, A.R. Jensen (1969), in his critique of intervention programs and Head Start, noted

> If diversity of mental abilities…is a basic fact of human nature…and if the idea of universal education is to be successfully pursued, it seems a reasonable conclusion that schools and society must provide a range and diversity of educational methods, programs, goals, and educational opportunities, just as wide as the range of human abilities (p. 117).

The obvious diversity of children's intellectual capacities argues forcefully for ability grouping. Even in the midst of trends favoring smaller class sizes, it is the range of *g* levels of the students that determines the effectiveness of teaching. For example, class sizes in Britain and the U.S. are typically a third of what they were fifty years ago, when homogenous ability grouping (i.e., grouping according to a child's intelligence level) was standard practice. Yet, both nations, favoring heterogeneous ability grouping on the premise of equality of opportunity, document a decline in achievement compared to other nations. The practical reality is that in classrooms of heterogeneous grouping, instruction is oriented to the average learner, consequently placing the most

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and least able students at an educative disadvantage. In effect, the most able students sacrifice valuable instruction time and end up teaching the least able. While philosophical trends among educationists still favor the inclusion of even the most exceptional children into the same academic track (Freytag, 2001), there is good empirical evidence favoring grouping (Brand, 1998). Thus it is no surprise that Britain's moderate "New Labour" government, from 1997, backed "fast track learning" and kindred concepts in the teeth of opposition from educational experts and teachers' unions and produced in 2002 a major national ability-grouping initiative organized by The National Academy for Gifted and Talented Youth at the University of Warwick and linking to several other English universities (http://www.warwick.ac.uk/gifted/about.html).

Philosophers and educationists may say that educational choices are as much a matter of morality as they are of empirical findings: many of them wish to use the schools to provide the egalitarian input to Western society that was once provided by religion. However, when educators neglect *g* in educational grouping and methods, the result is nothing short of educational deprivation for children of many levels of intelligence. Thus to acknowledge the importance of Spearman's *g* is itself both a moral and empirical imperative. To quote Thomas Jefferson, "Nothing is so unequal as the equal treatment of unequal people."

Summary

Various theories of psychometric intelligence offer insights into the nature of cognitive abilities. These theories also provide a means for understanding personal and societal outcomes. Central to any empirically based model of intelligence is the crucial position and function of Spearman's *g* factor. Spearman's *g* routinely accounts for more variance than all other cognitive factors combined, and therefore assumes a position of hierarchical prominence in any model depicting the structure of human cognitive abilities.

Although egalitarians resist the obvious, Western societies are increasingly dependent upon Spearman's *g* as a causal factor in educational and societal outcomes. The relationship of *g* to occupational and educational attainment is so large as to effectively stratify society according to IQ. When egalitarian fallacies are set aside, the ubiquity of *g* is obvious. As Scarr (1985) noted "…there are few human endeavors that could not be included in the domain of intelligence, if one considered all of the correlates of '*g*'." Because of a reluctance of some researchers to discuss a construct that accentuates individual differences rather than individual equalities, Spearman's *g* has become one of the best-kept secrets in science and education. As global societies continue their movement toward technology-based economies, intelligence and Spearman's *g* will become increasingly important in discussions of education and public policy. Therefore, the salient issue is not the existence or importance of intelligence and its constituent factors, but rather whether policy makers will accept its impact on reality.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Figure 1. Spearman-Holzinger Model of Intelligence. This simple model poses a single general factor (g) and several specific factors (s) specific to each

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Figure 2. Thurstone Model of Intelligence. This multiple factor model poses a number of group factors (f) with the exclusion of a single general factor (g).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Figure 3. Guilford's Structure of Intellect (SOI) Model of Intelligence. This taxonomic model offers that each distinct mental ability is created by specific facets (Content, Operations, and Product). The SOI model marks a vast departure from other factor analytic models in that it does not accommodate group abilities or a general factor.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Figure 4. Horn-Cattell Model of Intelligence. In its purest form, this multiple model poses a broad dichotomy of fluid (gf) and crystallized (gc) abilities and a single general factor (g).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Figure 5. Carroll's Three Stratum Model of Intelligence. This hierarchical model poses a number of second-order group factors such as fluid ability (gf), crystallized ability (gc), processing speed (gs), working memory (gwm)and long-term memory retrieval (glr). These multiple factors are subsumed by an overarching general factor (g).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Figure 6. Das-Naglieri PASS Model of Intelligence. This model poses four factors that are directly related to specific neurological functions that are required for all cognitive activity. Although these processes are theoretically assumed to work in concert, no general factor (g) is offered as an explanative source of variance.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Harrison Kane is Assistant Professor of School Psychology at Western Carolina University. His area of interest is intellectual assessment (direct correspondence to hkane@wcu.edu). Chris Brand has been a faculty member in the Department of Psychology, University of Edinburgh, is author of ***The g Factor*** *as well as numerous articles and book reviews in the psychological literature, and currently serves as research consultant to the Woodhill Foundation, USA.*

REFERENCES

Adams, M.L. (1993). Project Spectrum: A theory-based approach to early education. In R. Pasnak and M.L. Howe (eds.), *Emerging themes in cognitive development,* (53-76) New York: Springer-Verlag.

Benton, D. (1995). Do low cholesterol levels slow mental processing? *Psychosomatic Medicine* 57, 50-53.

Benton, D. (1996). Dietary fat and cognitive functioning. In M. Hillbrand & R.T. Spitz (eds.), *Lipids, health, and behavior,* 227-243. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Blaha, J. & Wallbrown, F.H. (1982). Hierarchical factor structure of the WAIS-Revised. *Journal of Consulting & Clinical Psychology* 50, 5, 652-660.

Brand, C. R. (1996b). *The* g *Factor: General intelligence and its implications.* New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Brand, C. R. (1996c). The importance of intelligence in Western societies. *J. Biosocial Science* 28, 387-404. Fast track learning comes of age.

Brand, C. R. (1996a). Fast track learning comes of age. *Personality & Individual Differences* 24, 6, 899-900.

Brand, C. R. (2002). The great IQ-score rise: Test sophistication, Caesarian births or masked mystificatory multipliers?

Brand, C. R. (2003). Hereditarianism without tears. *Heredity* 89.

Brand, C. R., Constales, D., & Kane, H. (in press). Why ignore the *g* factor? — Historical considerations. Chapter for a festschrift for Arthur Jensen, edited by H. Nyborg, *The scientific study of general intelligence,* Oxford: Pergamon Press.

Brody, N. (1992). *Intelligence.* San Diego, CA: Academic Press.

Burt, C. (1940). *The factors of the mind,* London: University of London Press.

Carroll, J.B. (1993). *Human cognitive abilities: A survey of factor analytic studies.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Cattell, R.B. (1941). Some theoretical issues in adult intelligence testing. *Psychological Bulletin* 38, 592.

Ceci, S.J. (1994). Education, achievement, and general intelligence: What ever happened to the psycho in psychometrics? *Psychological Inquiry* 5, 197-201.

Ceci, S.J. (1991). How much does schooling influence general intelligence and its cognitive components? A reassessment of the evidence. *Developmental Psychology 27,* 703-722.

Cronbach, L., & Snow, R.E. (1977). *Aptitudes and instructional methods: A handbook for research on interactions.* New York: Irvington.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Das, J.P., & Naglieri, J.A. (1997). *Das-Naglieri: Cognitive assessment system*. Chicago: Riverside.

Death Penalty Information Center. (2002, August 7). *Race of defendants executed since 1976*. Retrieved August 7, 2002, from http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org.

Eckstrom, R.B. (1979). Review of cognitive factors. *Multivariate Behavioral Research* 79, 7-56.

Eysenck, H.J., & Barrett, P. (1985). Psychophysiology and the measurement of intelligence. In C.R. Reynolds & P.C. Willson (eds.), *Methodological and statistical advances in the study of individual differences*, 1-49. New York: Plenum Press.

Eysenck, H.J., & Kamin, L. (1981). *The intelligence controversy*. New York: Wiley & Sons.

Flanagan, J.L. Genshaft, & P.L. Harrison (Eds.), *Contemporary intellectual assessment: Theories, tests, and issues*, 32-49. New York, NY: The Guilford Press.

Flynn, J.R. (2000). IQ gains and fluid g. *American Psychologist*, 55, 543.

Flynn, J.R. (1999). Searching for justice: The discovery of IQ gains over time. *American Psychologist* 54, 5-20.

Fraser, S. (1995). *The bell curve wars: Race, intelligence, and the future of America.* New York: Basic Books.

Freytag, C. (2001). Teacher Efficacy and Inclusion: The Impact of Preservice Experiences on Beliefs. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southwest Educational Research Association (24th, New Orleans, LA, February 1-3, 2001).

Gardner, H. (1983*). Frames of mind: The theory of multiple intelligences.* New York: Basic Books.

Gordon, R.S. (1987). SES versus IQ in the race-IQ-delinquency model. *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy* 7, 30-96.

Gould, S.J. (1981). *The mismeasure of man*. New York: Norton.

Gorsuch, R.L. (1983). *Factor analysis*. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Gross, M. (1994, summer). To group or not to group: Is that the question? *Journal of the Indiana Association of the Gifted*, 4-20.

Guilford, J.P. (1967). *The nature of human intelligence*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Guilford, J.P. (1985). The structure of intellect model. In B.B. Woman (eds*). Handbook of intelligence: theories, measurements, and applications*, 225-266. New York: Wiley & Sons.

Gustafsson, J.E. (1989). Broad and narrow abilities in research on learning and instruction. In R. Kanfer, P.L. Ackerman, & R. Cudek (eds.), *Abilities, motivation, and methodology: The Minnesota Symposium on Learning and Individual Differences*, 203-237. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Haier, R. J. (1993). Cerebral glucose metabolism and intelligence. In PA Vernon (ed.), *Biological approaches to the study of human intelligence*, 317-373. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

Hernnstein, R.J. & Murray, C. (1994). *The bell curve: Intelligence and class structure in American life.* Free Press: New York.

Herrnstein, R. & Wilson, J. Q. (1986). *Crime and human nature*, New York: Simon and Schuster.

Horn, J.L., & Cattell, R.B. (1966). Refinement and test of the theory of fluid and crystallized ability intelligence. *Journal of Education Psychology* 57, 253-270.

Horn, J. L., & Noll, J. (1997). Human cognitive capabilities: Gf-Gc theory. In D. P. Flanagan, J. L. Genshaft, & P. L. Harrison (eds.), *Contemporary intellectual assessment: Theories, tests and issues*, 53-91. New York: Guilford.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Jensen, A. R. (1969). How much can we boost IQ and scholastic attainment? *Harvard Educational Review*, 39(1), 1-123.

Jensen, A.R. (1982). Reaction time and psychometric *g*. In H.J. Eysenck (Ed.), *A model for intelligence*, 93-132. New York: Springer.

Jensen, A.R. & Reed, T.E. (1992). The correlation between reaction time and the ponderal index. *Perceptual-and-Motor-Skills, 75(3),* 843-846.

Jensen, A.R. (1994). Understanding *g* in terms of information processing. *Educational Psychology Review* 4, 271-308.

Jensen, A.R. (1998). *The g factor*. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Jensen, A.R., & Weng, L. (1993). What is a good *g? Intelligence* 18, 231-258.

Kranzler, J.H., & Jensen, A.R. (1991). The nature of psychometric *g*: Unitary process or a number of independent processes? *Intelligence* 15, 397-422.

Kranzler, J.H. (1994). Application of the techniques of mental chronometry to the study of learning disabilities. *Personality and Individual Differences* 16, 853-859.

Kranzler, J.H. & Weng, L. (1995). Factor Structure of the PASS Cognitive Tasks: A Reexamination of Naglieri et al. (1991). *Journal of School Psychology, 33,* 143-157.

Luria, A.R. (1973). *The working brain: An introduction to neuropsychology*. New York: Basic Books.

Lynn, R., and Vanhanen, T. (2002). *IQ and the wealth of nations*, Westport, CT: Praeger.

Miller, E.M. (1994). Intelligence and brain myelination. *Personality and Individual Differences* 17, 803-832.

Naglieri, J.A. (1989). A cognitive processing theory for the measurement of intelligence. *Educational Psychologist* 24, 185-206.

Ogbu, J.U. (1999). Beyond language: Ebonics, proper English, and identity in a Black-American speech community. *American Educational Research Journal* 36, 147-184.

Ormrod, J.A. (1996*). Learning and cognition*. New York: Basic Books.

Osmon, D. C., & Jackson, R. (2002). Inspection time and IQ - Fluid or perceptual aspects of intelligence? *Intelligence*, 30(2), 119-127.

Pinker, S. (2002). *The blank slate: The modern denial of human* nature. London: Allen Lane.

Raven, J.C. (1956*). Guide to using progressive matrices*. London: H.K. Lewis.

Ree, M.J., & Earles, J.A. (1993). *g* is to psychology what carbon is to chemistry: A reply to Sternberg and Wagner, McClelland, and Calfee. *Current Directions in Psychological Sciences* 2, 11-12.

Reed, T. E., and Jensen, A. R. (1992). Conduction velocity in a brain nerve pathway of normal adults correlates with intelligence level. *Intelligence*, 16, 259-272.

Rushton, J. P., & Skuy, M. (2000), Performance on Raven's matrices by African and White university students in South Africa. *Intelligence* 28, 4, 251-265.

Rushton, J. P. (2002). Race, brain size, and IQ. *The Psychologist* 37:2, 28-33. (Published by the American Psychological Association's Division of General Psychology.)

Scarr, S. (1985). An author's frame of mind. *New Ideas in Psychology* 3, 95-100.

Schmidt, P.B., Ones, D., & Hunter, J.E. (1992). Personnel selection. *Annual Review of Psychology* 46, 627-670.

Silverman, L.K. (1993). *Counseling the gifted and talented*. Denver, CO: Love.

Spearman, C. (1904). General intelligence, objectively determined and measured. *American Journal of Psychology* 15, 201-293.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Spearman, C. (1927). *The abilities of man*. London: MacMillan.

Spearman, C. (1941). How '*g*' can disappear. *Psychometrika* 6, 353-354.

Sternberg, R.J. (1985). *Beyond IQ: A triarchic theory of intelligence.* London: Cambridge University Press.

Sternberg, R.J., & Wagner, R. (1986). *Practical intelligence: Nature and origins of competence in the everyday world.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Thorndike, R. (1997). The early history of intelligence testing. Found in D.P. Flanagan, J.L. Genshaft, & P.L. Harrison (eds.), *Contemporary intellectual assessment: Theories, tests, and issues*, 3-17. New York: Guilford.

Thurstone, L.L. (1938). Primary mental abilities. *Psychometric Monographs* (no. 1).

Thurstone, L. L. (1947*). Multiple factor analysis: A development and expansion of the vectors of the mind*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Vernon, P.A. (1990). An overview of chronometric measures of intelligence. *School-Psychology Review* 19(4), 399-410.

Vernon, P.A., & Mori, M. (1990). Psychological approaches to the assessment of intelligence. In C.R. Reynolds & R. Kamphaus (eds.), *Handbook of psychological and assessment of children: Intelligence and achievement*, 389-402. New York: Guilford.

Yoshikawa, H. (1994). Prevention as a cumulative protection: Effects of early family support and education on chronic delinquency and its risks. *Psychological Bulletin* 115, 28-54.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Pan-European Genetic Interests

Ethno-States, Kinship Preservation, and the End of Politics

Michael Rienzi

White gentiles of European descent, unlike all other groups, seem to demand objective, rather than subjective, justification for ethnoracial preservation. Thus, white racial nationalists have long desired to see an objective work that justifies a defense by whites of their racial interests. The wait is now over.

Dr. Frank Salter, a political ethologist with the Max Planck Society, Department of Human Ethology, has recently published just such an analysis.[1] As we are well aware, typical discussions about these topics usually center around issues which Dr. Salter terms "proximate," e.g., economics, crime and security, culture, etc. Completely lacking in such discussions is concern for what can be termed the "ultimate" interest: "genetic continuity." It is this ultimate interest which is the focus of Salter's work, the central question of which is asked in the very first sentence: "Does ethnic competition over territory pay off in terms of reproductive fitness?"

Crucial for the survival and propagation of an ethny is a definite territory in which to live and successfully reproduce. According to Salter: "The special quality of a defended territory is that it insulates a population from the vicissitudes of demographic disturbances...." Thus, the acquisition and defense of territory became an integral part of the tribal strategy of humans. In the long run, only territory can ensure survival, and human history is replete with conflicts of groups expanding and contracting, conquering or being conquered, migrating or being displaced by migrants. The loss of territory can result in ethnic diminishment or destruction, with the consequent negative effects on the native's genetic fitness interests. To objectively measure the extent of this negative genetic impact, a quantitative analysis is required.

Salter's quantitative analysis of ethnic genetic interests depends on the concept of genetic kinship, a relative term which defines genetic relatedness as compared to the genetic background of a random population. Thus, even though all humans share many genes, genetic kinship measures the genetic similarities and differences above and beyond this general gene sharing. Kinship values can be either positive or negative; if individuals (or groups) share more genes than is typical of the population, then the kinship is positive; if they share fewer genes than on average, then the kinship is negative.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Genetic kinship can be mathematically derived from studies of the genetic variation between populations. The genetic data that form the basis of Dr. Salter's quantitative analysis of ethnic genetic interests derive from the work of Cavalli-Sforza,[2] which examined gene frequencies of various alleles from a broad range of human populations. These genetic data, interpreted mathematically in terms of genetic kinship, can be used to determine the extent to which alien immigration harms ethnic genetic interests. Salter examines groups of 10,000 people and asks: What would be the effect of displacing 10,000 natives by 10,000 immigrants? To bring the point home more clearly, Salter expresses losses of genetic ethnic interest in terms of losses in "child equivalents." In other words, Salter is asking: for any given individual of the native population *x*, what is the number of lost children that would equal the loss of his ethnic genetic interests caused by immigration of 10,000 people of ethny *y*?

Salter begins by considering the English as the native population, and examines the effects of the immigration of 10,000 Danes, an ethny very similar genetically to the English. Displacing 10,000 Englishmen with 10,000 Danes results in a loss of genetic interests equal to 167 children for every person of English descent! What if the immigrants were Bantus—a group very genetically dissimilar to the English—rather than Danes? The genetic cost to a single Englishman of the immigration of 10,000 Bantus is the equivalent of 10,854 lost children! What if the level of immigration were larger, more in tune with the massive displacement of Western peoples observed today? The English population is roughly 50 million. If 12.5 million of these were displaced and replaced by an equal number of Bantus, the loss would be equivalent to 13 million children! Salter emphasizes that this loss is not somehow reduced by being spread over the entire native population. The loss applies to every member of the native populace.

To further illustrate these points Salter then determines the number of immigrants of group *y* necessary to reduce the genetic interests of a random member of native group *x* by one child equivalent (see table on page 43). For Europeans, an average of only 1.1 African or 1.7 Northeast Asian immigrants is sufficient for the loss of one child equivalent—a powerful and personal argument against racially alien immigration. Salter states that within-group charity is potentially adaptive and that self-sacrificial "heroism" directed at preserving one's group genetic interests can be adaptive as well.

For example, Salter points out that "an act of charity or heroism" performed by an Englishman that prevented 10,000 Danes from replacing 10,000 Englishmen would be worth it even if the Englishman sacrificed his life and with it the potential of having a family of up to 167 children. Preventing replacement by Bantus would justify a far larger sacrifice. It is therefore very clear that activism performed to avoid ethnoracial displacement is very normal and adaptive, and is entirely justified by a rational analysis. Indeed, it is multicultural surrender which is pathological and abnormal.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

What about the intra-European situation? What are the genetic costs of intra-racial immigration and displacement? In general, the trends are, as expected, that Europeans share more genetic kinship with other Europeans than with non-Europeans, Europe being, as Salter states: "a generally racially homogenous region." Of course, within Europe, geographically close populations tend to be even more similar, by another order of magnitude. Germans and Swiss are closely related, so it would take 125 Swiss immigrants to reduce a German's genetic interests by "one child." If we continue to look at Germans, we can see that the same effect will occur with 83.7 Belgians, 78.5 Dutch or Danish, 57.2 Englishmen, 33.3 Italians, 18.5 Spaniards, or 9.1 Greeks. In summary, Salter states: "Immigration between ethnies of the same race can still be maladaptive for the receiving population, but the threshold is typically 10 to 100 times that of inter-racial immigration."

Salter notes that Americans of European descent are a declining proportion of that nation's population, due to immigration and other factors, and that this is a clear and serious diminishment of the ethnic genetic interests of Euro-Americans. In addition, this problem is being exacerbated by racial miscegenation, which may actually benefit the genetic interests of the non-White migrants coming to America, for they are diluting the native gene pool while the gene pools of their own racially exclusive homelands remain intact. In fact, Salter notes that the genetic damage done by the post-1965 immigration to America "has decreased white genetic interests more than all American war losses combined." What Salter observes is that white Americans have, in the name of multiculturalism, engaged in a "unilateral withdrawal from ethnic competition," with devastating results for their genetic interests.

What does Salter suggest as a possible solution? Not surprisingly he brings up the possibility of ethnoracial states, a form of "universal nationalism" in which each ethnic state makes shared ethnicity a requirement for citizenship, and where the state "unambiguously serves the ethnic interests of the majority." This is opposed to the current fad of wave-the-flag "constitutional patriotism" (the nation as an "idea"). Salter rightly sees such raceless "patriotic" schemes as "a formula for reconciling ethnic majorities to their own demise," while serving minority and elite interests. Thus, such ethnoracial state models are the only real way for Western majorities to promote their ethnic interests in America, Europe, and Australia. In general, for this plan to work, both internal (class) and external (nation vs. nation) conflicts would need to be equitably resolved to make way for viable ethnoracial states. But the costs would be worth the result, in the form of states which truly represent the interests of their populations. Salter's vision of ethnic-based "universal nationalism" is a vision of ethnic and racial progress of great potential benefit.

Salter's work can be summarized as follows. Ethnies (and races) are large reservoirs of genetic interest for members of these groups. Ethnic genetic interests are thus real and of fundamental importance. Genetic kinship can be

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

quantitated and the harm to any person's (or group's) ethnic genetic interests resulting from alien immigration can be calculated. Immigration of even closely related groups has a negative impact on genetic interests; this detrimental influence increases rapidly with increased genetic distance between the immigrant and native populations. Putting this detrimental impact in the form of "child equivalents" is a particularly powerful way of demonstrating these effects. Peoples of European descent are being ill-served, on a fundamental, genetic level, by non-European immigration and the ideology of multiculturalism. The formation of ethnic-based national states is the most efficient way of safeguarding ethnic genetic interests.

We can then ask how the concepts behind ethnic genetic interests can be incorporated into a reasonable approach to pro-white, pro-western activism.

If we take as an example a German activist, at first glance it would seem best that he invest all his time and energy in promoting specific German ethnic interests, or perhaps the interests of Germans and other Germanic Europeans. However, two points can be made.

First, this German activist also shares, to varying degrees, significant genetic kinship with non-German European ethnies; thus, he would have some degree of ethnic genetic interest in those peoples as well. If Germans survive, but all other persons of European descent became extinct, this German activist would suffer a large loss of genetic interest.

Second, serious practical questions also come to the fore. Could Germans make it alone? If Germany obtained a nationalist government, but the rest of the white world was still in the throes of liberal multiracialism, could this German ethno-state long survive? Furthermore, isn't it possible that non-Germanic persons of European descent could make important contributions to German ethnic survival, either as part of a general European program, or as part of specific assistance to German nationalists? Thus, it would seem that a German activist would be well served by balancing his more narrow German-specific approach with a broader pan-European approach. But how much investment should be put into each type of activism? How much ethnic-specific activism and how much broader pan-racial activism should be performed? Is there any ideological framework which could help with these decisions? Could such a framework also assist in helping Euro-Americans of various ethnic backgrounds balance out their ethnic genetic interests?

Ideology of Ethnicity

As we shall see, pan-European activism, properly constructed, can be a powerful methodology for maximizing the ethnic genetic (as well as overall) interests of both the European peoples as a whole, and of the more specific ethnic groups which make up this whole. We will also examine some of the basic ideological concepts that can be incorporated by a pan-European movement for the promotion of both broad-based Western interests, as well as narrower ethnic concerns.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

What needs to be developed is an "ideology of ethnicity," an ideological framework in which ethnic concerns, ethnic genetic interests, and the work of Dr. Salter are considered the foundation upon which the activist structure is built. Ethnic concerns absolutely must be considered in addition to general racial concerns. Indeed, the overall survival of whites would be cold comfort to a German or Italian or Russian activist if the particular ethny of that activist were greatly diminished or completely eliminated. On the other hand, Euro-ethnic activists must also consider that they do indeed have genetic, and other, interests in European ethnies besides their own, albeit at variable and more diffuse levels. Thus, both the whole (white European race) and the parts of the whole (various European ethnies) are important. Therefore, an ideology of ethnicity would assist in informing activists and groups as to what strategies to pursue: those which maximize ethnoracial interests by properly balancing both the narrower (ethnic) and broader (racial) perspectives. Such avenues of activism must incorporate provisions for ethnic as well as racial survival.

An "ideology of ethnicity" can tell us not only what we should do, but what we absolutely must *not* do. For example, an individual who promotes multiracialism (e.g., of Europeans and non-Europeans) for someone else's ethny is promoting the genetic equivalent of mass murder (genocide). An individual who advocates splitting up someone else's ethny is promoting the break-up of a family unit on a mass scale; the damage done to that ethny is also the genetic equivalent of mass murder. Thus it is obvious that any such proposals, regardless of whether they originate from the "anti-racist left" or the "racialist right," must be absolutely eschewed. In summary, an ideology of ethnicity would bring issues of ethnic genetic interests to the forefront of debate, and begin a process in which ethnic concerns become an important part of movement activism. Therefore, the development of an ideology promoting ethnic genetic interests and racial preservation is of paramount importance for pro-white activism.

In addition to a focus on the ethny, there are solid reasons to also emphasize a broader, more "pan-racial" view of ethnic interests. Just as someone can pursue their genetic interests by helping more distantly related co-ethnics in addition to their immediate family, so can genetic interests be promoted by helping ethnic groups which are relatively genetically related to oneself, albeit more genetically distant than are more closely related ethnies. Given the degree of genetic relatedness among Europeans, a Swede could further bolster his genetic fitness by helping Spaniards, and an Italian could further improve his genetic fitness by helping Norwegians—as long, of course, as this more broad-based support does not impair the more ethnic narrow concerns. Time, money, and energy have to be invested in such a way as to provide maximal returns of ethnic genetic interest, given different situations.

A practical reason to take a broader approach is that a narrower approach may not be effective in many circumstances. Some European ethnic groups, especially in their homelands of Europe, have population bases smaller than those of big cities in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

larger, more densely populated nations. It would be very difficult for these small European populations, acting alone, to make an impact on world historical issues. Even European populations many times larger, and even subracial groupings of European groups, are still numerically dwarfed by the populations of emerging powers such as China, India, and the Islamic world.

In a future likely to be dominated by massive ethno-racial power blocs, persons of European descent need to maximize their power base, while at the same time preserving their more specific ethnic and national interests. In addition, pan-European cooperation, by increasing the pool of competent activists and other human and material resources, and by focusing these resources where they can do the most good, can significantly enhance the efficacy of ethnoracial activism. There is no logical reason for a Swedish activist to refuse assistance from a Spanish activist, or vice versa, as long as both sides adhere to an "ideology of ethnicity" that respects their more specific ethnic interests. It must also be noted that a nationalist victory in only one or a few white nations would probably not be stable; in the long run if the rest of the white world is liberal and "multicultural," the nationalist states will be in constant danger. The most stable situation for any white racial nationalist would be to see his ethny preserved in the context of broad racial survival. For example, a German Germany in a European Europe would be the most stable situation for German ethnic survival; a German Germany in a non-white Europe would be untenable. How then to best balance narrower with broader activist concerns? Studying the work of Frank Salter, as well as that of Kevin MacDonald,[3] can we discern an answer to this question?

One way to look at this problem is to view pan-European activism as concentric circles of ethnic interests. The primary interest would be genetic kinship. However, we may consider that phenotypic, cultural, and other concerns will also be very important in influencing rankings of groups within the circles. For example, some Slavic groups (e.g., Russians and "Yugoslavs" / Serbs) have a greater ethnic affinity than what would be predicted solely from genetic kinship distance. Thus, non-biological ethnic factors must be considered, although the genetic interests would always be the primary, underlying, fundamental consideration.

At the core of these concentric circles is the ethny or ethnies with which the individual most closely identifies, to which ethnic kinship is greatest. Outside of this circle would be other larger, more diffuse circles of genetic, phenotypic, and cultural ethnic interest, including various closely related ethnic groupings. In most cases, there would be a general trend for the outer circles to be more genetically distant from the inner circles and from the central ethnic core, even when taking non-biological factors into account. The final, outermost circle would encompass all of the European peoples as a whole, given that Europeans have more genetic kinship with other Europeans than with members of other races, and also share, to varying degrees, similarities of phenotype, culture, ancestries, and history. These various concentric circles would overlap across

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the wide spectrum of European ethnies, with the core ethnies being completely separate entities, and the outer shell of general European interests being held in common.

Thus, a Swedish activist would put priority on assisting Swedes as his inner core ethnic interest, followed closely by other peoples of Scandinavian descent. A broader core would be Northwest Europeans, particularly Germanics, and the broadest circle would include all peoples of European descent. A Russian would have as his inner core Russians, followed by a broader core of Ukrainian, Polish, and White Russian Slavs, followed by other Slavs and other related groups, and then general Europeans. An Italian would have an Italian inner core, a "Latin"/Southern European broader core, an even broader South/Central European circle, with again, all Europeans as the broadest circle of ethnoracial interest. A person of mixed European ethnic ancestry could have as his inner core of interests those ethnic groups from which he is descended, followed by an outer circle of other related groups, then general Europeans, etc. The pattern is clear. How to divide one's energy and attention among these circles or cores of interest would depend on the particular situation. As long as investing energy in the outer cores of interest does not deflect from the interests of the inner cores, then there is really no fundamental conflict. In many cases, inner core ethnic interests can be complementary to broader European interests, and both can be pursued at the same time. In cases where there is a conflict, the needs of the innermost cores should predominate and be given maximal attention and priority.

Given the dangerous world historical situation the overall European racial group finds itself in, it is in the interest of all Euro-ethnic parties to find common ground to resolve conflicts in a reasonable manner. In other words, if the propagation of intra-European ethnic conflict endangers the survival of all European ethnic groups, then such conflict endangers the narrow core interests as well as the broader interests. Thus, settling these conflicts in an expedient and rational fashion is beneficial to all. Some aspects of "game theory," which is out of the scope of this essay, may apply, in which all participants attempt to find a solution that maximizes the interests of all parties. Such an approach would be rational given European genetic kinship. Unfortunately, ethnic conflicts sometimes become so intense that they begin to become less rational, a trend that peoples of European descent need to avoid as they attempt to pursue their varied interests.

What about a specific ethnic example? Let us assume a Spanish activist who holds to the idea of "a Spanish Spain in a European Europe." If Swedish nationalists were in a position to help achieve Spanish ethnic goals, this Spanish activist could boost his genetic interests by helping the Swedes. However, in order for this to be truly adaptive for the Spaniard, the Swedes would have to be willing to reciprocate if the situation was reversed, and the Swedes could also need to share the attitude that "every European people has the right to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

exist." If, however, the Swedes were extreme Nordicists and planned to dump non-whites living in Sweden onto "the inferior non-Nordic Spaniards," it would not be in the interests of a Spanish activist to support those Swedes.

Likewise, if a Spaniard had the idea that his countrymen should have the right to migrate to Scandinavia and displace Swedes, then such a person would not be a useful associate for a Swedish ethnic-racial nationalist. The obvious requirements of reciprocity and granting the right of survival to others are fundamental here. Mutual respect for the ethnic interests of other persons of European descent, incorporation of an ideology of ethnicity and concentric circles of interest, and reciprocal assistance are the key components that would make pan-European activism a powerful and effective vehicle for achieving both narrower ethnic and broader racial goals.

Pan-European Diaspora

In his manuscript, Salter recommends ethno-states as a solution to the "genetic fitness problem" faced by Western majorities threatened by replacement immigration. Salter also states a need for balance between the "smaller is better" rationale (closer genetic kinship) and the "bigger is better" rationale (economic and military power to defend ethnic interests). How can these issues be resolved?

In theory, this need not be a problem in a Europe in which ethnic nationalists have achieved their goals. The nation-states of Europe are in general already built around ethnic identity, or, in those cases in which certain European nations can be viewed as really multi-ethnic, further separation into more ethnically homogenous units could be easily achieved. Arrangements could be made in which the various nation-states maintain their local autonomy and control immigration and their population make-up. National/ethnic hostilities and border problems between European states would need to be resolved in a fair and peaceful manner to avoid the sort of fratricidal bloodshed which would reduce European genetic fitness and further decrease the representation of European genes and phenotypes in the world. European ethno-states, while maintaining pure local autonomy and ethnic homogeneity, could form a Euro-racial union (along with diaspora European ethno-states abroad) for the purposes of military/economic competition with non-Western power blocs.

The situation in the European diaspora, particularly in America, is more complex. America is home to a wide variety of European ethnic groups, often living among each other, and often intermarrying to a considerable extent. In general, these groups tend to get along well at the present time. Perhaps the general relatedness of these groups, the intermarriage which has already taken place among them and which is continuing, as well as alliances forged through the future ethnic struggles, will prevent intra-European ethnic

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

conflicts from becoming a problem on the American continent. However, intraracial ethnic groups do have real interests. Thus, one cannot dismiss the possibility that some Euro-Americans may feel a need to assert more specific and narrow ethnic needs, especially if the overall threats to racial survival have been successfully dealt with. As regards these narrower concerns, we can ask: under what circumstances in this endeavor may a Euro-American group feel that a situation is maladaptive, and therefore consider ethnic separation? One can postulate that a group (or groups) in America will be concerned that in the event of a pan-European victory—defined as ensuring the continued existence of all peoples of European descent, most likely through racial separatism—they would lose their unique ethnic/genetic identities through submergence within the larger racial group. The concerns may be with being outbred, and/or with losing genetic (or phenotypic) distinctiveness through mixing with other European ethnic strains. Of course, these concerns may be voiced in ways other than reductive genetic arguments; for example, rather than talking about loss of genetic identity the talk may instead be about loss of a particular phenotype, loss of culture, loss of a "way of life," loss of a general "identity," etc., although in the ultimate analysis these comments are usually the surface manifestations of underlying genetic concerns. To meet these concerns, reasonable ethnic compromises are required to meet the needs of all Euro-American groups—including people of mixed European ethnicity—without coercion or hostility. Given that a degree of genetic kinship runs through all of these groups, and given the need to present a solid front to those who belong to other genetic fitness "concentrates" (Asians, etc.), ethnic concerns can be and should be dealt with in a calm and equitable manner. One can imagine several scenarios for Euro-Americans:

First, a Euro-American state could be made up of all Euro-Americans (or at least those who wish to live in such a state), fully separate from non-Europeans. Even in this situation, one can imagine that a heightened sense of ethnicity and race may promote the formation of various, more homogenous ethno-communities within such a state.

Second, if the first option fails to meet the ethnic interests of particular Euro-American ethnies, then one can imagine a number of separate, fully independent Euro-American states, each more genetically homogenous than would be a general Euro-American state. Each state would contain one or several more closely related ethnies. Persons of mixed Euro-ethnic descent would live in that state which seems to best meet their own ethnic interests based on their specific ancestral make-up. Analogous to the European situation, it would be reasonable for these Euro-American states to form alliances for protection against non-European power blocs. In theory, relations between these states should be like relations between family

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

members living in separate households; everyone has their own space, but shares considerable genetic interests with each other and thus works together to promote "the common family good."

Third, the "best of both worlds option," could be a single Euro-American state which is "federated": composed of a number of smaller, locally autonomous units of more concentrated ethnic similarity. This option would have the strength of a large single state, while still allowing more genetically homogeneous Euro-American populations to cluster together.

Another alternative, and one that perhaps allows people the greatest choice for determining their best fitness options, is to combine options one and two: have both a general Euro-American state (ideal for those of mixed European ancestry and/or those who have married across Euro-ethnic genetic cluster lines) together with smaller, more homogenous Euro-American ethno-states for those persons and groups who feel their interests are not most efficiently served in a larger Euro-American state. All these states can be allied as discussed above. There are of course other alternatives, but the key is to allow all peoples of European descent the opportunity to optimize their ethnic interests in a fair and reasonable manner. All peoples of European descent must be given the option of separating themselves from non-Europeans, and intra-European separation must be guaranteed for those who believe their interests lie in even greater homogeneity. Again, as long as all of this is dealt with rationally, and without hurting general European interests in competition with other groups, then broad genetic fitness interests need not be sacrificed for narrower interests, or vice versa. Of course, non-Europeans can also set up whatever types of states they wish, to promote their own interests, but the European/non-European separation must be strictly adhered to.

What kinds of policies could a European ethno-state practice, other than the obvious policy of separatism? One could expect that an ethno-state would promote fertility, values that strengthen the family, as well as eugenics. Eugenics would raise the genetic quality of the group and make them more formidable competitors with other groups, hence raising fitness. On a more individual level, picking as one's mate someone of good genetic quality increases the chances of having children of high quality, enhancing their ability to compete and reproduce, and thus increasing genetic fitness.

In a hypothetical multiethnic European state (e.g., a Euro-American state), one may need to balance issues of genetic similarity and eugenic quality in maximizing genetic fitness in mating choice. For example, it may make more sense to marry an ethnically different genius of good health (phenotypes representing both good genes and a higher probability of producing competitive offspring) than a co-ethnic who is a sickly retardate. On the other hand, given a choice of relatively equal quality, the co-ethnic would be the sounder choice from the standpoint of genetic fitness and paternal kinship with future children. Of course, in reality, choices are rarely this easy, and people

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rarely actually calculate, in a conscious sense, the inclusive fitness or genetic consequences of mating choice, although they well may do so indirectly by selecting for certain phenotypic markers of relatedness and fitness. This is of course not a comprehensive list of options, but a summary of examples that easily come to mind.

What to do now? We do not know when and if such ethno-states can be created. Thus we can ask: what to do now, as regards pan-European ethnic interests, under the current conditions of living in multiracial, multicultural states? Actually, many of the aforementioned methodologies can still apply, as demonstrated by the examples of the Jews, who have successfully defended their genetic ethnic interests for centuries as minorities in a varying array of nations. A degree of separatism can be sought after—political and geographical separatism preferred—but if that is not possible, then social separatism to the extent possible to achieve the goal of genetic separatism and survival is absolutely required. Fertility of the "in-group" can be bolstered, eugenic mating practiced, and various means of increasing genetic fitness pursued. Organization is an effective means of pooling resources for the common ethnic good, boosting inclusive fitness; thus one can envision group-serving, more collectivist structures being established to serve European ethnic interests (see: Kevin MacDonald's *The Culture of Critique: An Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish Involvement in Twentieth-Century Intellectual and Political Movements*, Praeger: 1998, Westport, CT).

Ultimately, we will need our own communities, our own schools and daycare centers, our own educational materials for our children, our own social organizations for both welfare and entertainment, and our own political structures. It is paramount that we get more involved in politics, not only to provide political "cover" and protection for our other pursuits but also for propaganda and recruitment, as well as a stimulus for organization and to shake up the stagnant, anti-white status quo. While I do not believe that the electoral process alone holds the key to victory, if we can get to the point where viable and respectable political candidates speak openly about the need for white separatism, we would have turned the corner in our attempt to persuade whites of the legitimacy of pursuing their ethnoracial interests. We also need to do what the left did in the 1960s and 1970s, that is, "march through the institutions," so that pro-white individuals are in positions to help the movement grow, and provide the political and social cover for our varied pursuits. There may well be a significant number of effective strategies which can be employed by peoples of European descent, provided they realize they have genetic ethnic interests to defend.

In order to achieve any of the aforementioned goals it will require a substantial paradigm shift in the mentality of the so-called racial-nationalist "movement." An equitable pan-Europeanism, built on an "ideology of ethnicity" and "concentric circles of interest," needs to replace the more divisive

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ideas currently extant. In his manuscript, Salter talked about "transparency of management" being a requirement for ethno-states; I believe such transparency is also just as required in the "movement." Leaders and organizations who are vague as regards what Euro-ethnies they do or do not represent and who are contradictory as to what is their actual "ingroup" need to be replaced by those who are honestly "transparent" on such questions. After all, if a person of group *x* supports an organization which is really hostile to the ethnic genetic interests of that group, this would be a significant loss of ethnic genetic interest for the activist. Comments such as "these issues will be resolved after a total white victory" are completely inappropriate; people need to know now where to invest their activist energies, and they need to know now where and how their specific ethnic genetic interests will be met.

As stated above, "total white survival" will not meet the ethnic interests of a person or group if their specific ethny or ethnies of ancestry are diminished or destroyed. These issues need to be resolved, and the best way to do so is via the ideological acceptance of everyone's ethnic interests, properly balanced against the overall interests of the race.

Another thing that needs to become transparent is hypocrisy vs. sincerity. Those who preach ingroup separatism coupled with outgroup multiracialism (hypocrisy), particularly when both ingroup and outgroup are ethnically European, must be eschewed in favor of those who promote the idea of ethnic interests for all members of the greater race (sincerity). Of course, an interest in specific ethnies must not eclipse the need for cooperation toward overall racial survival; the point to be stressed again and again is the need for balance. And, in the long run, the only way to find the required balance is through transparent honesty and mutual ethnoracial respect. It is through all of these ways of looking at activism that a true and productive pan-European movement will emerge.

It is likely that the twenty-first century will be the crucial one in deciding whether peoples of European descent will continue as genetic ethnic entities, and the issues discussed in this essay are likely to be fundamental in deciding this future.

Michael Rienzi, the pseudonym of a biological scientist living in the Northeast, is the author of the December 2000 cover story, "Race Is a Myth? The Left Distorts Science for Political Purposes," in ***American Renaissance****.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NUMBER OF IMMIGRANTS BETWEEN NINE GEOGRAPHICAL RACES NEEDED TO REDUCE THE ETHNIC GENETIC INTEREST OF A RANDOM NATIVE BY THE EQUIVALENT OF ONE CHILD

Immigrants/host	AFR	NEC	EUC	NEA	ANE	AME	SEA	PAI
Africans	1.3							
Non-Euro Caucasoids	1.1	8.5						
European Caucasoids	1.0	2.3	1.7					
Arctic Northeast Asians	1.0	2.1	2.0	3.1				
Amerindians	0.9	1.7	1.6	2.0	2.5			
Southeast Asians	0.9	1.7	1.4	2.4	1.6	1.3		
Pacific Islanders	0.9	1.4	1.3	2.1	1.4	1.1	3.2	
New Guineans & Australians	0.9	1.4	1.3	2.1	1.6	1.2	1.4	1.9
	AFR	**NEC**	**EUC**	**NEA**	**ANE**	**AME**	**SEA**	**PAI**

END NOTES

1. "Estimating Ethnic Genetic Interests: Is It Adaptive to Resist Replacement Migration?" *Population and Environment* 24, no. 2 (November 2002), pp. 111-140. A more detailed review, by the current author, of this specific paper was published in *American Renaissance* 14, no. 2 (February 2003) www.amren.com.

2. L. L. Cavalli-Sforza, P. Menozzi, and A. Piazza, *The History and Geography of Human Genes* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).

3. Kevin MacDonald, "An Integrative Evolutionary Perspective on Ethnicity," paper presented at the Meeting of the Association of Politics and the Life Sciences, Washington, D.C., September 3, 2000.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Introducing

WASHINGTON SUMMIT PUBLISHERS

Contemporary Works ⚜ Classic Reprints

- Anthropology
- Current Events
- Evolution
- Genetics
- Philosophy
- Psychology

WASHINGTON SUMMIT PUBLISHERS (WSP) now offers contemporary works and classic reprints (which include recently abridged versions and texts drawn from earlier works) in the social sciences with particular emphasis on anthropology, evolution and genetics, philosophy, politics and current events, and psychology.

Currently WSP has 12 titles available in its Classic Reprint Series and 30 titles in the Contemporary Titles Series (titles and rights recently purchased from *Scott-Townsend Publishers.*) Books from WASHINGTON SUMMIT PUBLISHERS are available by order from all major book retailers, or may be purchased directly via the Internet. A complete catalog of the WSP line of publications is available upon inquiry from the address below.



WASHINGTON SUMMIT PUBLISHERS

P. O. Box 3514 • Augusta, GA 30914

Ph: 706-736-4884 • Fax: 706-733-7652

Books@WSPublishers.com • http://WSPublishers.com

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Social Darwinism

The Development of an Intellectual Mood

Louis Andrews

During the Edwardian era in England a new intellectual mood was reaching its peak. The new mood manifested itself in many ways: as a new feeling of nationalist exclusiveness, as economic protectionism, as jingoistic imperialism, as social imperialism, and in appeals to "efficiency." Some have seen it as an intellectual reaction against humanitarianism and sentimentality, and indeed "might" and "necessity" were to some extent replacing the old concept of "right" in public policy.[1]

There were several factors behind the new mood, including a general increase in literacy that had resulted in a new, more popular, journalism, the decline in fundamental religious beliefs, and a Hegelian authoritarian trend in philosophy. But perhaps the primary factor was the impact of a new sociobiological school of thought, Social Darwinism.[2]

Social Darwinism[3] can by no means be considered a monolithic system of thought. It began as a liberal and individualistic construct, concerned largely with man's relationship to his own society in evolutionary terms, but soon developed into a collectivist doctrine, concerned with each society as a unit, and its relationship to other societies in evolutionary terms. Currents of Social Darwinism that focused on the latter can be characterized somewhat by the term "external," since they considered extranational forces the most important in evolutionary development. The earlier individualistic school can be called "internal" Social Darwinist, since its special interest was in intranational forces.[4]

The various schools of Social Darwinism were the product of the revolution which began in 1859 with the publication of Charles Darwin's monumental work, *The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life.* The idea of physical evolution had been prevalent for many years, but it had generally taken a directly environmental form, such as the inheritance of acquired characteristics, and had been largely rejected for various scientific and religious reasons. Darwin's great contribution was that he combined long and detailed observations with careful and cautious scientific reasoning, producing a theory that, disregarding teleological considerations, tended to explain how life had evolved and to do it much more satisfactorily than any previous theory had done. Nevertheless, this theory did not always win acceptance from the members of the old guard

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in biology, and certainly not in religion. In fact, the opposition that orthodox Christianity supplied was in many ways both beneficial to the eventual acceptance of the theory and harmful to the religious structures. The Darwinian theory was developed at a time when Western religion was undergoing a severe crisis, and it was quickly drawn into this crisis. Darwinism emerged triumphant and religion was perhaps irreparably damaged.

As a new theory, evolution had a great appeal to the new guard in biology. In fact, as far as biologists themselves were concerned, it can be argued that basically only the new guard accepted Darwinism; the rest gradually (and literally) died away, thus ending major opposition.

The two major ideas which Darwin expressed were the "struggle for existence," dealing with the eternal validity of competition of all forms, both intraspecific and interspecific, and "natural selection," the by-product of this competition or struggle, by which evolutionary advancement had occurred.[5] Since the "new biology" considered man a part of nature, not above or apart from it, these ideas and their many subsequent corollaries rapidly became part of contemporary discussions of man and the social, religious, economic, ethical, and political facets of his existence. Thus the intellectual framework was created for the development of Social Darwinism.

Herbert Spencer and the Origins of Social Darwinism

The first major figure considered to be a Social Darwinist was Herbert Spencer.[6] Spencer was the classic Social Darwinist: individualistic, liberal to the core, and an enthusiastic proponent of *laissez faire* economics. Easily the best known of all Social Darwinists and the founder of its most prominent school, he nevertheless played no direct role in that collectivistic Social Darwinism which chiefly concerns this essay. Still, he exerted a great influence on his contemporaries as well as on those later schools of Social Darwinism that rejected him for his defense of individualism and democracy.

Spencer espoused two major points that entered into the considerations of the later Social Darwinists. The first of these has been touched on previously, that man is physically an animal, and therefore the natural laws of the new biology applied as much to him as to the alligator or songbird. As an animal, man was subject to heredity, so Spencer felt that he could prove that the empiricists were wrong in maintaining that the mind was a *tabula rasa*.[7] Spencer's second point was that groups, or societies, had also evolved, and thus society itself was an organism.[8] He took this idea, which had been popular with Edmund Burke and the Romantics, and attempted to reinforce it with the prestige of the new evolutionary science. The physical organism, man, could be related scientifically and biologically to the social organism, society. Spencer felt that the many facets of man's development, e.g., his culture in the broad sense, were the products of evolution. Man's physical, mental, and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sociocultural evolution formed a system, a unified whole, which could be used to provide the proper explanations for all major questions concerning man and his problems. As a result, Spencer was able to make a systematic application of his Social Darwinism to many fields, and he wrote ponderous works on psychology, sociology, and ethics.

First generation Darwinists and Social Darwinists were generally optimistic and dedicated believers in progress as a result of the evolutionary processes, and Spencer was no exception. Of the struggle for existence, he wrote that

> inconceivable as have been the horrors caused by the universal antagonism which, beginning with the chronic hostilities of small hordes tens of thousands of years ago, has ended in the occasional vast battles of immense nations, we must nevertheless admit that without it the world would still have been inhabited only by men of feeble types sheltering in caves and living on wild food.[9]

Despite the apparent harshness of this statement, Spencer, perhaps because he was a humanitarian, refused to take the logical step of arguing for the necessity and, to reinforce this pragmatically, the glorification, of war in the present. For some reason, he negated the value of war for the present, thus in a sense rejecting the idea of the continuity of history. This was indeed inconsistent for a thinker who placed such emphasis on terms such as the "persistence of force" and the "indestructibility of matter and energy."[10]

WALTER BAGEHOT

Spencer, as a *laissez-faire* liberal, placed a strong emphasis on rationalism, believing that man's actions were based largely on reasoned self-interest. He was also somewhat anti-traditional, despite his theory of organic social development. Walter Bagehot,[11] the author of *Physics and Politics* (1873) and editor of the still influential journal, *The Economist*, was both a traditionalist and an irrationalist. He can perhaps best be viewed as a transitional figure in the development of Social Darwinism from its individualistic Spencerian form to a largely collectivist body of thought. Bagehot, even though he stood for office as a Liberal, was basically a conservative. He wrote "the first duty of society is the preservation of society."[12] As an irrationalist, he believed in the value of a "noble myth" and "dreams of glory."

> No orator ever made an impression by appealing to men by their plainest physical wants, except when he could allege that those wants were caused by someone's tyranny. But thousands have made the greatest impression by appealing to some vague dream of glory or empire or nationality.[13]

The special value of Bagehot to the later theorists was that he went far beyond Spencer in emphasizing the value of the group. He believed that in the struggle for existence the individuals who were able to work together to create and maintain a strong unified group survived. Competition then occurred between groups; those that proved themselves best able to compete, in other words the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

best disciplined, most compact, and homogeneous, survived. A major factor in his argument was that the part must submit to the whole, since survival in an evolutionary sense depended on the latter.[14]

Concerning moral progress, Bagehot wrote that in a situation in which groups or nations were equal in strength, the noblest would be the victor in conflict. Naturally, where the groups were unequal, the most powerful would be the noblest. Thus, Bagehot wrote, "in every particular state of the world those nations which are strongest tend to prevail over the others and in certain marked peculiarities the strongest tend to be the best."[15]

It would perhaps do an injustice to Bagehot to fail to mention that his theory also had a liberal side. He felt that groups or nations would eventually evolve to a point where some system of democracy and personal freedom could be allowed without endangering the existence of the state. Almost humorously, Bagehot called this period in a state's development "The Age of Discussion."[16]

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, there was a general trend in much of British thought away from liberalism toward a more collectivist and authoritarian nationalism. Neo-Kantians and neo-Hegelians were finding a place in British intellectual life. Attacks on the idea of free trade, a basis of internationalism, were multiplying. This was in part due to the successes of the German Zollverein and the writings of the German economist, Friedrich List, whose book *National Systems of Political Economy* (1841) had become popular in England. These influences all helped foster the development of a new and radical opposition to individualism and free-trade liberalism that had dominated the early Social Darwinist thought of the period.

A new, or partially new, form of Social Darwinism developed out of this radical environment. This "external" Social Darwinism, even though it had developed out of the earlier "internal" type discussed above, soon came to disregard or reject much of the approach of the "internal" school. It was probably Bagehot who began this trend, since he argued that at most stages of its development, a nation had to create a sense of unity to protect itself adequately against all external rivals.

By the 1890s, as England was confronted with greater problems in foreign policy, ideas of organic development became prevalent. Often these connected, interdependently, the nation and the Empire with the world in which nation stood opposed to nation in a supposedly bloody Darwinian struggle for existence. Because of the increasing contact with alien races, British racial pride was growing rapidly. In 1892, Alfred Milner[17] wrote concerning the British in Egypt "by the nature of our interests, by the nature of our power, and by certain special qualities in our national character, we seem marked out for the …job of stabilizing the economic situation." He added "the qualities of the race have triumphed."[18]

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BENJAMIN KIDD

In 1894, Benjamin Kidd's[19] *Social Evolution* appeared. Even though poorly argued and written, it quickly went through several printings to sell over 250,000 copies, a huge number for the day.[20] Kidd, like Spencer, attempted to build a system that would use evolutionary theory to indicate the direction in which English society should develop. Unlike Spencer, Kidd was most concerned with Britain's ability to meet external challenges and to maintain its place in the world. His book advanced programs designed to reduce the internal struggle so that a more cohesive nation would result, one better able to meet the ever-increasing external competition. Kidd felt that in the future those who had been excluded from internal competition due to poverty and other factors could be brought in on terms of equal political and social opportunity.[21] He believed that the major opposition to his programs was among the Spencerians and the socialists.[22] Both groups had worked for the interests of factions within the social organism, not for the organism itself. Their approaches had led to an increased stratification of society, resulting in a situation where class warfare had become a distinct possibility. Kidd wrote that "the forces which are working out our development are primarily concerned not with these interests of the individual, but with those widely different interests of a social organism subject to quite other conditions and possessed of an indefinitely longer life."[23]

For Kidd, the "interests of the social organism and those of the individuals comprising it at any particular time are actually antagonistic; they can never be reconciled…."[24] Therefore individual and intragroup interests must be subordinated to those connected with the survival of the social organism as a whole. It was the duty of the state to achieve some sort of social equality so that this might be accomplished. The state to which he referred was of course a racially homogeneous one.

Kidd believed that an innate quality of discipline, which led to social efficiency, had made Britain and the Empire strong.[25] He felt that religion would be an important factor in leading to greater national unity and an increase in social efficiency. This religion would be "a form of belief, providing an ultra-rational sanction for that large class of conduct in the individual where his interests and the interests of the social organism are antagonistic, and by which the former are rendered subordinate to the latter in the general interests of the evolution which the race is undergoing…."[26]

SOCIAL DARWINISM AND BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY

In February 1896, an article entitled "Biological View of our Foreign Policy" appeared in the pages of the *Saturday Review*. It was unsigned, but written by a biologist, probably a Professor Mitchell.[27] The author described international

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

relations in a strongly neo-Darwinian tone. "The great nations of the earth are local varieties, species in the making, which are gathering themselves together, emphasizing their national characters, and unconsciously making for specific distinctness."[28] He added that foreign policy, as long as it didn't represent only individual ambition or opportunism, was:

> anticipation of, and provision for, struggles for existence between incipient species… feeble races are being wiped off the earth and the few great, incipient species are themselves against each other. England as the greatest of these—greatest in race pride—had avoided for centuries the only dangerous kind of war. Now with the whole earth occupied and the movements of expansion continuing, she will have to fight to the death against successive rivals.[29]

In subsequent years other articles by various authors appeared, associating Social Darwinism with war, military preparations, and the Empire. One such article, by W. F. Wyatt, was entitled "The Ethics of Empire." Wyatt argued that biological law was indeed the foundation of Empire. He believed that humanitarians were the major opponents of this idea and characterized their argument as :

> [T]his brutal law of which you speak may prevail and does prevail in the vegetable and animal kingdoms, and it has doubtless prevailed among mankind. But now we have reached to the higher code of morality…. The principle of altruism is superceding the principle of competition.[30]

The author agued that if Britain were to follow a humanitarian policy, embracing altruism and withdrawing from international competition, that another power would simply take her place, grow stronger, and eventually control world affairs. Britain would "wither away and cease to operate as a moving factor in the affairs of men."[31]

All of the great institutions and ideas which England had developed and then spread to many parts of the world would then be lost. To forestall that it was thus her obligation, in a truly humanitarian sense, to disregard the so-called humanitarians.[32] Wyatt went on to characterize the maintenance of British military might as more than a matter of vital self-interest, indeed "a high and sacred obligation of morality."[33]

Just before the Hague Peace Conference of 1899, Wyatt published an article entitled "War as the Test of National Value," in which he advanced Social Darwinist ideas. He argued that war was not, as some had asserted, an unmixed evil, but that it "has been the absolutely necessary condition of human advance," declaring "if at any given period in the past, war could have been abolished…social evolution must have been stereotyped."[34]

Wyatt struck an especially strong Social Darwinist note in remarking that contemporary wars were:

> only the expression of vast natural forces, having their roots far down in the national character…there is something melancholy and pitiful in the delusion that they can ever be arrested by the breath of [foreign] ministers sitting round a table.[35]

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

While he did feel that the trend of history was leading toward a more cosmopolitan world, eventually to be united in peace, he viewed this rather pessimistically. "The attainment of this much desired peace will be the signal for the beginning of universal decay."[36] In the absence of diversity between groups, stagnation would occur, and this would be closely followed by corruption.

In May 1899 an article entitled "The Hypocrisies of the Peace Conference" appeared on the Hague Conference. Written by Sidney Lowe, a well-known publicist, this essay vividly described the agony and brutality of war, yet argued that compared to industrial competition, on the surface apparently less brutal, war nonetheless was possibly less cruel. Lowe wrote:

> [a] righteous and necessary war is no more brutal than a surgical operation. Better [to] give the patient some pain, and make your own fingers unpleasantly red, than allow the disease to grow upon him until he becomes an offence to himself and the world.[37]

Around the turn of the century, British Social Darwinist thought again became concerned with the importance of the internal problems of the nation, but largely because it was felt that Britain must gird her internal strength in order to better face the challenges of the external world. The importance of surmounting these external challenges was still the primary concern; internal development was viewed as merely a means to that end.

In "The Breed of Man," H. H. Almond expressed a deep-felt concern about the quality of the British people. He argued that reform was needed, especially in education. Such reform was seen as a necessary preparation for war. Almond also urged universal conscription and a reform of the navy. Concerned about the general poor quality of the military establishment, he even urged that "a 'still strong man' be made absolute dictator over our whole military system."[38]

KARL PEARSON, SOCIAL DARWINISM, AND EUGENICS

Developing contemporaneously with Darwinism and Social Darwinism was another closely related scientific school, the ideas of which held broad implications for the improvement of man, and was thus of interest to Social Darwinists. This was the science of eugenics,[39] founded by Sir Francis Galton,[40] who published his first work on the subject as early as 1865.[41]

The appeal of eugenics to Social Darwinists was especially strong, since it sought to improve the quality of the race. That possibility interested others as well. In October 1906, Sidney Webb, one of the founders of the (socialist) British Fabian Society, wrote two letters to *The Times* on the population problem and the declining birth rate, in which he revealed that a study by the Fabian Society had urged the endowment of motherhood, to improve the quality and quantity of the English race.[42]

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

One Social Darwinist in particular, Karl Pearson,[43] was especially concerned with eugenics. In 1911 he became the first Galton Professor of Eugenics at the University of London. Pearson allied a thorough knowledge of evolutionary theory and a strong faith in eugenics with a deep social conscience, dating back to his studies of Marxist thought while a student in Germany. The result was perhaps the profoundest expression of Social Darwinism in the period. Pearson's ideas were distant indeed from those of the first Social Darwinist, Herbert Spencer.

Pearson based much of his synthesis on the idea of the organic nature of the state. As early as 1894, he wrote that "[h]uman societies cannot be symbolized as rigid structures of stone and iron, they are organic growths, yielding and accommodating themselves, if sound, to almost every form of internal and external stress."[44] He felt that, in evolutionary terms, the external struggle was far more important than internal competition. According to Pearson, history has shown only one way "in which a high state of civilization has been produced, namely, the struggle of race with race, and the survival of the physically and mentally fitter race."[45]

Professor Pearson seems to have accepted Marxian economic theory and considered himself a socialist, but he rejected the internationalism of most contemporary socialist thought. His was a national form of socialism.[46] Pearson's politics were firmly based on the idea of an organic state. He felt that the state must be a "homogeneous whole," and he denounced those socialists who stirred up class antagonisms. Since he viewed the struggle for existence as one between nations and/or races, the unity of the state was paramount. He urged that the state be considered a sacred principle, that "an offense against the state ought to be looked upon as a far graver matter than the offence against the individual." Socialists, he believed, must "inculcate that spirit which would give offenders against the State short shrift and the nearest lamp-post."[47]

Pearson attacked the Social Darwinist theories of both Kidd and Spencer. He argued that they had both rejected socialism by false reasoning and that they based their views on the internal struggle for existence on false biological premises.[48] He maintained that the social and economic "intra-group struggle plays little, if any, part in natural selection of man."[49] Pearson argued that social progress actually "depended on an organization of society checking very largely the individual struggle for existence within the group."[50] The ability to withstand external competition depended to a large extent on the level of social stability. Thus the "victory of the more capable, or the more fortunate, must not involve such a defeat of the less capable that social stability is endangered by the misery produced."[51]

Indeed, England could "be crushed" without great difficulty if she allowed too great an amount of internal competition.[52] But Pearson had a dogmatic faith in the inevitability of the reduction of intragroup competition, and wrote that "the future *will* be socialistic, the intra-group struggle *will* be weakened rather than intensified."[53]

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Pearson argued that true natural selection occurred in man (within society) before it reached the stage of intragroup competition; therefore the industrial and class competitions could safely be reduced.[54] In the true socialist state "less artificial protection for the weakling will be possible, less chance of their surviving…." The real socialist believed that "the progress of man has depended in the main on the minimizing of [the intra-group struggle] in order to emphasize the action of another factor—extra-group selection." [55]

Pearson rejected intragroup struggle as a means of bettering the race, but he had other ideas which he felt would improve the quality of the people. Primary among these was his advocacy of eugenics, designed to increase the production of more capable individuals and to lessen the numbers of the "unfit." To facilitate this, he urged a biological view of the status of women. Concerning female emancipation, he wrote

> How can woman follow her sexual and maternal instincts?…how can she do freely what she alone can do for society…. The answer…does not lie in "equality of opportunity," it lies in special protection, in the socialization of the State.[56]

Thus he urged a "national insurance for motherhood" and the regulation of the labor of women, all toward the end of improving the quality of the individuals within the state.[57]

Pearson's views on race were related to his eugenic creed, "man varies, and these variations, favorable and unfavorable, are inherited." Concerning African races, he wrote

> How many centuries, how many thousands of years have the Kaffir or the Negro held large tribal districts in Africa undisturbed by the white man? Yet their inter-tribal struggles have not yet produced a civilization in the least comparable with the Aryan. Educate and nurture them as you will, I do not believe that you will succeed in modifying the stock.[58]

Within England, Pearson hoped for the time

> when conscious race culture will cope with the ills which arise when we suspend the full purifying force of natural selection…. The higher patriotism and the pride of race must come to our aid in stemming deterioration.[59]

It was "a false view of human solidarity, a weak humanitarianism" that regretted the fact that "a capable and stalwart race of white men should replace a dark-skinned tribe."[60]

This race-building program would better prepare the nation for war. War was, to Pearson, totally necessary for evolutionary progress:

> You may hope for a time when the sword shall be turned into the ploughshare…but, believe me, when that day comes mankind will no longer progress…the relentless law of heredity will be controlled and guided by natural selection.[61]

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Social Darwinism, in its ultimate form, as has been outlined in the preceding pages, was at the core of much of the thought of the Victorian and Edwardian eras in England. Whether Liberal, Fabian, or Unionist, many of the most important individuals of the latter period reflect, in varying degrees, some consciously and some unconsciously, Social Darwinist ideas and theories.

Alfred Milner, Idealist

How pervasive was Social Darwinism can perhaps best be understood by looking at a man who, as a product of his age, unconsciously exhibited Social Darwinist tendencies in almost every aspect of his thought. Viscount Alfred Milner never spoke of "evolution," "natural selection," or "survival of the fittest" in biological terms, but nevertheless, his ideas and interests paralleled in many respects those of the later Social Darwinists.

Milner was an idealist, despite the fact that he shared many of the ideas of the realists. He was a nationalist to the core and allied this nationalism with outspoken racialist ideas. In most cases, Milner's nationalism extended to seeing the Empire as a unit. In 1905 he declared: "[w]hen we who call ourselves Imperialists, talk of the British Empire, we think of a group of states, independent of one another in their local affairs, but bound together for the defense of their common interests and the development of a common civilization...in a permanent organic union...."[62] He felt that not only national but Imperial unity was essential if Britain was to master the challenges of the twentieth century.

Milner regarded race as of overwhelming importance. His biographer, A. M. Gollin, wrote of his views on race that "they were the motive force behind every one of his political and Imperial proposals." Gollin added that "this race patriotism was not the vulgar racialism that sought to conceal British Imperial self-interest behind those tedious neo-Darwinian slogans which claimed that the strongest were best fitted to survive and to dominate in world affairs...."[63] Yet despite the fact that Milner never tried to rationalize his views with an appeal to science, he does seem to fit within the spectrum of later Social Darwinist thought. Many of his ideas align clearly with those of Karl Pearson.

Milner's Social Darwinism was based, not on science, but on nationalism, patriotism, and anti-cosmopolitanism. He wrote:

> [m]y patriotism knows no geographical but only racial limits. I am an Imperialist…because I am a British Race Patriot.[64]

He declared that his first great principle was that

> [t]he British State must follow the race, must comprehend it, wherever it settles in appreciable numbers as an independent community…. We cannot afford to part with so much of our best blood.[65]

Elsewhere Milner wrote:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> I have emphasized the importance of the racial bond. From my point of view this is fundamental. It is the British race which built the Empire and it is the undivided British race which can alone uphold it…deeper, stronger, more primordial than…material ties is the bond of common blood, a common language, common history and traditions.[66]

Lord Milner believed that the maintenance of the Empire was essential to the prosperity and strength of the nation and he often spoke of their interdependence. He was convinced that Great Britain must maintain a strong military force to protect the Empire, and thus he advocated both conscription and military education. Milner also felt that the time was coming when the home island would no longer be able to supply capable men in the numbers required to run the Empire, and recommended the emigration of good stock to build communities in the colonies. One aim of his imperialism was to maintain those communities as parts of an organic whole, thus providing for a continuity of race, nation, and Empire.[67]

It was Milner's conviction that the British had a national and racial mission; to accomplish it, they must keep racially strong. He hoped, as had Pearson, that Britain would develop a form of socialism, a national type of socialism, to strengthen the nation and to maintain and improve the race. This was to have a form which would not magnify class conflicts, since according to Milner "among civilized peoples of more or less equal size, that one will be, as it will deserve to be, the strongest, which is most successful in removing the causes of class antagonism in its midst."[68]

Milner's socialism was of a moderate form—"Gas and Water Socialism"[69]—which would result in a greater amount of social equality, leading to a more dynamic physical and moral strength for the British people in order that they would be better able to defend the nation and the Empire. His support of tariff reform (i.e., raising tariffs on imports) can be considered part of this program. Milner hoped that, through his influence, tariff reform might be broadened.[70] He believed that it was designed in the interests of "the nation as a whole, not only one class," and would "let all pay according to their means,"[71] thus helping to decrease class conflict.

Was Milner a true Social Darwinist? Perhaps not, but he was a product of the spirit of his age, albeit an extreme one, and the roots of this spirit lay to a great extent in the Darwinian revolution.

TODAY: SOCIAL DARWINISM AND SOCIOBIOLOGY

Is there a continuity between the Social Darwinism of Edwardian era England and today's sociobiology?[72] Certainly the egalitarian leftist opponents of sociobiology and its offspring, evolutionary psychology and biosociology, invariably attempt to link them to a totally discredited (in their eyes) Social Darwinism.[73] In response, some supporters of these late twentieth century disciplines have tried to distance themselves and their disciplines from the earlier school.[74] Where does the truth lie?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It is certainly true that various ideas and movements[75] with connections to Social Darwinism continued to develop to the mid-twentieth century and beyond. Nevertheless, we must recognize that the universal conquest of the Western nations by leftist egalitarians in matters social and political following our second great fratricidal war of the century virtually ended any connection of significant social or scientific movements with Social Darwinism. It had become a pariah in the very world it had helped build. Sociobiology was an independent creation—in fact E.O. Wilson, its creator, knew virtually nothing of the history of Social Darwinism. His primary interest lay in ants. It was only after the publication of his world-shaking classic, *Sociobiology*, that he began a serious study of either human evolution or the background of Social Darwinism. So the leftist critics are surely wrong: sociobiology and its offspring have no linear connection. Both arose independently, based on the scientific information available at the time and the social needs of the era. But are those (generally egalitarian) supporters of sociobiology who reject any possible ties with Social Darwinism correct? Let's look at the evidence.

1. The "new biology" on which Social Darwinism was based considered man a part of nature, not above or apart from it. So does sociobiology.

2. Social Darwinists believed that all life, and especially all human life, could be explained without the invocation of an all-powerful god. Sociobiology agrees.

3. Social Darwinists believed that the concept that drives all egalitarian leftist ideologies, the mind as a *tabula rasa*, was nonsense. Sociobiology rejects this concept just as emphatically.

4. The evolutionary importance of competition and cooperation between individuals and groups was integral to Social Darwinism. While with sociobiology the emphasis is often on the individual gene, recently the importance of group competition has grown in sociobiology.

5. Social Darwinists were generally strong in their support for eugenics and the improvement of the quality of humans being born. While sociobiologists are largely silent on eugenics, it is clear that sociobiological thinking is generally supportive of eugenic ideas and in no case supports anti-eugenic thought, regardless of rhetoric.[76] Despite the general public posture of most intellectuals, left and right, against the "evils of eugenics," today support for eugenics is growing rapidly, even if mostly in private.[77]

6. Social Darwinists accepted race differences, not only in the obvious physical characteristics, but also in mental and behavioral characteristics. It is fair to say that most sociobiologists avoid issues involving race as they would the Ebola virus. Nevertheless, private support among them for *The Bell Curve* and even for J. Philippe Rushton's *Race, Evolution and Behavior* is considerable and growing. A huge "fear factor" is involved here, but time and science are clearly on the side of the race-realists (as some of them call themselves).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Where does this leave us? Had our second great fratricidal war been averted, or even if—as that ardent believer in eugenics, Charles Lindbergh, urged—a negotiated peace had been achieved, perhaps the egalitarian leftist conquest of the social and political institutions of the West might not have occurred. In which case it seems likely that the development of contemporary sociobiology might have occurred earlier, influenced by, if not an outgrowth of, Social Darwinism. Since history took a different path, Social Darwinism remains a past and a prologue, but the contemporary sociobiology grew from a different branch on the Darwinian tree.

---

*Louis Andrews is a businessman and creator of the **Stalking the Wild Taboo** website. He is also web editor/publisher and business manager of **The Occidental Quarterly**. Mr. Andrews has written for **Right Now!** as well as other publications and lives in Augusta, Ga.*

End Notes

1. L. T. Hobhouse, *Democracy and Reaction* (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1904), 59-60.
2. Ibid., 75-84.
3. Although Social Darwinism is sometimes defined simply as the equating of business competition with natural selection leading to evolutionary progress, here it is more broadly used as any system or approach to the study of man and society that utilizes evolutionary theory on the biological level.
4. I have borrowed these terms from Bernard Semmel, *Imperialism and Social Reform: English Social-Imperial Thought, 1895-1914* (London: George Allen & Unwin , 1960.), 30.
5. Although a little dated, Garrett Hardin provides an excellent review of the development of evolutionary theory and its implications for man in *Nature and Man's Fate* (New York: Rinehart, 1959).
6. Herbert Spencer (1820-1903). Liberal philosopher, published works on almost all major phases of knowledge including philosophy, ethnology, biology, sociology, psychology, political science, history, and mathematics. He was a member of both the 'X' and Athenaeum clubs. *Dictionary of National Biography (1901-1911)* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 360-369.
7. For a brief discussion of Spencer's theories and their relation to the development of authoritarian thought, see William M. McGovern, *From Luther to Hitler* (London: George G. Harrap, 1946), 457-463.
8. Herbert Spencer, *The Principles of Sociology*, vol. 1, part II (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1897), 449 ff.
9. Cited in Carlton J. H. Hayes, *A Generation of Materialism* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1941), 11.
10. Ibid.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

11. Walter Bagehot (1826-1877). Educated at the University of London. Journalist and economist. Editor of the *Economist*. *Dictionary of National Biography (From the Earliest Times to 1900)* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 865-868.

12. Cited in McGovern, 464.

13. Ibid.

14. Walter Bagehot, *Physics and Politics* (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1895), chapters 3 & 4.

15. Ibid., 43.

16. Ibid., 156 ff.

17. Alfred Milner, Viscount (1854-1925). Educated at Tübingen; King's College, London; awarded first scholarship at Balliol College, Oxford. Liberal journalist; Director General of Accounts (Egypt), 1889; Undersecretary to the Khedive, 1890; Board of Internal Revenue (Eng.), 1892; C.B., 1894; K.C.B., 1895; High Commissioner to South Africa, 1897-1905; War Cabinet, 1916; Secretary of the Colonial Office, 1918-1921. *Dictionary of National Biography (1922-1930)*, 588-602.

18. Alfred Milner, *England in Egypt* (London: Edward Arnold, 1904), 356.

19. Benjamin Kidd (1858-1916). Civil servant, sociologist. *Western Civilization*, 1902; *The Science of Power*, 1918. *Dictionary of National Biography (1912-1918)*, 305-306.

20. William L. Langer, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism*, vol. 1, 87. See also Crane Brinton, *English Political Thought in the Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), 282-292.

21. Benjamin Kidd, *Social Evolution* (New York: Macmillan and Company, 1894), 227.

22. Ibid., Chapters 1 and 7 generally.

23. Ibid., 78.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid., 277-287.

26. Ibid., 103. For a criticism of Kidd's religious theories, see Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1928), 672 ff.

27. Langer, 87.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. W. F. Wyatt, "The Ethics of Empire," *Nineteenth Century*, April 1897, 524.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid., 525-529.

33. Ibid., 530.

34. W. F. Wyatt, "War As the Test of National Value," *Nineteenth Century*, February 1899, 218.

35. Ibid., 220.

36. Ibid., 224-225.

37. Sidney Lowe, "The Hypocrisies of the Peace Conference," *Nineteenth Century*, May 1899, 692.

38. H. H. Almond, "The Breed of Man," *Nineteenth Century*, October 1900, 667.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

39. Eugenics is concerned with the genetic or hereditary improvement of man. In its beginnings it was largely concerned with the possibility of the improvement of innate intelligence or "talent." Perhaps its major "theorem" is that "Man's political actions have genetic consequences." Hardin, 214.

40. Sir Francis Galton (1822-1911). Founder of the school of Eugenics; creator of fingerprint analysis. Conducted studies in evolution, experimental psychology, and heredity. Numerous awards and honors from scientific societies in England and France. *Dictionary of National Biography (1901-1911)*, 70-73. Hardin, 214 ff.

41. *Macmillan's Magazine* 11 (November 1864-April 1865), 157-166. This as well as his second essay, a continuation of the first, were reprinted in *The Occidental Quarterly*, 2 (3), Fall 2002, 45-68.

42. For a discussion and criticism of these letters, see James W. Barclay, "The Race Suicide Scare," *Nineteenth Century*, December 1906, 895-899.

43. Karl Pearson (1857-1936). Statistician and biologist; educated at University College School; King's College, Cambridge; University of Heidelberg; University of Berlin; from 1884, at University College, London; FRS, 1896; Darwin Medal, 1899; founded journal *Biometrika*, 1901; 1911 first Galton Professor of Eugenics; numerous scientific papers and books. *Dictionary of National Biography (1931-1940)*, 681-684.

44. Karl Pearson, "Women and Labor," *Fortnightly Review*, January-June 1894, 562.

45. Cited in Hobhouse, 114-115.

46. Semmel, 37.

47. Ibid., 39.

48. Karl Pearson, "Socialism and Natural Selection," *Fortnightly Review*, July-December 1894, 2-5.

49. Ibid., 18.

50. Ibid., 5.

51. Ibid., 6.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid., 11.

54. Ibid., 14.

55. Ibid., 16.

56. Pearson, "Women and Labor," 569.

57. Ibid., 576.

58. McGovern, 499.

59. Semmel, 49.

60. Ibid., 50.

61. Hayes, 340.

62. A. M. Gollin, *Proconsul in Politics: A Study of Lord Milner in Opposition and in Power* (London: Anthony Blond, 1964), 123.

63. Ibid., 127.

64. *The Times*, July 27, 1925.

65. Ibid.

66. Gollin, 130-131.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

67. Edward Crankshaw, *The Forsaken Idea: A Study of Viscount Milner* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1952), 162.

68. Cited in Semmel, 181.

69. Gollin, 156.

70. Gollin, 115.

71. Semmel, 181-182.

72. In the balance of this essay, sociobiology refers to both sociobiology and its offspring, evolutionary psychology and biosociology.

73. For example, see William H. Tucker, *The Science and Politics of Racial Research* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1994).

74. For example, see Steven Pinker, *The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature* (New York: Viking Press, 2002), reviewed in this issue of *The Occidental Quarterly*.

75. Group evolution, the socialization of the state, and the British Empire and its race-based paternalism.

76. Louis Andrews, "Science for Tomorrow," *The Occidental Quarterly* 2, (1) Spring 2002, 73-79.

77. Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray, *The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life* (New York: The Free Press, 1994) and Malcom Brown, "What Is Intelligence, and Who Has It?" *The New York Times*, October 16, 1994.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Racial Differences in Intelligence:

The Evolution of One Person's Views

Lawrence Auster

Abstract

In this essay, written in 1995, I recounted the development up to that time of my ideas on the vitally important subject of race and intelligence. I hope the document will be read in the exploratory spirit in which I wrote it. The worst thing about the present racial situation is the silencing of needed discussion, and, even if my ideas are wrong or overstated on some points, one must start somewhere.

With the publication of *The Bell Curve*, we see the fascinating phenomenon of mainstream journalists and intellectuals wrestling, most of them for the first time, with the uncomfortable facts about race differences in intelligence. While this is an historic event, it can also seem rather disappointing. Apart from the writers who demonize Murray and Herrnstein, which was to be expected, even those more thoughtful liberals and conservatives who (grudgingly) admit the subject of race and intelligence into discourse hedge it around with so many qualifications as to make it almost meaningless. Thus William Buckley acknowledged the reality of the racial IQ difference, but then quoted Murray and Herrnstein to the effect that it's not important. Scott McConnell in the *New York Post* said that IQ can be changed. Jacob Weisberg of *New York* magazine, a true liberal diehard, threw even more fences and evasions and escape hatches around the subject. Unfortunately, Charles Murray and Richard Herrnstein themselves had already set the stage for this intellectually unserious treatment of their work by downplaying the idea of race differences even as they promoted it. Murray, in his many appearances on television, has been appallingly evasive about the true content and purport of his ideas.

As disappointing as this hedging is, we need to recognize that it is a natural and predictable stage in an unfolding of thought that will take some time to reach clarity. It does not happen all at once, but necessarily goes through several stages. This is because the question of race and intelligence does not consist, as people seem to imagine, of just *one* idea, it consists of a *constellation* of ideas, which must be grasped one at a time until the larger scene comes into view. To illustrate this, I would like to tell the story of the involvement of one

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

non-specialist—namely myself—with these ideas. The experience as I've lived through it can be compared to looking at the world through slightly out-of-focus lenses, then slowly sharpening the focus until what was hazy becomes clear. Or it is like something in the background of one's field of vision slowly moving into the foreground.

In this process, rationalizations and evasions slip away, sometimes gradually, sometimes through startling insights that revolutionize one's whole way of thinking. In telling about my own experience of these ideas as they came to me, one by one, I can perhaps give the reader a more comprehensive, if non-systematic, approach to understanding this subject.

IQ and Intelligence

In the mid-1980s, *New York* magazine had a cover story on the growing tensions between blacks and Jews. The article gave figures on black SAT scores that were absolutely stunning; for example, in the entire U.S. only about one hundred blacks in any given year scored over 700 in the verbal SATs. What this meant to me was that the number of blacks at the top level of academic abilities was virtually non-existent. So it was no longer a surprise that there were so few blacks in the intellectual professions.

At the time, however, I did not draw any deeper conclusions from this with regard to black intelligence. The data did not suggest to me that differences in SAT scores related to something I would call "intelligence" or that such differences were permanent, but only that, *as blacks were at this point*, it was unrealistic to expect proportional equality in all professions, and in particular there was this shocking absence of blacks at the higher levels of verbal and logical ability.

In 1990 I met Michael Levin when he hosted a National Association of Scholars meeting at his apartment in Manhattan, around the time that he was first being attacked for his statements on black intelligence. I acquired a copy of Professor Levin's controversial article in the Australian quarterly *Proceedings* which contained the sentence, "The average black is significantly less intelligent than the average white." After reading it and also hearing him interviewed on a radio program, I wrote a letter to Levin in which, perhaps contradictorily, I expressed both admiration for his courage and concern that he was being too blunt; specifically, I suggested that instead of saying "blacks on average are less intelligent" he might say "blacks on average are less capable in the intellectual skills measured in I.Q. tests"—wording, I argued, that would be more precise and less demeaning to blacks.

At the same time, however, I conceded to Levin that blunt language might be the only way to get at these forbidden ideas. Experience in later years proved this to be correct. I came to feel that Levin, by simply stating the forbidden truth in *plain English* rather than in technical terms or euphemisms, had been a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pioneer. The reason for this is that without that horrifying word "intelligence," as in "blacks are on average less intelligent than whites," the difficult truth of this matter *does not get through to our minds*. We can always evade the truth by imagining that the thing at issue is something secondary, like "the ability to take tests."

Then there was the question of whether IQ tests measure something *real*. While this is amply demonstrated in the literature (and I don't want to go into it much here), a key finding that proved to my satisfaction the validity of IQ is its *predictability*—a point well established by Murray and Herrnstein in *The Bell Curve*. You can make all kinds of metaphysical arguments that IQ is just the "ability to take IQ tests," or that it "does not measure creativity," and so on. But as Murray and Herrnstein demonstrate in exhaustive detail based on data from the National Longitudinal Study of Youth, if you give a large sampling of fourteen-year-olds an IQ test, while controlling for socioeconomic background, ten or twenty years later their life achievement will correlate very strongly with the results of those tests. This, I think, is the definitive argument for the validity of IQ. [Author's note: A couple of years after this was written, Murray demonstrated that siblings with different IQs—who of course share exactly the same socioeconomic status and home environment—differ markedly in their later success and income. This was absolute proof of the reality and importance of IQ.]

In 1991, when the *New York Post* condemned Levin as a racist, I wrote a letter to the *Post* defending Levin's ideas. It was the first time I had addressed the issue in print. In that letter, I saw the significance of the IQ difference in that it meant blacks could not be expected to have equal intellectual achievement with whites, and that lower black representation in the professions was not due to racism. However, I still thought that the lower black achievement might be due to "cultural" factors and therefore could potentially be raised up to equal that of whites. The main point for me was that, as blacks are *now*, they could not be expected to achieve equally with whites, and that affirmative action was therefore based on wrong premises. I was not particularly interested in the great debate over "environment versus genetics," since the topic seemed metaphysical to me. I was, and am, also offended by the constant references to "genes" as causal in human life, which I think is a materialistic, reductionist concept. I felt we should stay with the things we know, such as the concrete fact that blacks do perform differently, without worrying ourselves to death over the hidden ultimate causes that we cannot know.

The problem with the above view, however, is that it leaves open a huge escape hatch for the supporters of affirmative action. They can concede that blacks are less intelligent *now*, but still insist that if we push blacks artificially into higher socioeconomic levels through massive affirmative action, then black intelligence will be equalized with that of whites. Or that, if it's too late for this generation of blacks to improve, then their children will grow up with a better

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

environment (created through affirmative action) and will be more intelligent. Liberals are constantly looking for ways to keep the egalitarian social engineering project alive; and as long as that project is alive, any failure by society to achieve complete racial equality of outcomes will continue to be falsely blamed on "white racism," with all the divisive, demoralizing, and destructive effects that charge has on society. For these reasons, it's not enough to know about the existence of racial differences in intelligence without also grasping the fact that these differences are not amenable to elimination by any known means. Of course, black intellectual performance could be improved, perhaps significantly in some cases, if society brought back real standards and discipline and if black illegitimacy were reduced. But that's not the same as *eliminating* the racial gap, which is the aim and demand of our ruling ideology.

Richard Lynn's and Michael Levin's articles on the Scarr-Weinberg cross-racial adoption study in the March 1994 *American Renaissance* settled these questions for me. The adoption study, which followed until adulthood black children adopted as babies by college-educated whites, showed that even with a totally "white" upper middle-class environment and upbringing, the large black-white IQ gap remained; at best it was slightly narrowed. As Levin pointed out, this was a definitive demonstration of a hereditary racial difference in IQ.

Then there was the assertion of cultural bias in mental tests, meaning that blacks did worse on IQ tests because the tests emphasized "white" cultural knowledge. Jared Taylor's interview with Arthur Jensen, published in the August and September 1992 *American Renaissance* (and even more, the unabridged, 36-page typescript of this interview), blew that notion out of the water. Jensen made the point that in test questions that involved no cultural background at all, such as the ability to see similarities in geometric shapes, blacks actually did worse than in questions that used "white" cultural references.

Differences in Style of Thought

So far, I've been speaking of intelligence as something that can be quantitatively measured. But in recent years I've also come to believe there are differences in black and white *styles of thinking*. Race differences are not limited to numerical differences on a single scale like IQ (which itself is an aggregate of several different abilities). Race differences also take in different types of mentality, which we can see more readily by commonsense observation than by scientific tests.

Personal observation is of course subjective and may be erroneous and unfair. Nonetheless, it is a necessary part of understanding the world in which we live. Further, I am attempting to describe the whole journey of my change of attitude regarding race, a journey that has included (possibly unfair)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

generalizations from personal experience as well as the cognition of more objective facts. In the next few paragraphs, therefore, I will state my subjective impressions and conclusions as such, without claiming objective validity for them and without attempting to document or prove them beyond telling the experiences that led to them.

Following the arguments and actions of black leaders, and listening to black callers on talk radio, led me over several years to an increasingly bleak view of black thinking styles. For one thing, it seemed to me that many blacks have a marked tendency to pick up some slogan and then just use it without much logical connection to the subject at hand. I also became increasingly aware of the "hustle," the way many blacks at all levels—from street people and politicians to celebrated "intellectuals" like Cornel West—did not use ideas as ideas, but as a hustle, as a way of manipulating people's feelings. Suggestibility and the substitution of rhetoric for reason are general human weaknesses, but it seemed to me that these failings were noticeably more pronounced among blacks. Of course there are many blacks who are rational and logical and intellectually competent. But the preponderance of irrationality among the black population is hard to ignore.

I was also impressed by Gedahlia Braun's fascinating manuscript, *Racism, Guilt and Self-Deceit*, based on his many years of close personal observation of blacks in Africa, an excellent review of which appeared in *American Renaissance* in 1993.

According to Braun, African blacks have a wholly different kind of mentality from whites. He pointed to Africans' inability to understand cause-and-effect relationships, as seen in the magical mode of thinking observed among Pacific Islanders and known as the "cargo cult" syndrome, and which Braun also saw evidenced among black Africans. For example, as Braun described it, Africans seem to see Western development aid as a magical process that will automatically make all the appurtenances of a modern society appear. This way of thinking leads African blacks to see whites as magical beings who could, if they wanted, do *everything* for blacks. To the extent that this attitude carries over to blacks outside of Africa, it would explain their belief in (white) government as the answer to all their needs, and their growing rage at whites for not giving blacks the vast range of goodies that blacks believe is within whites' (magical) power to give.

Another of Braun's provocative observations was that African blacks (at least those who have not come under the influence of Western liberalism) have no hang-ups about the notion that whites are smarter. In fact, they take it for granted and, he pointed out, are eager to talk about the subject with him because it's so rare for them to find a white who will speak honestly about race. They prefer such honesty to the racial guilt, the pious lies about equality, and the hypocrisy that they normally get from whites. These observations suggest that white liberal attitudes have done more to harm race relations than any other factor.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

I also began to think about differences in black and white attitudes and outlook on the world, particularly in relation to the capacity for objectivity. Through numerous experiences and observations, I started to have the sense that blacks are more "non-objective," they understand things in a much more personal, subjective way than whites. They seem to have much less interest in knowledge or beauty for its own sake. For example, I repeatedly had the following experience. Whenever I would turn on C-SPAN and the conference being broadcast consisted of black people, literally five seconds would not pass before the speaker would say the word "black." In other words, *blackness itself* was the topic of the conference. When whites get together at an academic or other type of meeting, it's to talk about some objective area of shared interest, whether science or literature or history or politics. But, at least as far as one can judge from C-SPAN, when blacks get together to talk in a formal public setting, it is almost always to talk about themselves.

Many blacks believe that there is such a difference of intellectual orientation between blacks and whites. Black multiculturalists say that whites are more interested in "things" (or, as the multiculturalists charmingly put it, whites are more interested in "manipulating" things), while blacks are more interested in "relationships." Of course, the multiculturalists put this in such a way as to make whites look cold and mean, blacks warm and empathetic. In any case, the multiculturalists do not seem to realize that to the extent such a difference in orientation toward external reality does exist, it means that blacks are in fact less endowed with the qualities that make civilization possible, particularly Western civilization. What distinguishes Western from non-Western cultures is the capacity for objectivity, the ability to recognize a truth beyond one's own immediate impulses or family and tribal loyalties.

A corollary of this lack of orientation toward objective facts and ideas is the relative intellectual and moral passivity of blacks. While there are many decent, upright black people, there is a notable failure on the part of blacks effectively to resist the bad people in their communities. The result is that the bad people—the orators, the hustlers, the corrupt, the despots—always seem to rise to the top. That is why black countries, and black-run cities in America, are the way they are. There are good people living in those places, but for the most part they are only good in their private, familial sphere. They are not actively good in the social and political sense and thus rarely take leadership or succeed in creating a civilized political order. The number of morally courageous and principled blacks who actively resist the corruption and racialist conformism around them is very limited; in fact, such upright and intelligent blacks often separate themselves from the black community when they recognize how unwelcome they are in it.

The only time when there was a relatively high-quality black leadership in America was when America was under the influence of a white bourgeois Christian elite who set decent standards for the whole society including whites *and* blacks. Black communities and churches (just like white ethnic minority

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

communities) tended to replicate the authoritative moral standards of the larger society. Thus the upright black leaders of the mid-twentieth century were themselves indirect products of a virtuous white majority culture. But as blacks have thrown off white influence and cultural standards (and as whites have cast off their own standards), black public society, as everyone is painfully aware, has become radically cruder and less ethical.

What really convinced me of an inherent, dangerous weakness in black ways of thought, however, was their widespread belief in Afrocentrism and the notion that whites were committing "genocide" against blacks. In September 1989, ABC News did a program on the condition of blacks in America, followed by a special edition of *Nightline* with a panel consisting of several of ABC's black correspondents and other noted blacks. With the exception of Professor Shelby Steele, these accomplished, successful blacks all endorsed the notion of a white conspiracy to commit "genocide" against blacks. The fact that it was not just ignorant street people, but successful, articulate black professionals who believed these insane and wicked conspiracy theories made a devastating impression on me. Indeed, with the exception of the 1992 Los Angeles riots, I was more traumatized by this program than by any other public event in recent history. It shook my former belief that blacks and whites could more or less get along in the same society. (I wrote an article about this program, saying the same things I've said in the present paragraph, which New York *Newsday* rejected because, as the editor put it, it showed an "odd lack of compassion.")

The wide acceptance of Afrocentrism had a similar effect on my views of blacks. I was appalled when I heard commentator Tony Brown, a reasonable and intelligent black (who, moreover, had just joined the Republican Party), say in a speech to the Heritage Foundation that, given the fact that mankind began in Africa, "all civilizations are African." More than anything else, Afrocentrism, with its claims that European civilization was "stolen" from Africa and that people like Hannibal and Cleopatra were black because they lived on the African continent, confirmed my growing conviction that blacks were often incapable of distinguishing their wishes, feelings, and resentments from objective reality. There is also the growing "black Bible" movement, which teaches that the main figures in the Bible, including Abraham, Moses, Mary, Jesus, and Paul, were black—a truth which (naturally) those tricky whites have systematically hidden from blacks so as to maintain their dominance over them. As far as I can see, the blackness of the people in the Bible constitutes the sole teaching of this sect. Their interest in the Bible is exclusively racialist. (Once again, the fact that a large number of blacks do not believe in Afrocentrism does not change the fact that a large number of them do, and are acting on it and spreading it and institutionalizing it throughout the whole society.)

The most extreme form of black conspiracy thinking is the Nation of Islam claim that whites are demons who were created by a mad scientist 5,000 years ago, and who ever since then have robbed blacks of their birthright. Whether

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

blacks believe in that myth, or are just fixated on a general feeling of historic grievance, the notion of their historic victimhood *tends to justify in their minds every crime and injustice that they might now commit against whites*. Over and over, polls and statements reveal that blacks feel they should not be held to moral standards for the crimes of blacks against whites, because blacks have been the victims of this vast and still unacknowledged evil by whites for several thousands of years. Blacks thus tend to see every issue in purely *racialist* terms—as we can see when black juries excuse black killers of whites, or when the great majority of blacks say that O.J. Simpson is innocent, or when a high percentage of blacks agree that Colin Ferguson's mass murder on the Long Island Rail Road was a justified act of rage against white racism. The above attitudes all increasingly suggest that blacks and whites cannot truly live as equal co-citizens in the same society.

It is hard to forget Jefferson's chilling premonitions in this regard:

> Why not retain and incorporate the blacks into the State, and thus save the expense of supplying by importation of white settlers, the vacancies they will leave? Deep-rooted prejudices entertained by the whites; t*en thousand recollections, by the blacks, of the injuries they have sustained*; new provocations; the real distinctions which nature has made; and many other circumstances, will divide us into parties, and produce convulsions, which will probably never end but in the extermination of the one or the other race. [Italics added] [*Notes on Virginia*, Query XIV, 1782].

Of course, blacks have suffered real historic crimes at the hands of whites. But that does not explain the contemporary, *intensifying* sense of black grievance, which finds its most flagrant expression in fantasies of white devils and 5,000-year-old conspiracies. Most importantly, the fact that the black feeling of grievance is augmenting, rather than diminishing, as slavery and legal discrimination recede into the distant past, suggests that the grievance has little to do with any actual crimes committed by whites. As I suggested in my American Renaissance speech, even in the complete absence of any racial oppression, blacks with their lower abilities will still tend to end up at the bottom of any biracial or multiracial society, a condition blacks and white liberals can only explain by saying that whites are keeping the blacks down. In other words, so long as the truth of racial differences is not recognized, whites will *always* end up being blamed—by both blacks *and* whites—for a black inferiority that is not whites' fault.

The "Optical Illusion"

But there was still a major objection in my mind to the idea of an intractable racial difference in intelligence or civilizational capacities. It was the thought that, after all, most blacks seem normally intelligent, so how could there be so big a racial difference in overall intellectual abilities? It didn't make sense. I then realized that this confusion stemmed from the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mistaken assumption that intelligence is a single ability measured along a single continuum. In fact, intelligence consists of a set of several different abilities at different levels. People who may be equal to each other at *one* level may be vastly unequal at *another* level. As I was reading Daniel Seligman's useful book, *A Question of Intelligence*, published in 1992, the following occurred to me, based on an experience that many people have probably had:

> You're speaking to an intelligent skilled worker, say a carpenter who is doing renovations on your house. He can speak about the job with great knowledgeability and intelligence. But the moment the conversation strays to an abstract or conceptual subject, he is uncomprehending. At one level of intelligence two people may be more or less equal, but at a higher level of intelligence there may be significant difference between them.

The carpenter idea helped me conceptualize the group difference between blacks and whites. For example, blacks do virtually as well as whites in reciting a list of numbers from memory, but they do much worse than whites when the test calls for them to recite a list *backwards*. In other words, at the level of ordinary abilities, the racial difference is small, but at a higher order of abilities, the difference is large.

This insight explained for me the "optical illusion" of racial equality. I realized that the reason whites do not automatically become aware of the large differences in average intellectual ability between whites and blacks is that whites often deal with blacks on a superficial level where only the ordinary levels of intelligence are brought into play.

In the fall of 1993 I had a kind of epiphany in which all these thoughts crystallized into a new paradigm concerning racial differences. It happened like this. I recalled an uncle of mine, one of my father's brothers, who died about ten years ago. He was a tall, handsome man, a natty dresser, a golfer, socially popular, a tough guy with an authoritative air, a bit irascible at times but not unkind. It never occurred to me in my youth there was anything wrong with him. It wasn't until I grew older that I realized his entire conversation was limited to saying things like "Not too bad," or "How about that," or "You don't say." That's an exaggeration, but not by much. My uncle, a year older than my father, worked with him in their business, in which they were partners, but I gradually realized my uncle did little except answer the phone and take in receipts. It was my father who actually ran the business and who had basically supported my uncle through his entire life, all the while keeping up the amiable front that my uncle was a partner in fact as well as in name. My mother told me that before she married my father, he told her that he would always have to take care of his brother. In fact, my uncle was of very limited intelligence, perhaps even borderline retarded, but it wasn't something you automatically noticed because of the way he carried himself, his almost kingly manner and leonine appearance.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

As I thought about my uncle in this light, I began to see through the "optical illusion" of racial equality. I realized how in ordinary interactions and behavior blacks seem on the whole like ourselves, indeed, often more vital than ourselves, with warm and vivid personalities, so we assume that any intellectual differences must be insignificant. It is only when we go beyond superficial contact and get to know them better, or when we observe them in a position requiring intelligence, that we see that, much more often than whites or Asians, they are unable to deal with more rigorous tasks. In undemanding, routine affairs they are, more or less, intellectually equal to whites. In more demanding settings they are not.

It was this insight that, by revealing and removing the "optical illusion," brought all my ideas into a new pattern and gave me the conviction that there is a substantial, real difference in intelligence between blacks and whites, and that the difference is not just quantitative, but qualitative.

The optical illusion applies to political morality as well as to intelligence. I discussed earlier the question of passive and private goodness versus active and social goodness. Now, since we experience many blacks as good people, we naturally assume that blacks are equal to whites in the larger sense of being able to maintain a decent, humane, lawful society. But this is an illusion. The personal decency of individual blacks does not translate into the ability to resist public evil, the aspiration to enforce social order. Those things require a degree of moral will, intelligence, and organizing energy that blacks, collectively, do not possess. In any black-run society we can think of, from Washington, D.C. to Haiti to the Congo, good people end up suffering under the rule of despots, crooks, and incompetents.

It was all the above thoughts that led me to conclude, in my speech at the 1994 American Renaissance conference, that "the large and enduring differences in average intelligence between blacks and whites mean ... that blacks *on their own*" cannot be expected in the foreseeable future "to be able to maintain a modern, civilized, democratic society." That may sound needlessly harsh, but I think all the evidence points, tragically, to its truth. Here, once again, the thought will crop up that many blacks in America perform quite well in modern civilized institutions, that there are many individual blacks who are smarter and more competent and have better characters than many whites, and that some blacks have made distinguished contributions at a very high level, all of which would seem to disprove what I've just said about an overall black deficiency. But that is another example of the optical illusion. Such competent or even highly talented blacks are functioning within a white-majority society in which there are expectations and standards and a general level of skills and wealth created and maintained by whites. In a society without whites, the small number of intelligent blacks combined with the very large number of unintelligent blacks would make a high or even middling level of civilization impossible. The question, once again, is not one of individual blacks, many of whom are as capable as whites; the question is one of the civilizational character of the whole black community.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The above also means that to the extent blacks gain power in an institution or community, that institution will begin to suffer a catastrophic decline. This is the unspoken argument against affirmative action. The spoken argument against affirmative action is that it's unjust, which is of course true. The unspoken—and far graver—concern is that by bringing blacks on a racially proportional basis into occupations for which many of them are not qualified, we are dragging down every institution and profession, with incompetent teachers, incompetent doctors and nurses, incompetent airline pilots, incompetent and corrupt police officers and officeholders, and all the rest of it.

Even more alarming, the more blacks advance, the more—not less—they resent whites. The more America does to overcome its "racism," the more "racist" America appears. The reason for this is built into the dynamics of human nature. Very simply, the more equal blacks become with whites, the more unbearable and unjust seem the remaining differences. Thus what started as a demand for basic civil rights mutated into a demand to overturn the whole society, along with its traditions and norms, its standards and laws, its history and heroes, since in all these things blacks are still not "equal."

An example of what happens when blacks gain power can be seen in the current imbroglio at Rutgers University, where President Francis Lawrence, through his own affirmative action policies, created the very student body that is now trying to destroy him. When blacks gain numbers and power, they inevitably subject whites to intimidation and tyranny, just as they do to their own people.

In Summary

The insights that came to me on this personal journey of discovery accumulated through several distinct stages.

First I learned that blacks on average score much less well on achievement tests, which explained why there were so few blacks in intellectual professions, but I didn't associate these facts with a black deficit in "intelligence" as such.

Then that pioneer Michael Levin came along and tactlessly used the forbidden word "intelligence" to describe the quality in which blacks differ from whites. I was disturbed by this, wishing he would speak of a "difference in test-taking ability" rather than of a difference in intelligence. Yet at the same time I seemed to recognize that intelligence was, in fact, the issue at hand.

Then I came to understand that the quality measured by intelligence tests is something real, as proved by the fact that the results of IQ tests performed in childhood correlate highly with achievement in later life.

At this point, however, I still accepted the conventional view that group deficits in intelligence, even if real, were to a large degree determined by inferior cultural circumstances, and therefore could be eliminated by improvements in behavioral standards, socio-economic status, home environment, and so on.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

My inchoate belief in environmentalism was decisively refuted by the Scarr-Weinberg study showing that black children raised from infancy by white middle-class parents still were about 15 IQ points behind whites. This proved that IQ was determined by heredity, not culture.

But even if IQ itself was not cultural but genetic, there was the objection that the IQ tests themselves were culturally biased. This was eliminated by the discovery that blacks did worse in questions involving pure cognitive ability than in questions using white cultural references.

Then there was the growing awareness of the markedly different styles of thought between the races, including blacks' much greater suggestibility and reliance on rhetoric and emotional manipulation; their relative lack of ability to think in objective, cause-and-effect terms; their noticeably lesser orientation toward objective things and ideas outside the self; and their demonstrably lesser orientation toward the common political good and a moral and stable social order. There was, finally, the pronounced orientation of many blacks toward paranoid conspiracy theories, their tendency to see every issue in terms of race and to blame all their problems on whites.

Finally, drawing all these thoughts together into a new paradigm, there was the discovery of the "optical illusion" of racial sameness. This experience convinced me that the intellectual differences between blacks and whites are both substantive and qualitative—in short, that there are intrinsic racial differences in civilizational abilities.

Lawrence Auster is the author of ***The Path to National Suicide: An Essay on Immigration and Multiculturalism,*** *and* ***Huddled Clichés: Exposing the Fraudulent Arguments That Have Opened America's Borders to the World.*** *He is co-editor of the website* ***View from the Right****.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Sociobiology for Liberals

The Blank Slate:

The Modern Denial of Human Nature

Steven Pinker
New York, NY: Viking, 2002
$27.96
509 pp.

Reviewed by Jared Taylor

For the last half of the previous century, it was common—sometimes obligatory—to believe there is no such thing as human nature, that men are "blank slates" on which society can write any message it chooses. It was widely believed that humans are born essentially equal, with almost no predispositions or inherent abilities, and that behavior was almost entirely controlled by rearing and environment.

Steven Pinker's *The Blank Slate*, which takes its name from that theory, purports to be an introduction to new findings that support an older view, that human beings are born with differing abilities but the same general characteristics, and that all societies are built upon and reflect these characteristics. There is, in other words, such a thing as human nature, which largely dictates our social arrangements rather than the other way around, and that men (and women) are not born equal. *The Blank Slate* also offers to explain why so many people denied this for so many decades, and why they resorted to every trick to suppress and discredit those whose research contradicted their view.

This book does these things to some degree, but its real purpose is not to explain the discoveries of science but to instruct us what to think about them. It begins by leaving out a great deal—the entire field of racial differences, for example—and goes on to lather what science it does present in layers of moralizing, hand-holding, reassurances, and apologies. Steven Pinker, who teaches psychology at MIT, has therefore written a book that is polemic masquerading as science. It is perhaps one-tenth science, eight-tenths spin, and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

one-tenth blather. Prof. Pinker writes altogether like a man who does not trust his readers to think for themselves, and in offering to do their thinking for them, tries to uphold the liberal doctrines that were erected on the very blank-slate assumptions he is attacking.

This is the perfect book for liberals who have heard unpleasant rumors that what they have always pretended to believe about human nature is wrong, but who are dying to be told they can go on being liberals anyway, and this no doubt explains why the book has been well received. On balance, we should welcome any book that acknowledges the deep, biological roots of human behavior, but it is hard to be enthusiastic about an author so given to preaching.

Prof. Pinker begins his book with what reads almost like an apology for the progress of science. "To acknowledge human nature, many think, is to endorse racism, sexism, war, greed, genocide, nihilism, reactionary politics, and neglect of children and the disadvantaged," he writes, but assures us that "acknowledging human nature...does not, for example, require one to abandon feminism, or to accept current levels of inequality or violence.... " He adds it is now clear humans cannot be perfectly and infinitely molded by society, but "I will show how the passing of the Blank Slate is less disquieting, and in some ways less revolutionary, than it first appears." In other words, even if the basic assumptions of virtually every social movement and uplift program of the last fifty years are wrong, we need not change our politics or our policies.

The Left and the Blank Slate

It is clear why the left so loved the idea that people are blank slates: They were dying to write on them. The idea of remaking people, of bossing them around for their own good, is the fundamental impulse of liberalism, and the left gloried in the idea that human abilities and personalities could be putty in its hands. If environmental intervention could make people into anything at all, people who could force the right environment upon us could create utopia. For the left, utopia means equality, and the politics of the blank-slate movement were openly socialist.

Prof. Pinker rightly recognizes the importance of Franz Boas in establishing the doctrine of human plasticity. "I claim," wrote Boas, "that, unless the contrary can be proved, we must assume that all complex activities are socially determined, not hereditary." Boas' students pushed his views even farther. Margaret Mead wrote, "human nature is the rawest, most undifferentiated of raw material." Otto Klineberg wrote that the environmental explanation for behavior was always preferable "because it was more optimistic, holding out the hope of improvement."

Prof. Pinker recognizes that zeal for "improvement" has led to the worst mass killings in human history. He concedes that the French Revolution and the communist slaughter in China, Cambodia, and the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet Union were all driven by power-mad leftists who wanted to write exciting, new messages on the blank slate. "Inborn human desires are a nuisance," he writes, "to those with utopian and totalitarian visions, which often amount to the same thing."

In the non-communist West, the blank-slate theory has been most vigorously pushed by people fighting "racism" and "sexism," and they have the same power-hungry fervor as communist revolutionaries. On the question of whether women should stay home with their children, Simone de Beauvoir wrote in 1975 that "women should not have that choice, precisely because if there is such a choice, too many women will make that one." Betty Friedan wanted "compulsory preschool" for two-year-olds so as to be able to stuff them full of feminist thought as early as possible. In the name of combating "racism" and "sexism," American law now forbids freedom of association in all but the most private settings, but as we shall see, Prof. Pinker has no objection to this.

What, though, are the findings that have finally discredited the view that people are blank slates? Prof. Pinker summarizes the evidence competently but offers few surprises to anyone who has followed the field even from a distance. One kind of research shows that all human societies are built on universal human traits, and another suggests that individual differences are innate. In the former category, Prof. Pinker includes an appendix listing hundreds of characteristics common to all human societies, even the most isolated. Some of the obvious ones are sex role differences, consciousness of in-group and out-group, territoriality, status rankings, the incest taboo, a conception of right and wrong, and distinctions between close and distant kin. Anthropologists have also found that all people celebrate marriage, respect generosity, have taboo foods, decorate the body, dance, cry, suck wounds, use language to deceive, have meal times, and prefer to copulate in private. These things are not coincidences. Society reflects human nature. Even monkeys have complex patterns of behavior that demonstrate jealousy, peace-making, reciprocity, and clear sex differences.

For years, anthropologists tried to argue that warfare was mostly a white man's disease and not a universal trait. Also, in order to suggest colonization could not have had a civilizing mission, they played down the savagery of primitive peoples whom they tried to portray as noble savages. However, as Prof. Pinker explains, the fiction of the peace-loving forest-dweller has been impossible to sustain:

> [N]ative peoples are dead serious when they carry out warfare. Many of them make weapons as damaging as their technologies permit, exterminate their enemies when they can get away with it, and enhance the experience by torturing captives, cutting off trophies, and feasting on enemy flesh.

War and violence are part of human nature, and that nature is often at its rawest among the primitives.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Prof. Pinker argues that complicated, built-in behavior is necessary for survival, and that in this respect humans are no different from animals. Without instinctive jealousy, men will rear children not their own. Without an instinct to defend their interests—with violence if need be—they will be dispossessed. Likewise, Prof. Pinker adds, "[I]f our minds were truly malleable they would be easily manipulated by our rivals, who could mold or condition us into serving their needs rather than our own."

Prof. Pinker spends a number of pages arguing that the structure of the brain itself suggests humans are designed for certain kinds of behavior rather than others. This material is often tedious and hardly crucial to his point of view, but he does offer some interesting observations. When deaf people use sign language, they use the same part of the brain people use when they talk, which suggests this area (the superior gyrus of the temporal lobe) is built to handle the processes of speech. The brain, in that sense, is not a blank slate. It is also well known that amputees feel sensations in their "phantom limbs," but Prof. Pinker reports that people who are born without limbs have the same sensations. One girl solved math problems by counting on fingers she never had. This, too, suggests the brain is put together to do specific things, not simply to absorb instructions from the environment.

As for the evidence that individual differences are inborn, Prof. Pinker replows the well-worked ground of twin and adoption studies to explain that intelligence levels and personality appear to be unaffected by "shared environment," that is to say the conditions parents provide in their homes and that are shared by siblings. Parents can influence their children to some degree while they are still young, but as soon as they become independent they find environments that suit their genetic propensities and the influence of their rearing environment dwindles close to zero.

Heredity appears to account for about 50 percent of most personality traits (the figure is probably somewhat higher for intelligence), with the rest, by definition, influenced by environment. There is still disagreement among experts as to how environment works its effects, but Prof. Pinker believes it is a combination of chance events, perinatal shock and childhood diseases, and—most important—the influence of childhood playmates. The importance of peer group is unproven, but Prof. Pinker makes a strong case for the view that children are constantly trying to fit into the society of children, not of adults, and therefore model themselves more on other children than on their parents.

Although he does not seem very comfortable with the evidence—perhaps because of its implications for racial differences—Prof. Pinker concedes that criminality is at least partly heritable, and notes that psychopaths were often refractory, cruel children.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SOCIOBIOLOGY

The publication in 1975 of *Sociobiology* by E. O. Wilson marked perhaps the most important turning point in the return to a more realistic view of human nature, and it sent the blank-slate school into a screeching rage. It had already shown its closed-mindedness when anthropologist Paul Ekman reported in the late 1960s that human facial expressions are the same worldwide, even among isolated primitives. This hint of innateness was, according to Margaret Mead, "outrageous," "appalling," and "a disgrace." Others called it fascist.

As Prof. Pinker explains, "The discoveries about human nature were greeted with fear and loathing because they were thought to threaten progressive ideals." If *anything at all* was found to be innate, there was no telling what else might be impervious to busybody uplift artists. And this was why the left loosed such a blast against E.O. Wilson.

In 1976, the American Anthropological Association came close to passing a vote to censure *Sociobiology* and to cancel two symposia on it. Steven Jay Gould and Richard Lewontin wrote that the study of sociobiology provided the intellectual basis for "the establishment of gas chambers in Nazi Germany." These two, together with the British neuroscientist Steven Rose, became, in Prof. Pinker's words, "the intellectual vanguard of the radical science movment." They wrote that they shared "a commitment to the prospect of a more socially just—a socialist—society," and saw "critical science as an integral part of the struggle to create that society." Prof. Lewontin, for example, claimed that "each of us, irrespective of race, class, or sex, can develop virtually any identity that lies within the human ambit," and rejected the limitations of heredity. As co-authors, the three misquoted their intellectual opponent Richard Dawkins on five different occasions, saying he wrote genes "control us, body and mind," whereas what he really wrote was that they "created us, body and mind."

Prof. Pinker might have drawn on a very thorough 2000 book, *Defenders of the Truth*, about the fight to suppress *Sociobiology*. The author, Ullica Segerstråle, does an excellent job of describing the state of mind of the defenders of the blank slate. Prof. Lewontin, for example, was convinced that researchers whose ideas he opposed were just as politically motivated as he and could not believe they were not twisting science in order to promote all the hated "isms." He agreed with fellow lefty psychologist Leon Kamin that scientists "sometimes tell deliberate lies" in order to advance larger political purposes. With co-author Richard Levins he was even capable of writing, "As working scientists in the field of evolutionary genetics and ecology, we have been attempting with some success to guide our own research by a conscious application of Marxist philosophy." He even once cheerfully admitted that his criticism of Prof. Wilson was deliberately "nasty," because the political stakes were so high.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

One would think it an embarrassment for "scientists" to glory in their political biases, but because their politics are the politics of our time, it serves to prove their virtue rather than destroy their credibility. Prof. Pinker notes that anthropologist Leslie Sponsel, for example, claims to want an "anthropology of peace" that will promote a "more nonviolent and peaceful world," which he thinks is "latent in human nature." He confesses to "an almost automatic reaction against any biological explanation of human behavior." This is an admission that he cannot do objective science, yet men like him are not run out of the profession.

Race and Sex

Prof. Pinker is at his most annoying when he discusses race and sex. He concedes that as the blank slate became popular, "the prevailing theories of mind were refashioned to make racism and sexism as untenable as possible," but even though "racism" and "sexism" were vanquished with the help of bad science and even outright lies it was still a "well-deserved victory." How can this be? He offers separate defenses for the assaults on "racism" and "sexism," both equally bad. There are, he concedes, important inborn differences between men and women but "sexism," whatever that is, is still wrong because it's—well—wrong. "Racism," whatever that is, is wrong because there are no significant biological differences between the races, but even if there were it would still be—well—wrong.

They are wrong because "no one likes being treated unfairly, that is, according to traits that the person cannot control." This may be the stupidest argument in the book. Prof. Pinker would agree that athletic ability, beauty, musical talent, intelligence, and personality are largely inherited, yet people routinely treat others differently on account of them and few complain that it's "unfair." If race and sex carry real meaning, they are not "unfair" reasons for discrimination either.

Prof. Pinker has made the argument against "sexism" more difficult for himself by admitting the sexes are different. He concedes parents might prefer to hire a woman rather than a man as a nanny, on the assumption that a woman would be less likely to molest their children. And yet, "it would be reprehensible for a bank to hire a man over a woman as a manager for the reason that he is less likely to quit after having a child." Reprehensible? Companies want employees who will not quit in a year or two, and until the law prohibited it, they routinely discriminated against women for that very reason. Prof. Pinker replies as follows:

> The point is not that group differences may *never* be used as a basis for discrimination. The point is that they do not have to be used that way, and sometimes we can decide on moral grounds that they must not be used that way.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

These "moral grounds" are a rabbit out of a hat. Most of the time, Prof. Pinker tries to argue out his conclusions, but these "moral grounds" appear from nowhere and with no justification. He seems to be telling us that now that we know men and women are not identical, a little discrimination is OK, but not too much. He will no doubt tell us when we have gone too far and erred on "moral grounds." Elsewhere, Prof. Pinker complains of the leftist "temptation to overmoralize matters of judgment;" it is clear that he is, himself, guilty of "overmoralizing."

Occasionally, Prof. Pinker actually flirts with the logic of human nature before scurrying off to "moral grounds": "If races or sexes are different on average, racial profiling or gender stereotyping would be actuarially sound, and it would be naïve to expect information about race and sex not to be used for prejudicial ends." Of course, if there are differences, discrimination is not "for prejudicial ends." When an actuary charges higher life insurance premiums to smokers, it is sound business practice, not "prejudice."

Ultimately, Prof. Pinker's position is pure assertion. At one point he announces that "people's stereotypes are generally consistent with the statistics, and in many cases their bias is to *underestimate* the real differences between sexes or ethnic groups." Yet he hastens to add, "the partial accuracy of many stereotypes [now their accuracy is only "partial"] does not, of course, mean that racism, sexism, and ethnic prejudice are acceptable." Why not? Because Prof. Pinker says they are not.

When it comes to sex differences, Prof. Pinker refuses to face the facts he admits are true. With race, he simply denies the facts: "[A]ny biological differences are minor at most and scientifically uninteresting." In the meantime, he insists that racial differences in historical achievement are due to "the vicissitudes of geography and ecology" and have nothing to do with intelligence. "The 'culture' of any of the conquering nations of Europe, such as Britain," he explains, "is in fact a greatest-hits collection of inventions assembled across thousands of miles and years." But if Europeans are just copiers, why can't the equally intelligent Africans copy just as well?

Prof. Pinker recites the mantra about how closely related the races are, and although he has told us that in the animal kingdom "small differences in the genes can lead to large differences in behavior," he fails to apply this insight to humans. He trots out another standby—that there is more genetic variation within races than between them—and tells us "these are reassuring findings." Reassuring? Scientific data are "reassuring" only for those who cannot approach them objectively and whose prejudices ride on the outcome. In any case the "variation" argument is a con job. The difference in arm strength between the weakest and the strongest man is much greater than the difference in arm strength between the average man and the average woman. This does

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

not change the fact that men on average are considerably stronger than women, and all societies take this for granted. As evidence against racial differences, the "variation" argument is almost deliberately obtuse.

In the end Prof. Pinker prefers to hedge his bets on race, admitting that group differences in intelligence and personality are possible. "This is not to say," he adds, "that such genetic differences are expected or that we have evidence for them, only that they are biologically possible."

Why this concession after so much dogmatism? Philippe Rushton is in Prof. Pinker's bibliography, and he even cites Arthur Jensen's *The g Factor* when it suits him (on the similarity of male/female IQ distribution curves), so he is not completely unaware of the literature on race differences. At some level he probably realizes further study of the human genome will turn up racial differences in the distributions of genes for intelligence. "So," he asks, "could discoveries in biology turn out to justify racism and sexism? Absolutely not."

What he is doing is preparing the same incoherent argument about race that he has already advanced for sex. He concedes that the intellectual basis for the battle against "sexism"—that there were no important inherent differences between men and women—was a fraud, but he still wants the battle to continue. Likewise the battle against "racism" must continue no matter what the scientists tell us. He distinguishes his enlightened liberalism from that of the past:

> Once they [the blank-slate socialists] staked themselves to the lazy argument that racism, sexism, war, and political inequality were factually incorrect because there is no such thing as human nature (as opposed to being despicable regardless of the details of human nature), every discovery about human beings was, by their own reasoning, tantamount to saying that those scourges were not so bad after all.

At least the blank-slate types were logical: They said there was no justification for treating people differently because people are all the same. Prof. Pinker admits people are different but wants us to *act* as if they are the same. In this respect the "radical" scientists got it right and Prof. Pinker got it wrong. If science tells us blacks are, on average, less intelligent, more violent, more libidinous, and more psychopathic than whites, the traditional disinclination of whites to live among them or send their children to school with them is justified.

Early in the book, Prof. Pinker writes, "the taboo against human nature has left us playing without a full deck as we deal with the pressing issues confronting us." Indeed, it has. Prof. Pinker leaves the greatest taboo untouched and appears happy to let us blunder along in our willful blindness about race. For example, he complains in two separate passages about "racial inequities that put too many African American men in prison." But what if the biology of blacks explains high crime rates? Because of "taboos against human nature," Prof. Pinker would prefer to leave us "without a full deck" and to go beating the bushes for "racial inequities."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Prof. Pinker writes sympathetically about the abuse, death threats, and dishonest criticism that greeted sociobiologists in the early days, but he is silent on the even worse treatment meted out to Arthur Jensen, William Shockley, Philippe Rushton, and Michael Levin. Perhaps he thinks anyone who studies race deserves it.

Other Objections

The sound of constant political ax-grinding is not the only thing that grates on readers of this book. Prof. Pinker's editor let him ramble and repeat himself and go on about all manner of irrelevant pet ideas. Why must we plod through musings about whether language is the same thing as thought, how image differs from reality, whether the Superfund Act was good law, whether Malthus was right about population and resources, when a fertilized egg becomes a person, and why a consumption tax is better than an income tax? There is a completely useless chapter on art, as well as lengthy, contrasting quotations from novels that illustrate both the blank-slate view and an understanding of human nature. Half this book should be pruned away.

Nor does Prof. Pinker deliver everything he promises. "I will retrace the history that led people to see human nature as a dangerous idea, and I will try to unsnarl the moral and political rat's nests that have entangled the idea along the way," he writes. Why, then, is he silent about the fact that the blank slate was undermined by gentile scholars, while its most hysterical defenders were Jews? Prof. Pinker is a Jew—he writes of his shtetl grandparents, and of his relief in learning that a famous botched circumcision that led to a boy being reared as a girl was *not* a Jewish ritual—and could perhaps throw light on this interesting subject.

But the worst, of course, is his compulsion always to tell us what to think. Prof. Pinker is always jury-rigging justifications for liberalism and ignoring even the most obvious conservative conclusions. If men and women are different, it is stupid to act as if they are the same. If humans are tribal and territorial, "diversity" is a mistake. If humans differ in ability, equality is a chimera. If genes and peer group are what form the young, "early intervention" is useless. If there are born criminals, rehabilitation is a waste of time. If fecklessness is heritable, welfare swells the ranks of the feckless. If genes matter, some forms of eugenics are justified.

Whatever he thinks privately, Prof. Pinker would never suggest anything that might offend anyone at the *New York Review of Books*. Prof. Pinker tosses off the view that "intellectuals have a responsibility to take reasonable care that their ideas not be misused for evil ends." How are they supposed to do that? By misrepresenting their ideas? By concealing them? By shading the facts? By offering antidotes they don't believe in? It is hard to think of a way to protect ideas from misuse that does not involve deceit.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Although Prof. Pinker quotes him disapprovingly, one cannot help but wonder if he does not have a sneaking sympathy for Irving Kristol, who once wrote:

> There are different kinds of truths for different kinds of people. There are truths appropriate for children; truths that are appropriate for students; truths that are appropriated for educated adults; and truths that are appropriate for highly educated adults, and the notion that there should be one set of truths available to everyone is a modern democratic fallacy. It doesn't work.

Jared Taylor is the editor of ***American Renaissance*** *and the author of* ***Paved with Good Intentions: The Failure of Race Relations in Contemporary America****.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Men against Leviathan

The Outline of Sanity
G.K. Chesterton
Reprint ed., 1926; Norfolk, Va.: IHS Press, 2001
$23.95
183 pp.

Economism and the National Prospect
John Attarian
Monterey, Va.: American Immigration Control Foundation, 2001
$6.00
72 pp.

The Free Press
Hilaire Belloc
Reprint ed., 1918; Norfolk, Va.: IHS Press, 2002
$11.95
95 pp.

Reviewed by Samuel Francis

G.K. Chesterton, like his friend Hilaire Belloc, is today best known as a polemicist for Roman Catholicism, but both writers were also prominent in their day as social critics, especially of modern capitalism. Unlike the socialist left, they and their followers defended an economic system known as "distributism," which promised a third way between the path of Marx on the left and Mises on the right. Today, despite the quite dated references in much of their work on this subject, what they had to say is more relevant than ever, as what is called capitalism (which includes a good deal of socialism) lurches across the globe, wiping out traditional cultures, national boundaries, and racial and ethnic identities.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Distributism, unlike socialism, champions private property, but, unlike capitalism, it also rejects the unlimited accumulation of wealth and the centralization of economic power that attends it. The ideal for distributists is an economy in which the small firm (ideally a shop selling products its owners manufacture themselves) or farm owned and operated by the same persons is prevalent—the kind of peasant economy that prevailed in many medieval settings and has been systematically obliterated by the rise of modern capitalism and its twin brother, the modern centralized state.

The result is cultural and economic (as well as racial) dispossession of the bulk of the population, which is reduced to what is really a kind of proletarian status. Workers, whether in mass factories or mass offices, may retain a good deal of material affluence, but they have entirely lost their independence as they become locked into "career paths" working for giant, anonymous organizations often known only by a set of meaningless letters or fabricated acronyms ("Exxon," "CVS," "IBM," "Amoco," "Verizon," "Cingular," etc.). They thereby lose any ability to mount even the simplest resistance to whatever the masters of the state and the mass economy demand of them in either thought or action, and since the bureaucratized "culture" permeates their minds, any inclination to resist soon vanishes.

This process of proletarianization goes far to explain why virtually no one today dares to question those subjects the system does not want questioned or even discussed, and the end result of proletarianization, of course, is slavery—the "Servile State" that Belloc discussed in another book, the "Friendly Fascism" of more recent writers. It is well beyond high time that someone wrote a book that offers a serious exposition of distributism as a critique of modern global capitalism and its political and cultural analogues as well as a practical plan for moving toward a distributist order.

Unfortunately, what Chesterton offers in *The Outline of Sanity* is not that book. Instead, what we mainly get is a steady stream of the kinds of word play that characterizes the Chestertonian style: metaphors, similes, elaborate (not to say convoluted) analogies, parables, puns, understated ironies, and overstated generalizations, among other rhetorical devices too obscure to identify or analyze, often marshaled for the purpose of expressing a point that Chesterton seems to imagine is mysteriously profound but which in fact is commonplace. One lengthy passage, from his chapter on the "The Religion of Small Property," will serve to illustrate:

> The pioneer spirit is beginning to fail, as a well-known traveller recently complained, but I doubt whether he could tell us the reason. It is even possible that he will not understand it, in one radiant burst of joyful comprehension, if I tell him that I am all in favour of a wild goose chase, so long as he really believes that the wild goose is the bird of paradise; but that it is necessary to hunt it with the hounds of heaven. If it be barely possible that this does not seem quite clear to him, I will explain that the traveller must possess something as well as pursue

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> something, or he will not know what to pursue. It is not enough always to follow the gleam; it is necessary sometimes to rest in the glow; to feel something sacred in the glow of the camp fire as well as the gleam of the polar star. And that same mysterious and to some divided voice, which alone tells that we have here no abiding city, is the only voice which within the limits of this world can build up cities that abide.

Some readers may regard this sort of writing as both amusing and instructive, but I must confess that I found it tedious in the extreme, especially after the writer insists on keeping it up continuously throughout the book, and utterly useless for the communication of serious thought and information. There are plenty of readers who are Chesterton fans, and no doubt they will treasure this as well as his other books, but those who really want to learn something about either distributism or what distributists are criticizing and why will have to go elsewhere.

One place where they would be well advised to turn would be the too-short monograph, *Economism and the National Prospect*, by John Attarian, who holds a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Michigan and is a well-known writer for paleo-conservative journals. While with Chesterton what the reader gets is a constant stream of tiresome and unconvincing word-play, what Dr. Attarian offers is careful logical analysis, copious and well-documented quotations to support his arguments, and clear prose that communicates sophisticated ideas in a simple and straightforward exposition. "Economism" as he uses the term is the doctrine that "reduces humans to economic animals, reduces life to economics, and argues that only economics matters." It is at once a combination of what is usually called "economic determinism," the belief that economic motives determine all human action and that economic forces determine all human history, and what might be called "ethical materialism," the belief that material gain is the highest ethical ideal for human beings. Dr. Attarian says he originally thought that he had coined the term "economism" but later found that another contemporary writer had already used it. In fact, the word "economism" was used by the German free market economist Wilhelm Röpke as well as the American libertarian writer Albert Jay Nock. I cited their usage of the term and Nock's definition of it in a *Chronicles* column of 1990 as a view that "interpreted the whole of human life in terms of the production, acquisition and distribution of wealth. Like certain Philippians in the time of St. Paul, its god was its belly."

Economites (a useful word that Dr. Attarian does coin to distinguish adherents of economism from economists, who merely study economics) these days are perhaps unlikely to profess their economism openly, and it may be suspected that it exists mainly as a kind of unconscious assumption embedded in the set of what many people today simply regard as obvious truths about the universe and man—the sky is blue and everyone is and should be driven by desire for material gain. Indeed, as Dr. Attarian shows in a chapter devoted to the refutation of economism, so silly is the claim of this belief to be true that hardly anyone could profess to adhere to it.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But as he also shows in his many quotations from many different proponents of economism, both on the left and the right, many do believe in it and espouse it. Economism is especially prevalent on the political right, usually among libertarians and neo-conservatives. Thus, among the economites Dr. Attarian exposes are *Reason* magazine editor Virginia Postrel, *National Review* editor John J. Miller, professional neo-conservative Hispanic Woman Linda Chavez, failed entrepreneur George Gilder, columnist George Will, the *Weekly Standard*'s David Brooks, House Majority Leader Dick Armey, Jack Kemp, and many others. The *Wall Street Journal* and almost any periodical on the contemporary right is a virtual treasure trove of fatuous economite nonsense, as for example, my own favorite, from John J. Miller: "Haitians make great Americans. They boost our productivity, hold down our cost of living and make us more competitive." As Dr. Attarian comments, the unspoken premise of these two sentences is that to be a good American is to be "someone who makes economic contributions." People like Mr. Miller are such sloppy thinkers that they are probably not conscious of believing that and would deny believing it, but their own prose betrays them.

Dr. Attarian details the impact and consequences of economite thinking in different fields of public policy such as immigration, foreign trade, and the environment, but his larger target is the same as that of Chesterton and Belloc—the "global capitalism" that is currently smashing its way across the globe and is rationalized only through the formulas of economism, which, he is well aware, serves the material interests of the very forces that push it into our minds and down our throats.

> Economism clearly serves the agendas of the corporations and other powerful interests which run this country, and they are not about to drop it. Corporations' profits depend on expanding their market shares, which means expanding exports, and on driving down their costs, which means using cheaper imported inputs, low-wage immigrant labor, and transferring production overseas. Mainstream news and opinion media are owned by these selfsame corporations, hence are globalist. Most think tanks depend upon corporate money, hence are unlikely to generate serious criticisms of globalization and economism.

If there is one flaw in the monograph, it is that the author seems to concede that economism was a dominant strain of American culture from its beginnings. He fails, I think, to distinguish between the legitimate economic aspirations of early settlers and pioneers, on the one hand, and the obsession with material gain that possessed later American elites, on the other. "Born of rebellion against long-standing authority, America was and remains peculiarly inclined to impiety, hence to economism," he writes. This, one has to suspect, is more the Russell Kirk Toryism of the author emerging than serious historical analysis. Pioneers who fought Frenchmen, Englishmen, Indians, Mexicans, and assorted outlaws were not driven solely by desire for economic gain. They were also driven by the same forces that Dr. Attarian mentions as driving everyone else:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> People ruin themselves over love and sex; get caught up in causes; squander their lives serving adventurers like Bonaparte; murder and make war over religion, ethnic hatred, and desire for power or revenge. Rational pleasure-pain calculators governed by economic incentives don't act like that. So much for the shallow myth of Economic Man.

Dr. Attarian might have dwelled a bit more on the rise of economism in American history. Although there was an important strain of it in such early figures as Alexander Hamilton, whose nationalism was centered on economic development and material acquisition, it did not become dominant until after the Civil War, when the triumph of the Republican Party and Lincoln's ideology helped produce the "Gilded Age." There is a good reason why Lincoln remains an icon in an age that has swallowed economism whole.

Nevertheless, within the confines of the short monograph Dr. Attarian has written, it's understandable why he sacrificed a certain amount of history to contemporary concerns. What he has written is probably the best available introduction to how deeply economism has already penetrated our thought and values and to what is fundamentally and philosophically wrong with the economite mind and what it produces.

As Dr. Attarian points out in the passage quoted above, "mainstream media" are themselves corporations and, for all their "left-wing bias," are as steeped in economism as oil companies and car salesmen. Indeed, one of the larger points of the "Third Way" critics of capitalism and socialism is that right and left, capitalism and socialism, are really largely the same things. Dr. Attarian shows how the economism espoused by neo-conservatives and libertarians who imagine themselves to be die-hard anti-communists is closely related to the Marxist assumptions of communism. As for the media, it was no secret to Hilaire Belloc, Chesterton's great friend and fellow polemicist, that the "Free Press" even of his day was mainly an illusion. There was a free press, but then as now, it consisted mainly of small newspapers and magazines that rejected the lies, propaganda, and sophistry of the dominant media.

Nor was it a secret to Belloc that "the Press," as the industry of producing and disseminating ideas and information (and misinformation) came to be known, was itself a product of capitalism.

> Side by side with the development of Capitalism went a change in the Press from its primitive condition to a worse. The development of Capitalism meant that a smaller and yet smaller number of men commanded the means of production and of distribution whereby could be printed and set before a large circle a news-sheet fuller than the old model.

The concentration of ownership and control of the means of production in the Press meant that an oligarchy controlled what the masses could read, know, and believe. The emergence of modern capitalism, then, was inseparable from the systematic manipulation of the human mind by technological means in the interests of those who controlled the technology.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Belloc, as was his habit, does not adequately document the concentration of media power in his own day. He preferred to argue along what are almost deductive lines—the particular follows from the nature of the universal—but the preface to his *The Free Press*, like that of Chesterton's *Outline of Sanity*, often makes these authors' arguments more concrete and relevant than the authors did themselves. Thus

> The owners of the Media conglomerates are not (merely) professional journalists; they are, rather, giants of the corporate world and the "entertainment" industry. General Electric owns NBC; Walt Disney owns Capital Cities / ABC; Viacom owns both CBS and Paramount; Time Warner owns both CNN and American Online; and Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation owns Fox.

It might have been useful had the authors of the unsigned preface from which this passage comes detailed the precise names of the chief executives of these conglomerates, so that we might know exactly who and what it is that is controlling our minds and what our minds are permitted to perceive.

Belloc saw the plutocratic domination of the "mainstream press" as balanced by the existence of the real "free press," the small newspapers and journals that managed to remain afloat without succumbing to the bonds of advertising and financing by which the larger press outlets were controlled. The free press in his view consisted not merely of the newspapers of the right but included the socialist press as well (oddly, he seems to include the Morgan-dominated *New Republic* as part of the free press of his day). The free press suffered from various disabilities, but cumulatively it was able to uncover facts and develop ideas that allowed some degree of intellectual and personal autonomy to persist. In this respect, of course, the free press of Belloc's day was similar to the "underground" press, local talk radio shows, short-wave radio, and Internet websites that today offer alternative views of reality to the one imposed by the "mainstream media."

Today, Belloc's belief that the independent sector of the media would be successful in instigating significant reforms seems naïve—certainly, whatever its other accomplishments, the free press of Belloc's time failed to do so. Still, if the Western world today is ever to be steered away from its present course of disaster, it will be because men of the courage and honesty of Chesterton, Belloc, and John Attarian demanded that it do so. Toward the end of *The Free Press*, Belloc writes what should be the motto of the men and women of the free press whenever and wherever they lift their heads.

> No man who has the truth to tell and the power to tell it can long remain hiding it from fear or even from despair without ignominy. To release the truth against whatever odds, even if so doing can no longer help the Commonwealth, is a necessity for the soul.

Samuel Francis is a nationally syndicated columnist, a contributing editor for ***Chronicles*** *magazine, and Associate Editor of* ***The Occidental Quarterly****.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Race, Genetics, and IQ

The Funding of Scientific Racism
Wickliffe Draper and the Pioneer Fund
William H. Tucker
Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2002
$34.95
286 pp.

Intelligence, Race, and Genetics
Conversations with Arthur R. Jensen
Frank Miele
Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002
$26
243 pp.

Reviewed by Kevin Lamb

Nothing stirs the ire of egalitarians more than discussions of genetic-based racial differences in intelligence. Just raising the point in a conversation during a coffee break at the office or over a backyard barbeque with neighbors can stoke inflamed passions and scornful fury, enraging even the most sedated egalitarian. The implications of genetic influences give credence to the idea that people (individuals, races, and sexes) are actually *different*, and that these differences are reflected in human nature, which completely undermines the entire raison d'être of egalitarianism.

Racial egalitarians generally adopt two approaches when confronting hereditarian arguments: Contest the empirical data by directly challenging the validity of behavioral genetic methodology, and undermine the credibility of researchers by leveling the charge of "racism." Nearly a decade after the publication of Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray's bestseller *The Bell Curve*, egalitarian critics of IQ research have aggressively tried to undermine both the empirical foundation of behavioral genetic studies and the efforts of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

researchers to pursue further analysis of the IQ gap between blacks and whites as measured by the most reliably administered IQ tests.[1] Often, however, strident egalitarian critics simply sidestep empirical validity issues by "exposing" the alleged hidden political motivations of researchers who persist in probing the relationship between IQ, genetics, and racial differences.

Two recently published books highlight the contrast between a skeptically objective examination of the genetic hypothesis of racial disparities in intelligence and a neo-Marxian screed that presumably passes for social science scholarship. No two books could be more different in content and tone—one carefully probes the complex scientific frontier surrounding the empirical findings on intelligence, race, and genetics, while the other rakes the muck of innuendo and hearsay rumor in a flimsy attempt to undermine the credibility of leading IQ researchers by questioning the motives and objectives that inspired their scientific pursuits.

The title of William H. Tucker's *The Funding of Scientific Racism* reveals a great deal about the ideological lens with which the author views research that investigates the genetic foundation of racial differences in intelligence. A foretaste of the author's objectives is evident in his acknowledgments, where Tucker recognizes Barry Mehler as "the director and founder of the Institute for the Study of Academic Racism at Ferris State University," who "generously opened both his files and his home to me," and Keith Hurt, "who shared his encyclopedic knowledge of right-wing activists, as well as the transcripts of his interviews with a number of important sources of information." (Tucker's previous book, *The Science and Politics of Racial Research*, received the Ralph J. Bunche Award, which gives some indication of the author's own ideological ax-grinding.) That a book purporting to expose the political bias of its subjects would rely upon the efforts of Marxist mudslingers like Mehler and Hurt—in effect employing witch doctors as witch hunters—brings the concept of *chutzpah* to new heights.

From beginning to end, Tucker's ideological narrative, a spin-off from his previous book, is part heuristic depiction ("racism" is the "hidden" motive for studying racial differences) and part an extended diatribe that traffics in gossip and innuendo. He aims to spin a tale of political intrigue and conspiracy, revealing a plot of deception on the part of Tucker's protagonists—scientific "racists" who seek to dismantle the civil rights of American blacks. Private correspondence and manuscripts from no fewer than eighteen archival repositories were combed through in search of comments, no matter how flippant or trivial, that might be used—regardless of context—to depict anti-egalitarian activists and researchers as "racists."

Tucker's primary focus is the research activities of the Pioneer Fund, a corporation founded in the late 1930s by five distinguished individuals: Wickliffe P. Draper, Harry H. Laughlin, Frederick H. Osborn, John M. Harlan, and Malcolm Donald, for the primary purpose of providing research grants

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

into the study of human nature, heredity, and eugenics. The research interests of these founders reflected a prevalent view of human nature that has shifted over the years—one that remains at odds with the contemporary ideological prism of radical egalitarianism, which considers race as strictly a "social construct" rather than a biological concept. What is missing from Tucker's account is any real sense of what the Pioneer founders and grantees were actually like as persons. Most were accomplished Americans, some independently wealthy, others highly educated with distinguished careers—departmental chairmen in academe, a Nobel prize-winning scientist, a Guggenheim fellow, a former U.S. Supreme Court justice, Royal Society fellows, members of leading scientific academies and societies, and some of the most recognized authorities in the behavioral and life sciences.

Tucker's narrative begins with an examination of the writings and activities of Earnest Sevier Cox and his connection with Pioneer's main benefactor and first director, Wickliffe Draper. Cox's most noted work is *White America*,[2] a self-published book that warned of the societal dangers of racial miscegenation and argued for a historical record of cultural and social decay as typified by racially hybrid societies in Latin America and South Africa. Tucker then turns to Madison Grant and Lothrop Stoddard, whose popular works exemplified an anti-egalitarian perspective that dominated the first three decades of twentieth century America. He tries to portray Cox, Grant, Stoddard, and such other leading scholars of the period as Charles Davenport and Harry Laughlin, as sinister plotters in a "racist" and "anti-Semitic" scheme to undermine the status of blacks and Jews in American society. The author's failure to supply historical context glosses over a seismic ideological shift in the social sciences over the last century that has been well documented in Carl Degler's *In Search of Human Nature* and Ullica Segerstråle's *Defenders of the Truth*.[3] This historical void enables Tucker to misleadingly depict his principal characters as a malign and monolithic entity.

Other conspirators include assorted "neo-Nazis," "segregationists," and garden-variety "racists" whom the author strives to link—no matter how remotely—to Pioneer Fund directors or grant recipients. Tucker is also at pains to weave a web of conspiratorial intrigue and subversion implicating several researchers who received grants from the Fund. Their goal, according to Tucker, was to give saliency to the idea of racial separation and legitimacy to suppressing the rights of blacks. He fails however, to establish that these researchers cooperated with one another in any meaningful way. Flippant remarks and trivial comments are lifted out of context from private correspondence, and in one case the surviving mother of a deceased researcher affiliated with Pioneer-sponsored academics is questioned about her late son's attitudes and political views in order to scandalize the slightest derogatory observation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Tucker's selective manipulation of the factual record stands out in his brief mention of the "Cyril Burt scandal." Glossing over the details and various twists in the course of the literature that deals with the scandal, Tucker notes that it was Shockley's inquiries about Burt's research on twins that "helped to prove that Burt's study had been fraudulent." Tucker simply accepts the accusations leveled against the eminent British psychologist as if there were little doubt about Burt's guilt. In the research notes that cover this brief passage, readers are advised of Leon Kamin's book, *The Science and Politics of IQ*, and N. J. Mackintosh's *Cyril Burt: Fraud or Framed?*, but no reference is made to Robert Joynson's *The Burt Affair* or Ronald Fletcher's *Science, Ideology and the Media*.[4] The reader is left with a misleading impression that Burt was actually guilty as accused, since the two major books that have all but exonerated Burt's alleged misdeeds are nowhere to be found. A fair and balanced assessment of the literature on the Burt scandal would conclude that the "evidence" fails to substantiate any of the claims that Burt conscientiously fudged his findings on identical twins—findings that have been corroborated by a growing body of evidence.

Such a simplistic narrative reflects a dogmatic mindset: the egalitarian social critic as true believer. In his 1985 book *Alien Powers*, Kenneth Minogue masterfully described the dynamics behind the "ideological revelation"—a pseudo-intellectual Marxian dogma—in which "ideologies neither fit, nor aspire to fit, the academic world."

> It is the essence of the ideological challenge that it insists upon its own comprehensiveness. Indeed the main function of the dialectic is to act as a glue which prevents ideology from dissolving into a set of proposals and a collection of accounts of the real world, each of which might be criticized according to the appropriate criteria of judgment. Ideology, however, denies that the conditions relevant to judging a proposal are different from those appropriate to criticizing theories; it similarly rejects the discipline of disciplinary boundaries. Academics of an ideological bent in universities are, of course, forced to take some account of these distinctions, but the pure ideological position is an insistence upon its own seamless unity. Just as the only ideological solution to any particular problem is the total revolution which solves all problems, so also no practical or academic issue can be isolated from the structure of domination.[5]

So it is with Tucker's work—one that purports to expose "clandestine activities" which reveal the goals of the Fund as "the preservation of white supremacy and white racial purity from the threat posed by blacks and undesirable immigrants, especially Jews." Such a discovery, according to Tucker, shows that the Fund uses science as a vehicle against civil rights. The scheme that Tucker purportedly unravels ranks with some of the great conspiracy theories of the modern age—the Illuminati, Freemasonry, and the Protocols of Zion. True enough, any sophisticated reader can conclude that some research endeavors which have received the support of the Pioneer Fund have over the years effectively challenged the empirical basis upon which the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

civil rights agenda of radical egalitarians rests: the literal notion of racial equality. What is missing from this warped account is a balanced perspective of the *quality* and *variety* of research projects that Pioneer has supported over the years, and which are documented in Richard Lynn's official history of the Fund.[6]

Tucker claims that the Pioneer Fund's "favorite issues [are] no longer of any great significance to either the scientific community or the public" and that "very few researchers outside the Pioneer clique are particularly interested in a topic that has so little basic scientific value." This is simply Tucker's way of carefully tiptoeing past the thicket of empirical realities that cannot be addressed by some ideological doctrinaire. The scientific findings that Pioneer has supported have become accepted as valid scientific paradigms—from the ubiquitous presence of the *g* factor to the behavioral genetic foundation of human personality traits. Academic egalitarians have shifted much of their criticism away from disputes over the methodological analysis of empirical data to exposing the motivational aims of researchers, particularly Pioneer Fund recipients.

Egalitarian critics like Tucker have no other recourse but to massage their own ideological passions, taking aim at empirically driven scientists rather than properly evaluating the scientific analysis of solid data, because the prism with which they render their own assessments, as Garrett Hardin once argued, is a filter of folly. Ideological egalitarians intuitively realize that egalitarianism rests on a foundation of intellectual quicksand—void of any empirical validity—and any extended scrutiny of racial disparities in IQ test scores, educational outcomes, or ability-competitive occupations will expose the futility of the dogma of racial equality. The only possible recourse for keeping this flawed grasp of human nature intact is to persist in using deceitful smokescreens, such as the red herring of "racist" motivations, to avoid the fundamental intrinsic realities of racial *inequality*. Such a contemporary Zeitgeist reflects a fantasy existence in which genetic-based differences are meaningless. Social or educational policies that recognize the realities of individual and group differences are immediately denounced for their "racial insensitivity."

One must ask: What is it that drives knaves and fools to persist in espousing such a scientifically bankrupt and destitute perspective as egalitarianism, and more notably, launch a vindictive attack on those who seek a true understanding of human nature? Montaigne provides a reasonably sound answer to this question in chapter IV ("How the Soul Vents Its Emotions on False Objects When True Ones Are Lacking") of the first volume of his essays:

> A gentleman of our day, who was terribly subject to gout, being urged by his physicians to abstain altogether from salt meats, was wont to reply jocosely that in the paroxysms and torture of the disease, he wanted to have something to lay the blame on; and that storming and cursing at one time about sausage, at another about tongue, and again about ham, he felt greatly relieved. But in all

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

seriousness, as, when the arm is raised to strike, it annoys us if the blow meets no object but is wasted on the air; and as, to make a view pleasant to the eye, it must not be lost and spread out to the dim horizon, but should have rising ground to limit it within a reasonable distance—

Ventus ut amittit vires, nisi robore densæ
Occurrant silvæ spatio diffusus inani*—

(*a*) so it would seem that the mind, when disturbed and excited, goes astray of itself, if we do not give it something to lay hold of; and it must always be supplied with some object to seize and work upon. Plutarch says, speaking of those who become attached to monkeys and little dogs, that the affectionate part of us, in this way, for lack of a legitimate object, fashions a false and frivolous one rather than remain useless. And we see that the mind, when most excited, deceives itself, setting up a false and fanciful object, even contrary to its own belief, rather than not act against something. (*b*) So the anger of wild animals drives them to attack the stone or the spear which has wounded them, and to take vengeance on themselves with their own teeth for the pain they suffer.[7]

*As a wind loses its strength meeting with no opposition from a dense forest, and is dissipated in the void. —Lucan, III, 362.

A Skeptic Objectively Examines Arthur Jensen's Work

The actual story of Arthur R. Jensen's career path and research accomplishments is one that runs counter to the caricature rendered by egalitarian critics. A scientist who has published over four hundred articles and seven books, four of which are among some of the most cited publications in the psychological literature, Jensen has tirelessly pursued an exemplarily productive life as an educator and pioneering researcher in his own field of expertise—differential psychology. Jensen studied under Percival Symonds as a graduate student at Columbia University, then under Hans Eysenck for two years in a postdoctoral program in London. As an educational psychologist and eventually pioneer as a differential psychologist, Jensen spent his career teaching at the University of California at Berkeley. He is the recipient of numerous awards and is ranked among the top one hundred most recognized psychologists among his colleagues.

Jensen gained notoriety when the *Harvard Educational Review* (HER) published his landmark article, "How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement?," which its editors had solicited for the Winter 1969 issue. In 123 pages, Jensen summarized the findings from the psychological literature on individual and group differences in IQ and the degree to which genetics plays a role in shaping these differences. Jensen's framework for considering these issues was the abysmal failure of compensatory education programs (Head Start) to achieve a lasting measurable increase in the intelligence levels of disadvantaged children. Jensen's article addressed the nature of intelligence, the concept of heritability, social class differences in intelligence, possible dysgenic IQ trends, kinship correlations, and racial differences in IQ. Shortly after its

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

publication, a wave of publicity and widespread coverage in the mass media engulfed Jensen, including a profile in the *New York Times Magazine* that coined the expression "Jensenism" and two interviews with Mike Wallace on *60 Minutes*. It prompted several replies from critical scholars that were published in subsequent HER issues and led to an eventual monograph that included a rejoinder by Jensen. Over the years, Jensen has received hundreds of requests for reprints of his article. It remains one of the most cited articles in the psychological literature.

Frank Miele's recent book, *Intelligence, Race, and Genetics: Conversations with Arthur R. Jensen*, explores Jensen's work in considerable detail. In terms of objectivity, it will likely remain the standard for other such books in the future. It is the first book to cover the full scope and magnitude of Jensen's writings and explain his scientific outlook to a lay readership. Miele, an editor for *Skeptic* magazine, has put together a concise yet definitive volume that spans Jensen's career and yet carefully examines Jensen's major research accomplishments in a clear and succinct manner. Each chapter flushes out the essential highlights of Jensen's career and major research endeavors: "Jensenism," the *g* factor in IQ studies, heritability and the nature/nurture paradigm, race and racial differences in intelligence, the *Bell Curve* wars, and science and social policy. It thus covers the full panorama of an interesting iconoclast—a social scientist who pursued unresolved research questions while defying the trends within his own profession.

The image of Jensen that emerges from this informative volume is of a courageously honest, persistent, and thoroughly meticulous scientist. In his most important undertaking—research that culminated with the publication of his 1998 book, *The g Factor*—Jensen has remained several steps ahead of his critics. Anticipating various weak points in his thesis (that *g* is the single ubiquitous factor in the constellation of human abilities), Jensen pursued a range of research projects and independent analyses that would solidify the thesis: measuring reaction times and their relationship to differences in *g* (indicative of an underlying physiological correlation to general mental ability); the full range of biological correlates from body, brain, and head size, electrochemical brain activity, cerebral glucose metabolism as measured by positron emission tomography (PET scans), to nerve conduction velocity; the heritability of *g*; population and demographic differences (race and sex differences); the impact of nutrition, home environment, and other non-biological factors; and theoretical challenges to *g* from multi-intelligence rivals such as Howard Gardner and Robert Sternberg.

By taking a lead in these research areas, Jensen carved out a scientific niche that has earned him the respect of a number of his contemporaries. A 1998 special issue of the journal *Intelligence*, edited by Douglas K. Detterman, and the forthcoming festschrift edited by Helmuth Nyborg testify to the high esteem with which Jensen is viewed by his fellow scientists.[8] When the American

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Psychological Association sponsored a talk by Jensen on the Cyril Burt controversy and research taboos during the APA's centennial convention in Washington, D.C. in August 1992, the large banquet room at the Washington Hilton Hotel was nearly filled to capacity. Several hundred attendees turned out to hear Jensen's enthralling lecture and slide presentation on the latest developments in the Burt affair—a turnout five or ten times the norm for such a lecture.

Miele provides a well-rounded portrait of a complex individual. He describes a man whose personal interests include reading biographies (with particular interest in Bertrand Russell's life and scientific philosophy, and in Mohandas Gandhi and Indian culture) and playing the clarinet while cultivating an intense interest in classical music. Jensen's support for the role of inheritance in intelligence, we learn, was preceded by an initial belief in the efficacy of Lyndon Johnson's "Great Society" programs. Needless to say, Jensen comes across as a workaholic, steadfastly devoted to his professional work.

The book's only shortcoming is the lack of space devoted to certain secondary and tangential issues. More space could have been devoted to teasing out the relationship between Jensen's own research interests and career path as an educational psychologist to specific educational policies that Jensen must have pondered to a considerable degree. Despite the turmoil that engulfed Raymond Cattell's nomination and subsequent withdrawal for the APA's Life Time Achievement Award a few years ago, the subject never comes up, nor is Cattell's work ever touched on. Jensen knew Cattell reasonably well and most likely would have had some interesting thoughts about Cattell's wide range of research interests, including his controversial philosophical beliefs as articulated in two separate but related books on his "beyondism" ideas. The issue of political correctness surfaces from time to time, but only incidentally. Jensen mentions that he submitted *The g Factor* to eight different publishers before it was accepted. Miele could have pressed Jensen further about his views on these and other issues, including his collegial relationship with Nobel physics laureate and race researcher William Shockley, and Jensen's thoughts about Shockley's own research endeavors. Miele barely skims the surface of Jensen's interests in eugenics, which could have been expanded into a separate chapter.

Still, Miele is to be commended for an otherwise thorough and comprehensive review of Jensen's major contributions to the psychology of individual and group differences in general mental ability. If there is one aspect of Jensen's life (both professional work and personal pursuits) that emerges from Miele's book, it is that the caricature of Jensen (promoted by Tucker and other critics) as a man consumed by "racist" objectives could not be further from the truth. Jensen states unequivocally that he has never supported segregationist policies; believes that people should be treated as equals before the law; accepts the idea of equal opportunity (provided that academic standards of excellence apply even-handedly to everyone); and believes that the variation in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

IQ within families is as important as the differences that exist between blacks and whites in terms of understanding the latent problems in educational policies. His overarching goal is to pursue the truth wherever it leads and to let the truth win out, rather than to advance politically correct fallacies. The irony is that it is Jensen's staunchest critics who have persisted in grinding an ideological ax and, in the process, have tossed any regard for the truth to the four winds.

Kevin Lamb is the Editor of ***The Occidental Quarterly*** *and* ***Race, Genetics & Society: Glayde Whitney on the Scientific and Social Policy Implications of Racial Differences*** *(Scott-Townsend, 2002).*

END NOTES

1. Several books that attempt to directly or indirectly challenge the thesis of Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray's *The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life* (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1994) have been published since late 1994, including *The Bell Curve Wars: Race, Intelligence, and the Future of America*, ed. Steven Fraser (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1995), *The Bell Curve Debate: History, Documents, Opinions*, ed. Russell Jacoby and Naomi Glauberman (New York, NY: Times Books, 1995), *Intelligence, Genes, & Success: Scientists Respond to the Bell Curve*, ed. Bernie Devlin et al. (New York, NY: Copernicus, 1997), *Inequality by Design: Cracking the Bell Curve Myth*, C. S. Fischer et al. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), *The Rising Curve: Long-Term Gains in IQ and Related Measures*, ed. Ulric Neisser (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 1998), *Race and Intelligence: Separating Science from Myth*, ed. Jefferson M. Fish (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2002). Although this body of criticism ranges from the serious to the absurd, most of it falls into the category of social and political commentary and fails to credibly refute Herrnstein and Murray's analysis of the data presented in their study. For a detailed scrutiny of the issues raised in the criticisms of *The Bell Curve*, readers should consult the special issue of *Intelligence* 24, no. 1 (January-February 1997), ed. Linda Gottfredson.

2. Earnest Sevier Cox, *White America* (Richmond, VA: White America Society, 1923).

3. Carl N. Degler, *In Search of Human Nature: The Decline and Revival of Darwinism in American Social Thought* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1991), and Ullica Segerstråle, *Defenders of the Truth: The Battle for Science in the Sociobiology Debate and Beyond* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2000).

4. Robert B. Joynson, *The Burt Affair* (New York, NY: Routledge, 1989), and Ronald Fletcher, *Science, Ideology and the Media: The Cyril Burt Scandal* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1991).

5. Kenneth Minogue, *Alien Powers: A Pure Theory of Ideology* (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1985), 227.

6. Richard Lynn, *The Science of Human Diversity: A History of the Pioneer Fund* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2001). Lynn's balanced description of the Pioneer Fund researchers leaves little doubt that these grantees rank among the elite of distinguished scholars in a number of professional disciplines. See also Louis Andrews'

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

review in *The Occidental Quarterly* 2:1 (Spring 2002), 73-79, or http://theoccidentalquarterly.com/. For a thorough critique of recent criticisms leveled against the Pioneer Fund, see J. Philippe Rushton's "Commentary on the Pioneer Fund and the Scientific Study of Human Differences," *Albany Law Review* 66 (2002), 207-262.

7. *The Essays of Montaigne*, trans. George B. Ives (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925), vol. 1, 25.

8. *Intelligence* 26 (no. 3, 1998) and Helmuth Nyborg, ed. *The Scientific Study of General Intelligence: Tribute to Arthur R. Jensen* (New York, NY: Pergamon, 2003).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Lynchings in Historical Context

At the Hands of Persons Unknown:
The Lynching of Black America

Philip Dray
New York: Random House, 2002
$35.00

528 pp.

Reviewed by Dwight D. Murphey

One of the things most admirable about the film adaptation of Truman Capote's *In Cold Blood* a few years ago was that the film never allowed itself to focus entirely on the criminals and their hanging. Flashbacks showing their robbery and murder of a Kansas farm family constantly reminded the viewer that there was more to the story than the criminals' own personal travail.

The lack of such balance is a serious flaw in any history of lynching in the United States that presents the subject with an overemphasis on the lynching itself. The selection of the subject has built in the bias unless the author is careful. In Philip Dray's narrative, he will mention briefly that "a white woman named Anna Pelly, twenty-four, was found raped and murdered in an alley, strangled to death," or that "a seventeen year old white girl, Eula Ausley, went missing and was found murdered in a forest clearing, her throat slashed from ear to ear." But all of the narrative from that point forward (often for two or three pages) centers on the search for and eventual lynching of the alleged perpetrator.

A book could just as validly be written entitled *At the Hands of Persons Known: A Century of Outrages against White America*, with emphasis on the innocents who were robbed or raped or murdered or kidnapped, followed by a mere sentence or two about what happened to the accused. Of course, the very suggestion of that, under such a title, will seem outlandish; but the fact that it is a mirror image of Dray's own subtitle, *The Lynching of Black America*, shows just how selective and distorted is Dray's approach.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Unfortunately, the bias does not come only from a naive framing of the subject. Dray is committed to the left's view of American history, which has long since become the conventional view. His lengthy narrative account of a century of lynchings, dwelling primarily on those in the South, tells the story in easily readable fashion, and it is apparent that he has done considerable research into those parts of the story that he chooses to emphasize. Most readers, not predisposed to question the conventional account, will find the book yet another demonstration of how cruel, rapacious, and hypocritical white society has been and how much blacks have been the victims of that viciousness. Dray's book will especially help round out the education of young readers who are assigned the book in school.

From the standpoint of intellectual honesty and accuracy, the well-told narrative doesn't make up for its failings, most of them stemming from Dray's leftist myopia. He brings no historical perspective whatever to his eagerness to condemn white society. "Efforts to establish precise numbers...become, at a certain point, meaningless," he says, "... whether their number was 500, 5,000, or 25,000...." We might note that Robert Zangrando, in his book *The NAACP Crusade against Lynching, 1909-1950*, indicates a total of 4,742 between 1882 and 1968. Of these, he says, 1,297 were white and 3,445 black. (*The New York Times* has on at least two occasions reported that all those lynched then were black, but that was the result either of the particular author's dishonesty or sloppiness.)

The number of fewer than 5,000 lynchings over 87 years is hardly "meaningless" when we compare it with the 85 to 100 million victims of Communism estimated by several prominent European scholars in their recent *Black Book of Communism*. Consider, also, the list published in *Insight* magazine of just the more recent genocidal killings:

> Sudan, where 1.5 million plus are dead; Rwanda, where estimates range from 500,000 to 800,000; East Timor, at least 100,000; Sri Lanka, 54,000; Tajikistan, 30,000 to 50,000; Algeria, 70,000 to 80,000; Liberia, 200,000; Chechnya, 80,000; Ethiopia / Eritrea, 10,000 in recent weeks; Iraq, 1 million; and Kosovo, 2,000 prior to the NATO bombing attacks.

These are numbers that are beyond effective human comprehension, but each of the victims lived and breathed, laughed and cried, every bit as much as the blacks that Dray tells about. It is ideology, not an objective view of history, that caused Dray and Random House to select their subject.

The hypocrisy of his leftist ideology is especially apparent when at a number of junctures Dray expresses his condonation of communists. This condonation is a part of contemporary intellectual culture even though it has now been seventy years since a good many Western intellectuals began finally to "hear the screams" and turn away from communism. Dray refers to the Communist theoretician Herbert Aptheker as "the scholar Herbert Aptheker." Of Paul Robeson, he says: "A Communist sympathizer, he was also a strong, unbowed

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

black man....” And to Dray, anti-communism was yet more evidence of America’s depravity, as we see in his references to “the red scare,” “Red baiting,” and “anti-Red paranoia.” He would never write this way if Nazism rather than communism were the form of totalitarianism involved.

Human thought takes so many turns that one is tempted to write a treatise on “the zoology of the human mind.” In that context it is often best just to smile at the results, and it would be unwise to question a speaker’s intellectual honesty. Certainly, I won’t do so here. There is reason, however, to point out some significant “disconnections” in Dray’s thinking.

It seems oddly advantageous for him to cut off his narrative, as he does, in 1965. This leaves the reader with what seems to be a history of struggle for due process and social political equality. If the author had gone just a few months further, he could have told how the “civil rights movement” turned toward “black power” and kicked out its white activists. If he had brought the narrative forward just a short time more, he could have discussed how “equality” transmuted almost immediately into a demand for “compensatory privilege.” More than that, he could have related the American Left’s advance beyond the “black struggle” to use Third World immigration, “multiculturalism,” and an “adversary culture” to swamp the traditional Euro-American society. If Dray had sought a recent subject comparable to his lynching narrative, he could have told the individual stories of the now countless victims of black on black drive by shootings. Instead, he chose to stop in 1965, while the integration movement was still arguably a picture of an underdog seeking justice.

Even though Dray’s book was published in 2002, he strangely fails to add perspective by commenting on contemporary comparisons with much that he discusses. About the Atlanta race riot in 1906, he says that “for blacks, the sense of abandonment during the riot was virtually complete. The police were distinctly unhelpful, and the state militia and federal soldiers stationed at nearby Fort McPherson arrived only after several hours.” It wouldn’t have been out of line for Dray to comment about how similar this was to the Los Angeles riot in May, 1992, when Korean merchants under attack by blacks were left undefended for many hours. Elsewhere, Dray tells how white residents were unwilling to come forward to identify other whites who had taken part in a lynching. It would have helped the reader grasp the universality of much human behavior if Dray had commented upon how little cooperation police receive today from black residents in identifying drive-by shooters. As to the trial of the defendants accused of murdering Emmett Till in 1955, Dray says that the white jury came back with a “not guilty” verdict even though “the known facts that the jury took with them into the deliberation room might, anywhere else in the world, have pointed to a more or less automatic conviction.” Wouldn’t you think Dray would have been moved to comment on how the same thing happened in the O.J. Simpson case with a black jury?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Moreover, Dray's insights are ideologically selective. "American blacks," he says, "were victims of seventeenth and eighteenth century European imperialism." He lets it stand at that, and says nothing about the worldwide British drive to abolish the slave trade or about black African complicity in capturing and selling their fellow blacks into slavery. Of course, there is nothing about slavery having been an institution in a great many societies throughout history.

There is so much lacking in Dray's book that it is difficult to end this review. Before we conclude, however, it is worth noting that at no point is there an effort to understand, with any empathy at all, the concerns of white Americans in those years. They were, it seems, just inexplicably vicious.

Dwight D. Murphey is the author of a legal studies monograph, ***Lynching—History and Analysis****, published by the* ***Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies****. It is an intellectual scandal reminiscent of the Lysenko case in the Soviet Union that Canada has barred entry to the monograph as "hate literature."*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

About the Editors

- **Editor**

Kevin Lamb, a Hoosier native and graduate of Indiana University, with undergraduate degrees in political science and journalism, is a conservative freelance writer who has published in several periodicals, including *National Review*, *Chronicles*, *The Asian Wall Street Journal*, *Society*, *Mankind Quarterly*, *Conservative Review*, *and The Journal of Social, Political & Economic Studies*, and is a frequent contributor to *The Social Contract* and *Right Now!* A former intern at the National Journalism Center (Washington, DC) and former Marine reservist, Mr. Lamb resides with his family near Washington, DC.

- **Associate Editor & Book Editor**

Samuel Francis, Ph.D., is a graduate of Johns Hopkins University (BA, 69) and the University of North Carolina (MA, 71; PhD 79) and former policy analyst with the Heritage Foundation as well as a former U.S. Senate staff member. Formerly an award-winning staff columnist with *The Washington Times*, where he served as editorial writer, 1986-91, and deputy editorial page editor, 1987-91, Dr. Francis writes a nationally syndicated column, is a contributing editor to *Chronicles*, where he writes a monthly column, "Principalities and Powers,"and is currently Editor-in-Chief of the *Citizens Informer*. He is the author of *The Soviet Strategy of Terror*, Heritage Foundation, 1981; *Power and History: The Political Thought of James Burnham*, University Press of America, 1983; *Beautiful Losers: Essays on the Failure of American Conservatism*, University of Missouri Press, 1993; and *Revolution from the Middle*, Middle American Press, 1996. His writings have appeared in major newspapers and magazines, including *The New York Times*, *USA Today*, *National Review*, and *The Spectator* (London). Dr. Francis also serves on the Board of Editorial Advisors for *Modern Age: A Quarterly Review*.

- **Web Edition Editor**

Louis Andrews is a graduate of the College of Charleston (BS, 66) and did graduate work in the Department of History at the University of South Carolina. He is a businessman, web developer, and writer and has been published in *Right Now!*, the *Augusta Chronicle*, and the online journal *pinc*, for which he served as book review editor. He is also the developer and webmaster of the Stalking the Wild Taboo website. Though a native of South Carolina, Mr. Andrews has lived in Augusta, Georgia since 1982.

- **Associate Editor**

Theodore J. O'Keefe studied history and classics at Harvard College. During his career in publishing he has edited several racial-nationalist and historical revisionist periodicals and helped bring numerous books on European and American history and culture into print. O'Keefe has also published many articles on the political and cultural aspects of our civilization's contemporary crisis.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Editorial Advisory Board

Virginia Abernethy, Ph.D., emeritus professor of psychiatry, Vanderbilt University Medical School, is the author of *Population Politics: The Choices that Shape Our Future* (Insight Books, 1993; Transaction 1999), *Population Pressure and Cultural Adjustment* (Human Sciences Press, 1979), and (editor) *Frontiers in Medical Ethics: Applications in a Medical Setting* (Ballinger, 1980). A former editor of *Population and Environment*, she is the author of numerous articles in professional journals and member of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. She is a graduate of Wellesley College (B.A., 1955) and Harvard University (M.A. 1969, Ph.D., 1970).

Frank Ellis, Ph.D., is Lecturer in Russian at the University of Leeds, England, and is the author of *Vasily Grossman: The Genesis and Evolution of a Russian Heretic* (Berg, 1994), *From Glasnost to the Internet: Russia's New Infosphere* (St. Martin's Press, 1999), and *The Macpherson Report: 'Anti-racist' Hysteria and Sovietization of the United Kingdom* (Right Now Press Ltd, 2001). He has published articles on topics that range from Soviet war literature to political correctness. Prior to taking up an academic career he was a professional soldier and served in the Parachute Regiment of the Special Air Service.

Joseph E. Fallon, author of *Deconstructing America: Immigration, Nationality and Statehood* and a co-editor of the seven-volume history *German-Americans in the World Wars*, is a freelance writer / researcher. He began his Masters Degree program at the American University of Cairo, Egypt, and obtained his Masters in International Affairs from Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs.

Wayne Lutton, Ph.D., editor of *The Social Contract*, is a policy analyst and historian. He has published widely on population and immigration concerns. With a Ph.D. in history, Dr. Lutton has been research director for an educational institute and a college professor. He is the author or contributor to many books and monographs, including *The Immigration Time Bomb* (revised 1988) and *The Immigration Invasion*. His articles and reviews have appeared in *Chronicles*, *National Review*, *The Social Contract*, and other journals of scholarship and opinion.

Richard Lynn, Ph.D., professor emeritus of psychology, University of Ulster, Coleraine, Londonderry, Northern Ireland, is the author most recently of *Eugenics: A Reassessment* (Praeger, 2001), *The Science of Human Diversity: A History of the Pioneer Fund* (University Press of America, 2001), and *Dysgenics: Genetic Deterioration in Modern Populations* (Praeger, 1996). Other published writings include "National IQ and Economic Development: A Study of Eighty-One Developing Nations," (with Tatu Vanhanen), *Mankind Quarterly* (Summer 2001), "Geographical Variation in Intelligence," in *The Scientific Study of Human Nature: Tribute to Hans J. Eysenck at Eighty*, (editor) Helmuth Nyborg (Pergamon, 1997), "The Decline of Genotypic Intelligence," and "In Support of the Nutrition Theory," in *The Rising Curve: Long-Term Gains in IQ and Related Measures*, (editor) Ulric Neisser (APA, 1998). A contributor to various monographs and psychological journals, Dr. Lynn's previous books include: *Educational Achievement in Japan: Lessons for the West* (M.E. Sharpe, 1988), (editor) *Dimensions of Personality: Papers in Honour of H.J. Eysenck* (Pergamon, 1981), and *Personality and National Character* (Pergamon, 1971). He currently serves as an editorial advisor to *Mankind Quarterly*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Kevin MacDonald, Ph.D., professor of psychology, California State University-Long Beach, is the editor of *Population and Environment* and former editor of the *Human Behavior and Evolution Society Newsletter*. He is the author most recently of *The Culture of Critique: An Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish Involvement in Twentieth-Century Intellectual and Political Movements* (Praeger, 1998), *Separation and Its Discontents: Toward an Evolutionary Theory of Anti-Semitism* (Praeger, 1998), and *A People that Shall Dwell Alone: Judaism as a Group Evolutionary Strategy* (Praeger, 1994). As a frequent contributor to monographs and author of numerous articles in evolutionary psychology, religion, and ethnic relations, his previous books include *Sociobiological Perspectives on Human Development* (Springer-Verlag, 1988), *Social and Personality Development: An Evolutionary Synthesis* (Plenum, 1988), and (editor) *Parent-Child Play: Descriptions and Implications* (State University of New York Press, 1993).

Brent A. Nelson, Ph.D., a freelance writer, is the author of *America Balkanized—Immigration's Challenge to Government* (American Immigration Control Foundation 1994), as well as numerous articles and book reviews.

James C. Russell, Ph.D., is the author of *The Germanization of Early Medieval Christianity: A Sociohistorical Approach to Religious Transformation* (Oxford University Press, 1994) and has taught classes at Saint Peter's College, New Jersey.

Jared Taylor, editor of *American Renaissance* and president of the New Century Foundation, is a graduate of Yale and of the Paris Institute of Political Studies. He is the author or editor of several books, most recently, *The Real American Dilemma: Race, Immigration, and the Future of America* (New Century Books, 1998) and *Paved With Good Intentions: The Failure of Race Relations in Contemporary America* (Carroll & Graf, 1992).

Derek Turner, editor of the London-based conservative quarterly *Right Now!*, is a British journalist and frequent contributor to *Chronicles* and *The Social Contract*.

Miles D. Wolpin, Ph.D., J.D., is professor emeritus of political science, State University of New York, Potsdam, (NY), and the author of a dozen books, including *Alternative Security and Military Dissent* (Austin & Winfield, 1994) and *America Insecure: Arms Transfers, Global Interventionism, and the Erosion of National Security* (McFarland & Co., 1991), as well as scores of articles on militarism, national security, Third World politics, and immigration. He is a frequent contributor to *The Social Contract*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED